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English Summary
The dissertation is concerned with the management of ecological-economic systems,
especially with policy instruments to promote the ecosystem services such systems
provide. Within the research field of environmental and resource economics, resilience
has become a key concept to give guidance for the management of ecological-economic
systems. However, resilience as an attribute of those systems cannot be alone a
suﬃcient paradigm for a management device e.g. regarding sustainablity, a fallacy
which is often made.
For the attempt to maintain or increase a specific ecosystem service, such as water
purification, landscape beauty or watershed production, policy instruments have been
approved as a means to produce environmental goods and services. Such approval is
embedded in the logic of public goods and market environmentalism: If markets do
not exist the objective is to construct appraisal methods that come as near to the
Free Market ideal as possible. Within design of those instruments the dynamics of
the system which produces an ecosystem service are usually not considered.
The aim of the dissertation is therefore to apply the insights regarding the dyna-
mic of ecological-economic systems and make this knowledge applicable and valuable
for the design of policy instruments. Since many open questions exist regarding the
behavior and the dynamics of ecological-economic systems, the dissertation exhibits
a conceptual and analytical character in large parts. In a fist instance, the relation-
ship between resilience and sustainable development of ecological-economic systems
is discussed in detail by means of an ecological-economic system featuring multiple
stable states. The obtained result is that a deduction from resilience to sustainability,
or vice versa, is not possible. On the basis of the same model the eﬀects of factors
influencing the stability and resilience of a system, such as complementarity of re-
sources and species interaction are analyzed. Thereby the insights and knowledge
about ecological-economic systems are expanded. To make these insights applicable
and valuable for the management of ecological-economic systems the design of policy
instruments is analyzed.
In this respect the focus is on the so called “Payments for Environmental Services”
(PES). Usually a voluntary contract is negotiated between a landowner and some
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institution. As for the application and formalization of this contract relationship a
principal-agent model is adopted for the purpose of the dissertation. The intention
is to analyze and design optimal contracts regarding diﬀerent risk-preferences of the
principal and environmental uncertainty, two factors which might be influenced and
determined by the resilience of the system’s state.
With the adopted model the much discussed question, about the superiority of
performance-based over action-based payments and vice versa is overcome by the
proposal of a combined payment scheme. Within a case study, considering the con-
servation of the Scarce Large Blue (Maculinea teleius), it become obvious that a
combination of performance-based and action-based payments within one contract
scheme generates positive welfare eﬀects.
Summing up, on the one hand the dissertation reveals new insights about the be-
havior and the dynamics of ecological-economic system. On the other hand common
practices of the design of conservation contracts are revised and developed further.
In a synthesis of the dissertation’s results, it is concluded that the design of policy
instruments with respect to the dynamics of ecological-economic systems is a very
promising and recommendable concept. Under the challenge of uncertainty, risks can
be shared more eﬃciently, which might generate positive welfare eﬀects.
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem Management ökologisch-ökono-
mischer Systeme, insbesondere mit Politikinstrumenten, welche die Bereitstellung
von Ökosystemdienstleitungen durch solche Systeme unterstützen. Innerhalb der
Umwelt- und Ressourcenökonomik gilt Resilienz zunehmend als ein Schlüsselkonzept
für das Management von ökologisch-ökonomischen Systemen. Hierbei wird oft jedoch
nicht berücksichtigt, dass Resilienz als eine Eigenschaft ökologisch-ökonomischer Sys-
teme noch keine hinrichtende Bedingung für eine Managementscheidung, z.B. in Hin-
blick auf Nachhaltigkeit, liefert.
Bei dem Bestreben bestimmte Ökosystemdienstleitungen, so genannte “Ecosystem
Services”, zu fördern und zu erhalten, werden für den Bereich öﬀentlicher Güter, zu
denen viele dieser Dienstleistungen gehören, vor allem marktwirtschaftliche Instru-
mente eingesetzt. Bei der Anwendung und Gestaltung dieser werden jedoch bisher
die Eigenschaften von dynamischen Systemen nicht berücksichtigt.
Das Ziel der Dissertation war es daher, neue Erkenntnisse zur Dynamik ökologisch-
ökonomischer Systeme zu gewinnen, und diese bei der Gestaltung von Politikinstru-
menten in den Fokus zu nehmen. Da zu dem Verhalten und zu den Eigenschaften
ökologisch-ökonomischer Systeme noch viele Fragen oﬀen waren und sind, hat die
Arbeit in weiten Teilen einen stark konzeptionellen und analytischen Charakter.
Zunächst wird das Verhältnis des Resilienz-Paradigmas als Eigenschaft ökologisch-
ökonomischer Systeme zu der normativen Forderung nach einer nachhaltigen Ent-
wicklung analysiert. Mit Hilfe eines ökologisch-ökonomischen Modells werden die
unterschiedlichen logischen Möglichkeiten zwischen Resilienz und nachhaltiger Ent-
wicklung dargestellt. Hierbei wird deutlich, dass der logische Schluss von der Resilienz
eines bestimmten Zustandes auf dessen Nachhaltigkeit und umgekehrt nicht möglich
ist. Anhand eben dieses Modells werden die Auswirkungen von Faktoren wie der
Komplementarität bestimmter Ressourcen und Artinteraktionen auf die Stabilität
eines Systems verdeutlicht. Die Erkenntnisse in Bezug auf die Reaktionen ökologisch-
ökonomischer Systeme werden damit erweitert. Um diese Erkenntnisse auch für das
Management ökologisch-ökonomischer Systeme nutzbar zu machen, werden dazu Po-
litikinstrumente untersucht.
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Im Fokus stehen dabei freiwillige Verträge, so genannte “Payments for Environmen-
tal Services” (PES). Innerhalb der Dissertation wird anhand eines Prinzipal-Agenten
Modells, welches zur Darstellung und Formalisierung der Vertragsbeziehungen dient,
analysiert, welche Vertragskombinationen bei verschiedenen Risikoeinstelllungen des
Prinzipals und unter Umweltunsicherheit angeboten werden sollten, um ein opti-
males Ergebnis zu erreichen. Die viel beachtete Diskussion um die Überlegenheit
von maßnahmen- bzw. ergebnisorientierten Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleitungen
wird dabei um den Vorschlag erweitert, innerhalb eines Vertrages ebendiese zu kom-
binierten. Am Beispiel des Schutzes und der Wiederansiedlung des Ameisenbläulings
(Maculinea teleius) wird gezeigt, dass eine Kombination von ergebnis- wie maßnah-
menorientierter Honorierungen innerhalb eines Vertrages positive Wohlfahrtseﬀekte
verspricht.
Insgesamt werden damit zum einen neuen Erkenntnisse zu den Eigenschaften und
den Reaktionen ökologisch-ökonomischer Systeme gewonnen und zum anderen der-
zeit übliche Vertragsnaturschutzmodelle weiterentwickelt und verbessert.
In der Synthese dieser Ergebnisse wird gefolgert, dass die Anpassung von Politik-
instrumenten an die jeweilige Dynamik eines Systems vielversprechend und empfeh-
lenswert ist. So können unter dem Aspekt der Unsicherheit Risiken besser verteilt
und damit Wohlfahrtseﬀekte erzielt werden.
12
Chapter 1
Introduction and Paper Summaries
The management of ecological-economic systems is becoming increasingly complex. On
the one hand, present social and economic objectives have to be fulfilled. On the other
hand, our responsibility with respect to future generations means that we must not de-
plete natural resources. Additionally, natural systems used and managed by humans for
their ecosystem services may exhibit nontrivial dynamics (Baumgärtner et al. 2011). As
a consequence, management addressing the long-term conservation and sustainable use of
ecosystem services is a significant challenge. To successfully address this challenge, it is
important to understand the dynamics of ecological-economic systems.
Within the field of environmental and resource economics, models have been advocated
to emphasize the interconnectivities between ecosystems and economic principles. These
ecological-economic models are characterized through assumptions on both sides i.e. eco-
nomic relations as the management regime, and determinants of the ecosystem such as
the growth rates of the resources in question. Since these ideas are most common within
environmental and resource economics in the recent years, up to this point the theory and
research of non-marketed goods and incentives to maintain these goods are mostly uncon-
sidered regarding a system based view. Therefore, characteristics of ecological-economic
systems such as the level of resilience or the possibility of non-linear reactions have not yet
received any consideration within the design of policy instruments.
The dissertation aims to narrow this research gap by connecting the insights of sys-
tem dynamics with the design of conservation contracting. More precisely the dissertation
is concerned with the management of ecological-economic systems and the provision of
ecosystem services under uncertainty. A major focus will be on policy instruments which
attempt to obtain or maintain specific ecosystem goods or services provided by such sys-
tems. Insights are derived from stylized ecological-economic models and a principal-agent
model together with literature analysis. The central focus of the dissertation is thereby
neither a methodological discussions nor qualitative or quantitative inquiries and although
some of the case studies link to empirical results the main focus is on conceptual insights.
For a foundation the first focus is on the discussion of concepts and terms for the pur-
pose of the dissertation, i.e. the concepts of “resilience”, “sustainability”, and “Payments
for Ecosystem Services”. In a second layer, the properties of ecological-economic systems
providing ecosystem services are analyzed. In a third step concrete enhancements for in-
struments of policy design are proposed, while open questions remain for further research
on how to design conservation contracts with respect to system properties.
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Turning to the field of natural resource management in general, Rist & Moen (2013)
distinguish three approaches for providing a guideline for management decisions: The Eco-
system Approach, Adaptive Management and the paradigm of Resilience Thinking1. For
this thesis the last concept is particularly relevant and will be discussed further.
The focal point of the paradigm of resilience is rooted in Holling’s article (1973) on
stability and non-linear changes in ecosystems (Folke et al. 2010). Regarding this manage-
ment perspective Whitten et al. (2012: 331) state: “Resilience thinking oﬀers a promising
framework for framing environmental risks posed through the non-linear responses of com-
plex systems to natural and human-induced disturbance pressures”. In comparison to other
management paradigms the paradigm of resilience assumes the existence of multiple local
equilibrium, hysteresis, alternative stable states and regime shifts2.
Looking at the paradigm of resilience in more detail, two prominent meanings can be
distinguished. On the one hand, according to Holling (1973), resilience is understood as
“[. . .] the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its
structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior” (Holling & Gun-
derson 2002: 4). In this sense, resilience is thought of as “the capacity of a system to absorb
disturbances and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the
same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.” (Walker et al. 2004: 2). On the other
hand, following Pimm (1984), resilience is defined as the rate at which a system returns to
its equilibrium following a disturbance. This concept has been implemented to calculate
the cost of systems’ recovery after disturbances (Martin 2004).
The dissertation follows Holling’s paradigm of resilience. Ecosystems are thought of as
having diﬀerent “states” or – in alternative terminology – “basins of attraction”. A system
in a certain state is defined by a set of variables e.g. for an agricultural ecosystem such
state variables could be land, crops, livestock, farmers or roads. In one basin of attraction
the system has the same essential structure, function, feedbacks and, therefore, identity
(Walker et al. 2004)3. A regime shift occurs when due to a disturbance a system crosses
a threshold into an alternate basin of attraction4. Due to this disturbance the system is
1For a comprehensive overview and comparison of these diﬀerent management paradigms, their distincti-
ons and similarities with a special focus on the Resilience Thinking approach, see Rist & Moen (2013).
2A system might shift easily from one stable state to another, but much more energy or eﬀort might
be necessary to shift the system back to its initial state. This phenomenon is called “hysteresis” (e.g.
Scheﬀer & Carpenter (2003)).
3For a comprehensive outline of the paradigm of resilience and Resilience Thinking see the pages of the
Resilience Alliance (http://www.resalliance.org) and the Stockholm Resilience Center (SRC) (2013)
(http://www.stockholmresilience.org).
4For a comprehensive study of the background theory of “ecosystem resilience” see Brand (2005).
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then called “not resilient”.
From a human perspective this state might be identified as desirable or undesirable
depending on the desired amount of certain ecosystem services which are either provi-
ded or not provided. Therefore management will either aim at achieving or preventing a
transition into another state of the system. For example: In the semi-arid rangelands of
West Africa, climate conditions are highly variable and uncertain and cause scarce and
spatio-temporally variable resource availability (Jakoby 2011). The most important type
of land-use is livestock grazing and the landscape was initially covered with a mixture of
grassland and shrub vegetation. Recently, the ecosystem underwent radical change as the
excessive appearance of bushes on the grazing areas, also often called “bush encroachment”,
became a serious and apparently unstoppable problem, which caused a lot of concern:
“It can further be concluded that grazing pressure, even with declining stocking rates,
was still inherently too high to utilise the rangelands in a sustainable way and resulted in
a form of vicious cycle. Fear has been expressed that the bounds of resilience of the former
ecosystem have been exceeded. Only by means of external inputs will the original status
of our rangelands be able to be restored” (de Klerk 2004: 22).
In the case of the semi-arid rangelands, the grass-dominated state is preferred to a bush
dominated state insofar as this state provides desired ecosystem services, since in Namibia
agriculture is regarded as the backbone of the economy and the grass dominated state
supports livestock grazing (e.g. de Klerk 2004 and Stehn 2008).
By the same argument, the focus of ecosystem management strategies is often on the
maintenance of a given system state, without reflecting the characteristics and desirability
of possible alternative stable states. However, another perspective would be to ask how
a diﬀerent state of the system could meet the needs of a society, and if for example, the
benefits of transforming the system to an alternative state would outweigh the costs of
maintaining the given state. To decide which state is desirable and which is not, clear
definitions are necessary: What management expects from any given states, and which
services an ecosystem should provide. Such expectations might be e.g. supply of food,
energy or recreation, which can be subsumed as ecosystem services as e.g. the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MA) indicates (2005). The more precisely such expectations are
articulated the clearer it becomes which state of the system management should aim to
achieve.
Adopting a sustainability perspective constitutes one way to formulate such criteria.
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) defines sustainable
development as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED 1987). More precisely in the
15
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terminology of this dissertation a state hereafter corresponds to the claims of sustainability
if the utility of the ecosystem services this state provides do not fall below a certain baseline
over time5.
Policy instruments have been approved as a means to procure environmental goods and
services. Such approval is embedded in the logic of public goods and market environmen-
talism: If markets do not exist the objective is to construct appraisal methods that come
as near to the Free Market ideal as possible (Vatn 2009 and Corbera 2007). Environmental
and resource management encompasses many policy instruments such as taxes, subsidies
and tradable permits. In general one can distinguish between regulatory and economic
instruments for the enhancement and conservation of environmental goods and services.
Regulatory instruments influence the actions of an agent directly, e.g. because of sancti-
ons enforcing certain actions. In contrast, the aim of economic instruments is to influence
actions and choices of the agent indirectly by varied restrictions or incentives (Matzdorf
2004).
On this basis, the dissertation recognizes incentives as the focal point for the provision
of public goods, such as environmental goods, and as a possibility to maintain or achieve a
certain desired state of a system. This broadens the view to the whole literature of Contract
Theory, Incentive Theory and principal-agent models6. In this context the question of
the “right” incentives and optimal contracts between principal and agent is discussed by
means of analytical models. Up to this point the existing literature regarding the theory
of contracts focuses on labor economics and production of manufactured goods (Bolton &
Dewatripont 2005). By contrast, applications to the domain of environmental and resource
economics are sparse7. One main aim of the dissertation therefore is to apply the analytical
framework of contract theory to the field of policy design and especially to the design of
conservation contracts.
Conservation contracts usually fall into two subcategories of payment schemes: (i) pay-
ments which are bound to a specified performance or outcome, hereafter called performance-
based payments and (ii) payments which are bound to some defined management, hereafter
5This notion corresponds to a concept of “weak sustainability” (Ott & Döring 2004).
6As described in detail within Chapter 8 a person (hereafter called an agent) e.g. a land owner, is
rewarded for the environmental service he provides. Within a framework of PES the contracts are
usually voluntary. Therefore, one challenge is to incentivize the agent’s participation.
7While many practical examples can be found a consideration of conservation contracts within a frame-
work of contract theory and on a conceptual level is surprisingly rare, see Zabel & Roe (2009) for one
example.
16
1 Introduction and Paper Summaries
called action-based payments8.
Up to this point, action-based payments are the most established form of conservation
contracting. Their advantages are notable if actions are directly bound to the outcome or
if a specific management itself is an aim of the contract, e.g. low use of fertilizer, or a spe-
cific mowing regime. With information asymmetry, i.e. the agent is better informed about
the best input level, performance-based payments allow the agent to find the best way to
generate a desired level of an ecosystem service without determining her actions9. Howe-
ver, as the dissertation considers, external influences (e.g. disease, floods, and droughts)
aﬀect the provision of those services. Therefore performance-based payments are usually
applied for the conservation of a state already existing e.g. high levels of biodiversity, to
minimize the risk of the assumed risk-averse agent (Osterburg 2006 and Hampicke 2001).
Action-based payments are then applied for cases with uncertain outcomes, especially if
the principal can be assumed as risk-neutral. A drawback of this scenario, however, is that
information asymmetries and uncertainty of the contract outcome might appear together.
In these cases one cannot decide for an exclusively performance-based or an exclusively
action-base payment scheme for optimality.
The dissertation thesis investigates a combination of these payment schemes for the
case of uncertainty and information asymmetries between principal and agent. With the
adopted model the much discussed question concerning the superiority of performance-
based over action-based payments and vice versa is overcome by the proposal of a combined
payment scheme. Within a case study, considering the conservation of the Scarce Large
Blue Butterfly (Maculinea teleius), it becomes obvious that a combination of performance-
based and action-based payments within one contract scheme generates positive welfare
eﬀects.
Within the literature concerning the PES field, diﬀerent payment schemes regard dif-
ferent social and economic aspects. A contract design regarding the dynamic and specific
situation of an ecological-economic system has not yet been conducted although policy
instruments, which aim to prevent or achieve a special environmental service by inducing
a certain management strategy, are heavily dependent for their success on the knowledge
of the ecosystem and e.g. species interactions, regime shifts and tipping points. The thesis
aims to narrow this research gap by connecting the insights of system dynamics to the de-
sign of conservation contracts and management strategies as a leading research paradigm
8Advantages and disadvantages regarding both payment schemes are discussed within the specification of
Chapter 6. Further literature readings e.g. Ferraro & Kiss (2002) and Matzdorf (2004) are recommended.
9Within principal-agent models and contract theory the agent is usually denoted as “she” whereas the
principal is denoted as “he”.
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since up to this point specific characteristics of systems receive no consideration. In detail,
connecting the perspectives discussed above led to the following specific research questions
and propositions for the dissertation:
Within this context the dissertation focuses on one recently much discussed framework
for the maintenance and support of public goods: The concept of “Payments for Environ-
mental“ or “Ecosystem Services” (PES) (e.g. Wunder 2005 and Pagiola 2008). The terms
“Payments for Environmental Services” and “Payments for Ecosystem Services” are fre-
quently used as synonyms but also as discrete concepts. A literature overview revises the
general terminology of environmental and ecosystem services is presented in Chapter 2,
asking how “Payments for Environmental Services” might be defined in a consistent way.
In Chapter 3 the management of coupled ecological-economic systems which provide eco-
system services such as the semi-arid rangelands in Namibia is addressed on a conceptual
level. Insights considering this research study have been leading to the general question
whether resilience of an ecological-economic system state is a precondition for sustaina-
bility or not; a proposition which often has been made in the literature. Regarding this
question, the logical relationship of resilience as a property of ecological-economic systems
and sustainability as a normative claim is analyzed on the basis of an ecological-economic
model (Chapter 4).
During the work with the ecological-economic model of Chapter 4 it becomes obvious
that the stability landscape of the model changes rapidly with changes of assumptions re-
garding the relationship between species and the options of assessing the resources10. In this
respect the model is studied further, to understand the driving forces of ecological-economic
systems (Chapter 5). Up to this point characteristics of ecological-economic systems such
as the level of resilience or the possibility of non-linear reactions receive no consideration
within the design of conservation contracts. Aiming to narrow this research gap, the first
question is which combination of payment schemes are preferable regarding a socially op-
timal result. In Chapter 6 a principle-agent model is used to help elucidate the contract
relationship. Within this framework of a model, analysis varying environmental uncertainty
and diﬀerent levels of risk-aversion are considered.
To conclude, the dissertation reveals new insights about the behavior and the dynamics
of ecological-economic system and common practices of the design of conservation con-
tracts are revised and developed further. In a synthesis of the dissertation’s results, it is
10The term “stability landscape” is intended here to address the inherent dynamic and stability properties
of the whole system. As similarly used by Walker et al. (2004), imagine a 3-dimensional state space
with all equilibria and tipping points of the systems, one can imagine a picture of hills and valleys,
shaping the “stability landscape” of the system.
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concluded that the design of policy instruments with respect to the dynamics of ecological-
economic systems is a very promising and recommendable concept. Under the challenge
of uncertainty, risks can be shared more eﬃciently, which might generate positive welfare
eﬀects.
The published papers of the dissertation thesis are here summarized:
Chapter 2: What are PES? - A review of definitions and an extension
Chapter 2 compares and contrasts existing definitions of the term PES in the literature
(Derissen & Latacz-Lohmann 2013). Since PES is widely used either as “Payments for
Ecosystem Services” or “Payments for Environmental Services” as a first step, definitions
of ecosystem services and environmental services are discussed. This discussion points to
coexistence of diﬀerent definitions with diﬀerent meanings. Some authors diﬀerentiate the
two terms while others use ecosystem and environmental services synonymously. Similar-
ly, some authors use the terms “Payments for Environmental Services” and “Payments
for Ecosystem Services” as synonyms while others distinguish them to describe distinct
concepts.
These terminological inconsistencies lead to the question which term to use within this
dissertation thesis. The thesis is explicitly concerned with the framework and concept of
conservation contracting. In this context, environmental services are regarded as public
goods. Such public goods are not supplied in suﬃcient quantities if individuals act in their
own self-interest (e.g. Ferraro & Kiss (2002) on biodiversity). This is why incentives are
given to initiate their production. The chapter focuses on a debate in Germany where
landowners receive rewards for certain actions or omittance of actions. Thus these “Ho-
norierung ökologischer Leistungen” constitute a payment for the eﬀort of the landowner.
Such eﬀorts of landowners are generally not mentioned in definitions of environmental and
ecosystem services.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), for example, considers ecosystem services
as all the benefits people obtain from nature but not as services some agent conduct for
an enlargement or maintenance of such goods. More precisely: “[. . .] provisioning services
such as food and water; regulating services such as regulation of floods, drought, land de-
gradation, and disease; supporting services such as soil formation and nutrient cycling; and
cultural services such as recreational, spiritual, religious and other nonmaterial benefits”
(MA 2005: 27).
In a similar sense Pagiola (2008) refers to environmental services, for example of forests
and landscapes, as of mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, provisioning services such as
energy production and irrigation but also provision of landscape beauty for recreation and
19
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tourism. Only the FAO made a distinction in accordance to this consideration described
above, stating that “[. . .] environmental services are externalities, unintentionally provided
while producing, for example, food and timber for sale or direct consumption”11. Since no
consistent meaning could be found according to a literature survey and recent definitions
do not suﬃciently reflect the man-made nature of biodiversity, the dissertation proposes a
consistent definition for the two terms ecosystem and environmental services in the PES
context.
Summarizing, the definition of ecosystem services, as applied within the dissertation,
corresponds to the definition of the MA. The definition of environmental services corre-
sponds in most part to the definition of the FAO, extending it and explicitly focusing on
the meaning of environmental services as intentionally provided services. Therefore within
the whole dissertation the term environmental service is used to refer to human induced
ecosystem services, whereas services from “nature” without human intervention are called
ecosystem services. The term PES is referred to as “Payments for Environmental Services”
to underline that humans are rewarded for their actions and services i.e. environmental ser-
vices, while the connotation of “Payments for Ecosystem Services” was found as redundant.
Chapter 3: Resilienz und nachhaltige Entwicklung von semi-aridem Weideland
in Namibia
Chapter 3 focuses on resilience semi-arid rangelands in Namibia (Derissen 2009). Academic
discussion of resilience and dynamic of semi-arid rangelands and its implications for ma-
nagement started with Holling’s remarks on resilience and grazing ecosystems in 1973 and
continuing with Walker & Noy-Meir in the early 80’s and their article about the ’Aspects
of the Stability and Resilience of Savanna Ecosystems’ (Walker & Noy-Meir 1982). Up to
this point the management of rangelands based on the paradigm of resilience was firmly
established12.
Within the savanna ecosystem of rangelands the system is thought to have at least two
diﬀerent basins of attraction, one grass-dominated and one bush-dominated state. Concern
is raised that the system shifts from the former to the latter. To what extend grazing im-
pacts the shift from the grass-dominated to the bush-dominated state is a matter of intense
academic debate (see Vetter 2005, Briske et al. 2003 and Jakoby 2011). Some authors (e.g.
de Klerk 2004 and Perrings & Walker 1997) argue that the absence of frequent burning
11http://www.fao.org/es/esa/pesal/aboutPES1.html
12The management of coral reefs (Hughes et al. 2003) and the stylized model of the shallow lake (Mäler
et al. 2003) are examples of topics often raised which link the resilience paradigm to ecosystems.
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and climate change are the key factors stimulating bush encroachment. Jakoby (2011) on
the other hand, states that livestock grazing in combination with low precipitation has a
substantial negative impact on the vigor of grass and vegetation conditions.
The main utilization of the rangelands is livestock grazing. Thus, the society is currently
dependent on and aligned to the grass-dominated state which constitutes the desired state
of the system. Managing eﬀorts aim at keeping the system in this actual state. From
this perspective it is important to identify and assess the relationship and interactions
of the system components to find new and adjust approved management strategies to
maintain the grass-dominant state. By contrast, this chapter reflects this ambition. It asks
for possibilities to use the bush-dominated state in a way that allows that society to gain
the same or at least a suﬃcient amount of utility in comparison to the utility that society
gains from a grass-dominated state. In general the question was raised if the current state
of a system is necessarily to be protected or are there other adaptation possibilities. The
case study sets up the conceptual background for one of the leading research questions
of the dissertation: Is resilience of a systems state a precondition for sustainability of an
ecological-economic system?
On the basis of the described case study research conjectures have been formulated: As
for a case of a system state which is highly resilient but does not provide an ecosystem
service on a desired level, resilience might be an obstacle due to a regime shift into a
desired state of the system. Additionally a system which can provide a desired level of
ecosystem services within two system states would not be dependent on the resilience of
one system state. Therefore resilience might be necessary or not for sustainability depending
on the initial system state. Chapter 4 verified these hypotheses on a basis of an analytical
ecological-economic model featuring multiple basins of attraction.
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Chapter 4: The relationship between resilience and sustainability in ecological-
economic systems
Chapter 4 analyses the question if resilience is a precondition for sustainability (Derissen
et al. 2011). As discussed within the introduction, society regards a system within a certain
basin of attraction as desirable or undesirable depending on the flows of goods or services
it yields. Before management decisions can be made one has to decide which state of a
system should be reached or avoided and under a paradigm of sustainability a desired
state should be maintained in the long term. Sustainable development in this sense can be
understood as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED 1987); a definition the thesis
refers to. Thus, concerning obligations towards future generations, the primary question of
sustainability is to what extent ecosystem services, and therefore certain resources, have
to be maintained to enable future generations to meet their needs.
Some authors argue that resilience is a precondition for this long term maintenance,
which raises the question of how the concepts of resilience and sustainability are connected
in general and how the paradigm of resilience frames sustainability. The dissertation was
concerned to present and define resilience and sustainability in both analytical and concep-
tual way. A system state in terms of the dissertation therefore falls within sustainability if
the associated ecosystem service, which a society generates utility from does not fall below
a certain baseline, here called the “sustainability threshold”. This requirement corresponds
to a conception of “weak sustainability” as defined by Ott & Döring (2004). As for the
paradigm of resilience the definition of Holling (1973) was chosen, as described. Here resi-
lience is understood as “[. . .] the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the
system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior”
(Holling & Gunderson 2002: 4).
It can be assumed that a desired state has a better chance to be maintained in the long
run if the system state is resilient to many disturbances. But is the resilience of a given
system state therefore necessary for sustainability i.e. the maintenance of the stock flow,
in the long run? In this respect the dissertation sets out to contribute to this question
while reflecting the relation of resilience in ecological-economic systems to sustainability
i.e. the maintenance of natural capital (and capital flow) over time. In the first instance
the chapter of the dissertation reflects definitions and perspectives of recent literature:
Resilience is often seen as a precondition for a sustainability, for example in Lebel et al.
(2006) and (Holling & Walker 2003). Levin et al. (1998: 221) argue that “[. . .] the concept of
resilience oﬀers a useful way of thinking about the sustainability not just of environmental
processes, but of social and economic processes as well”. On the other hand, if a system
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state is undesirable, resilience would obviously be an obstacle to sustainability. Examples
of such “lock-in” situations which are in the way of change have been identified by Hanna
et al. (1996), like for example cultural or institutional settings or the dependence on a
specific technology. In this sense Holling & Walker (2003: 1) noted that “[r]esilience, per
se, is not necessarily a good thing. Undesirable system configurations (e.g. Stalin’s regime,
collapsed fish stocks) can be very resilient, [. . .]”.
Up to this point two scenarios therefore have been addressed: A system is either within
desired system state and should be maintained there or it is trapped within an undesired
state with the necessity of change. The statements quoted above do not take into account
the following possibilities, which are addressed by the dissertation: Due to the assumed
system properties a certain, desired amount of natural capital can fall below a given su-
stainability threshold even within a basin of attraction. Additionally, given a system with
multiple stable states, more than one basin of attraction can yield the desired level of
utility.
As a consequence, a system with a desired system state which is not resilient against a
certain disturbance might change its basin of attraction because of such disturbance. In
doing so, it could reach a new basin of attraction which does also qualify as a desired state
in respect to sustainability. Thus, the system management might still achieve sustainability
of the system, even if the basin of attraction has changed. In general, four relationships
between resilience and sustainability are logically possible. These are discussed with their
assumptions within the dissertation thesis: a) resilience of the system is necessary, but not
suﬃcient, for sustainability; b) resilience of the system is suﬃcient, but not necessary, for
sustainability; c) resilience of the system is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for sustainabi-
lity; and d) resilience of the system is both necessary and suﬃcient for sustainability. Any
of those may hold in a given system.
On the basis of a simple dynamic ecological-economic system with multiple stable states
the first paper of the dissertation shows that resilience is not a goal in itself. Rather, it
only constitutes a necessary and suﬃcient criterion for sustainability in cases where no
other systems state exists, which corresponds to the claim of sustainability (Derissen et al.
2011). As a consequence, one may conclude that resilience is neither desirable in itself nor
is it in general a necessary or suﬃcient condition for sustainability. Thus, in general the
deduction from sustainability to resilience, or vice versa, is not possible. In particular, the
property of resilience should not be confused with the positive normative connotations of
sustainability.
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Chapter 5: Consumer preferences determine resilience of ecological-economic
systems
Ecosystem shifts may threaten the inter-temporal eﬃciency of ecosystem services, although
such shifts do not necessarily imply such deterioration in ecosystem service provision (see
Chapter 4 and Derissen et al. 2011). Furthermore, the resilience of an ecological-economic
system and the stability landscape of such systems is neither immutable nor and always
stable. Working with the ecological-economic model of Chapter 4 it was becoming quite
obvious that the dynamic of the ecological-economic system’s responses to changes of sever-
al variables of the model with quite diﬀerent outcomes regarding the stability landscapes
(Baumgärtner et al. 2011).
Horan et al. (2011) point out that the stability landscape of an ecological-economic sys-
tem may be changed through institutional arrangements. As shown within this chapter,
altering access to resources, complementarities of ecosystem services and species competi-
tion also induce a change to the dynamic of an ecological-economic system. The literature
shows that species interaction and competition can destabilize the dynamic property of
a system (e.g. Ives & Carpenter 2007 and Scheﬀer 2009). However, the consequences of
changing economic resource use have so far not yet been investigated in detail. Chapter
5 analyzes which driving forces aﬀect the alteration of systems’ resilience and proves that
consumer preferences change the resilience and stability landscapes of ecological-economic
systems13.
With respect to the ecosystem management, resilience as a descriptive concept does
not necessarily provide guidance for the “right” actions and has to be seen as a merely
descriptive concept (Derissen et al. 2011). Moreover since in the given meaning a system
only is declared resilient ex post, i.e. after a disturbance took place. With respect to this
certain disturbance no management advices are possible ex ante. Consequently, another
concept is needed to guide management recommendations before a disturbance took place,
together with a prescriptive guideline of a desired state. For this purpose it is necessary
to measure resilience to estimate the probabilities of a given system state to change into
another basin of attraction (Baumgärtner et al. 2011).
To analyze and describe a change of the resilience of an ecological-economic system ne-
cessitates measuring resilience. This constitutes a matter of ongoing debate (Brand 2009).
Carpenter et al. (2005) assume that resilience cannot be measured directly. Instead they
argue, it is necessary to draw on surrogates such as ecological redundancy, response diver-
sity (e.g. Bellwood et al. 2003 and Bengtsson et al. 2003) or the concept of maintained
13Consumer preferences are understood as preferences that consumers hold over directly consumed com-
modities of the ecosystem and the interrelation of the given resources.
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system identity (Cumming et al. 2005)14. These could be used as indicators for resilience.
Within this chapter resilience is not measured directly and quantitatively but the resilience
of the ecological-economic system is said to decrease as the distance between correspon-
ding stability basins decreases, and also as the number of alternative basins of attraction
increases15.
Within a stylized ecological-economic model an ecosystem under natural conditions, i.e.
with no harvest, is firstly simulated based on a Lodka-Volterra model for a baseline. Se-
condly, a system under open access and profit-maximizing resource harvesting is analyzed.
The setting is similar to the model of Chapter 4: Two resources are harvested for a society’s
well-being, and consumers’ utility is based on the ecosystem services the resources provide.
Additionally to that, low complementarity between the resources is assumed with no inter-
species competition. The system is then studied under rising complementarity between the
ecosystem resources and with an increase of the competition between the species. Finally,
the alterations of the system’s stability landscape are compared with the system’s natural
dynamics.
Summarizing the results, Chapter 5 demonstrates that consumer preferences are an im-
portant determinant of the dynamic characteristics of coupled ecological-economic systems.
In detail three destabilizing eﬀects have been identified for the assumed ecological-economic
model which genuinely stems from consumer preferences in an ecological system used for
economic purposes: At first profit-maximizing harvesting by competitive firms under open
access considerably weakens the resilience of the basin of attraction as compared to the
natural dynamics. Second, complementarity of ecosystem services in consumption signifi-
cantly reduces the resilience of the system’s interior equilibrium where both species are in
existence. Finally increased competition between species destabilizes the system and may
lead to multiple basins of attraction.
14For a comprehensive overview of the discussion on the measuring of resilience see Brand (2009).
15Notice that in Chapter 4, resilience is described with regard to a specific disturbance.
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Chapter 6: Combining performance-based and action-based payments under
uncertainty
The final paper of the dissertation thesis presents a concrete design proposal for conser-
vation contracts (Derissen & Quaas 2013). As described within the introduction, usually
two subcategories of payment schemes are distinguished: (i) performance-based payments
and (ii) action-based payments. Action-based payments are bound to the implementation
of predefined actions whereas with a performance-based payment agents are rewarded for
the maintenance or achievement of a concrete conservation objective. Within the literature
the advantages and disadvantages of both payment schemes are discussed at large which
are summarized here16.
One predefined action might be eﬃcient in one agricultural business but not in another,
and the best action alternatives might change due to changes in seasonal annual weather
conditions or because of internal changes of the farm structure. Since the agent is assumed
to be better informed about the conditions of her land, a loss of eﬃciency might be the
result in the case of action-based payments.
For performance-based payment schemes it is assumed that better incentives are pro-
vided for the agent to innovate and find the most cost-eﬀective action to produce the
desired ecosystem good. In addition to this, performance-based payments can support the
cooperation between farmers although an advantage can obviously only be presumed if
the environmental good is necessarily bound to the protection of a bigger area. Another
advantage is that the principal in many cases cannot validate the actions or compliance
in detail for an action-based contract, whereas performance-based payments are only paid
out if the desired goal was achieved.
With all these arguments, the literature assumes performance-based payments are pre-
ferable to action-based payments: “If we want to get what we pay for, we must start tying
our investments directly to our goals” (Ferraro & Kiss 2002: 1719). However as indicated
within the introduction of the thesis this, as always, depends on the context and goals: In
the case of an action-based payment the burden of risk to produce a desired environmental
good is at the expense of the principal, since the agent is paid for the predefined actions
and not for the achievement of the intended goal. On the other hand performance-based
payments bear a greater risk for the agent, since the performance of the environmental
good is in most cases not only dependent on their actions but on external circumstances
as well, which modifies the performance. In this case the agent eventually would not con-
sent to a performance-based payment scheme since a payment might not compensate their
16See for example Hampicke (2001), Ferraro & Kiss (2002) and Matzdorf (2004).
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expenditure costs.
Therefore with this argument an action-based contract is chosen in many cases regardless
of the disadvantages of action-based payment schemes in case of e.g. cooperation marked-
ability, self-interest of the agent or compliance. Performance-based payments are usually
applied for the conservation of an already given state of existent biodiversity (Hampicke
2001). Or in addition to performance-based payments, a base-payment might be oﬀered
to compensate the agent’s opportunity costs of the conservation contract (Zabel & Roe
2009).
So naturally the question arises: How can contracts be designed to deal with risks of
the production and can risk be fairly distributed for the desired environmental good and
include the advantages of performance-based payments, such as lower probabilities of chea-
ting, more self-interest and cooperation? Furthermore, since uncertainty and information
asymmetries are not interdependent but likely to be positively associated, the disserta-
tion presents a combination of both payment schemes. Within this chapter, insights are
developed with the help of a principal-agent model. With diﬀerent assumptions regarding
the risk profile of the principal and with diﬀerent uncertainty levels for the production
of the ecosystem good, the optimal combination of performance-based and action-based
payments are examined. Furthermore the model has been modified to demonstrate the
situation regarding the case for a risk-averse regulator. Here, the situation changes as fol-
lows: While the regulator is not directly aﬀected through environmental uncertainty, he is
indirectly through the farmer’s choice of action, since the farmer chooses his actions consi-
dering environmental uncertainty. Thus, the performance-based payment tends to pay out
less favorably compared to the action-based payment for the regulator.
As a result of the model’s insights, it can be concluded that an exclusively performance-
based payment is optimal only if there is no environmental uncertainty or if both the
farmer and the regulator are risk-neutral. An exclusively action-based payment is optimal
only if the regulator has full information about the productivity of the action i.e. if there
is no information asymmetry. In every other case a combination of performance-based and
action-based payments (with diﬀerent weightings) increases welfare.
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What are PES? - A review of definitions and an extension
Abstract: The term PES is often used to denote market incentives for the provision of
public goods within the field of environmental and resource issues. In this context, PES
translates into either “Payments for Environmental Services” or “Payments for Ecosystem
Services” - the terms that are not consistently defined in the literature and sometimes used
as synonyms. Given the lack of coherent definitions, this note reviews current definitions
of payments for ecosystem services and payments for environmental services entertained in
the literature, discusses alternative meanings of environmental and ecosystem services in
the PES context, and finally proposes a consistent definition. We argue that current defi-
nitions of PES found in the literature are insuﬃcient to adequately describe the man-made
nature of many environmental goods and services: that nature is ’produced’ through human
intervention. Building upon the FAO’s definition of environmental services, we propose a
definition that regards environmental services as services provided through countryside
management in a broader sense whilst produced either unintentionally or intentionally.
Keywords: PES, ecosystem services, environmental services, conservation contracting,
market-based incentives
JEL-Classification: Q57
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2.1 Introduction
Public goods are not normally provided in suﬃcient quantities, but often produced as by-
product or externality of primary production activities. One response to this market failure
has been for governments and NGOs to implement policies and incentives which reward
landholders to maintain or enhance such goods.
The acronym PES has been widely used to refer to these "nascent market creation in-
centive mechanisms"(Pascual & Perrings 2007: 256). However, diﬀerent authors use PES
with diﬀerent definitions in mind, and there exists no agreement in the literature what
PES actually means. “ES” is translated either as environmental or as ecosystem services.
Concerning this terminological inconsistency, it is interesting to note that ecosystem ser-
vices is the more explicitly defined term in the literature and most authors agree about its
meaning, whereas the definition of environmental services is more ambiguous. This raises
the question as to how the terms “Payments for Environmental Services” and “Payments
for Ecosystem Services” are to be interpreted.
Against this background, this commentary sets out to: (i) review definitions of ecosystem
services and environmental services entertained in the literature; (ii) discuss alternative
meanings of environmental and ecosystem services in the PES context; and (iii) propose a
consistent definition of the terms.
2.2 Review of terms and definitions
2.2.1 Ecosystem services versus environmental services
Initiated in 2001 by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (MA) aimed at assessing the consequences of ecosystem change for
human well-being and establishing the scientific basis for actions needed to enhance the
conservation and sustainable use of those systems and their contribution to human well-
being17. The MA reports provided a definition of ecosystem services which has become
widely accepted in the academic community. In fact, most authors have subsequently drawn
on the MA’s definition of ecosystem services as a key reference (Corbera et al. 2007, Kroeger
& Casey 2007, Pascual & Perrings 2007, Engel et al. 2008, Jack et al. 2008, Chen et al.
2009, Carpenter et al. 2009, Leimona et al. 2009, Norgaard 2010, Pascual et al. 2010,
Sommerville et al. 2009, Swallow et al. 2009, Zabel & Roe 2009).
According to the MA, ecosystem services are all the benefits people obtain from ecosys-
tems. These include "[. . .] provisioning services such as food and water; regulating services
such as regulation of floods, drought, land degradation, and disease; supporting services
17http://www.maweb.org/en/About.aspx.
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such as soil formation and nutrient cycling; and cultural services such as recreational, spi-
ritual, religious and other nonmaterial benefits"(MA 2005: 27). Along the same lines, the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) describes ecosystem ser-
vices as: "[. . .] all benefits that humans receive from ecosystems. These benefits can be
direct (e.g. food production) or indirect, through the functioning of ecosystem processes
that produce the direct services"(FAO 2012a)18.
Definitions are less clear cut when it comes to environmental (as opposed to ecosystem)
services, and attempts to distinguish the one from the other add to the confusion. There
are barely two authors sharing the same definition of the term environmental services. The
following review does neither claim nor intend to be exhaustive; it rather aims to provide
an overview of definitions and of how the terms environmental and ecosystem services are
used and interpreted in the literature.
The FAO states that the terms ecosystem services and environmental services are so-
metimes used interchangeably. However, the FAO considers environmental and ecosystem
services as distinct concepts. On the one hand, environmental services are characterized
as externalities, unintentionally provided while producing food or timber for sale or direct
consumption, whereas ecosystem services are defined, according to the MA characterizati-
ons, as all the benefits that people obtain from ecosystems, as shown above. Environmental
services are seen as a subset of ecosystem services (FAO 2012b)19.
Muradian et al. (2010: 1202) provide another definition which in some way gives an
opposite meaning to the FAO’s understanding of environmental services while explicit-
ly refering to the distinction of ecosystem services and environmental services by noting
"[. . .] that ecosystem services is a subcategory of the former, dealing exclusively with the
human benefits derived from natural ecosystems. Environmental services also comprise be-
nefits associated with diﬀerent types of actively managed ecosystems, such as sustainable
agricultural practices and rural landscapes". Apparently, Muradian et al. (2010) consider
environmental services not to be a subset of ecosystem services, as assumed by the FAO.
Conversely, they regard ecosystem services as a subset of environmental services.
Myers (1996) also regards ecosystem services as a subset of environmental services, but
in his definition the crucial factor for distinguishing between both categories is the scale
of the service: Ënvironmental services are also known as ecosystem services, both terms
reflecting environmental functions and ecological processes. They can be defined as any
functional attribute of natural ecosystems that are demonstrably beneficial to humankind.
The term environmental services is preferred since it embraces the larger-scale and often
18http://www.fao.org/es/esa/pesal/aboutPES1.html.
19http://www.fao.org/es/esa/pesal/aboutPES2.html.
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more important services [. . .]"(Myers 1996: 2764). With reference to Scherr et al. (2004),
Wunder (2005) finally considers environmental services to be separable in nature, whereas
the term ecosystem services "probably has a more integral interpretation, implying that
multiple services cannot always be broken up into additive components"(Wunder 2005: 4).
Pagiola (2008), quoting the Forest Law No.7575 of Costa Rica, refers to the mitigation
of greenhouse gas emissions, hydrological services and to the provision of science beauty
as environmental services. This definition does not add clarity to the distinction between
ecosystem and environmental service since the description seems congruent with the MA’s
definition of ecosystem services (MA 2005). Therefore one might assume that the terms
have been used interchangeably. Myers (1996), Engel et al. (2008) and FAO (2012a,b,c)
also note that environmental services and ecosystem services are often used as synonyms.
2.2.2 Payments for ecosystem versus payments for environmental services
At the international scale, the debate about payments for ecosystem or environmental ser-
vices has attracted increasing attention (e.g. Ferraro & Kiss 2002, Wunder 2005, Pagiola
et al. 2007, Engel et al. 2008, Ferraro 2008, Pascual et al. 2010, Rodríguez et al. 2011, Gar-
bach et al. 2012, Xuan To et al. 2012). The debate focuses inter alia on the institutional
background needed to implement PES schemes, especially how such schemes can be imple-
mented in the context of weak institutions, and how in developing countries PES schemes
might help to benefit the poor and contribute to a more eﬃcient and equal distribution
of resources (e.g. Wunder et al. 2008, Bulte et al. 2008, Muradian et al. 2009, Norgaard
2010). Naturally, PES was not the first and only term which refers to the maintenance and
enhancement of amenities provided by nature. Other terms include, in chronological order:
• Conservation payments (Ferraro & Simpson 2002)
• Rewards for ecological goods (Gerowitt et al. 2003)
• Agri- environmental payments (Cooper 2003)
• Payment schemes for environmental services (Tomich et al. 2004)
• Agri-environmental subsidies (Wittig et al. 2006)
• Rewards for ecosystem services (Pascual & Perrings 2007)
• Rewards for environmental services (Leimona et al. 2009)
• Compensation and rewards for environmental services (Swallow et al. 2009)
• Incentive Payments (Ferraro & Gjertsen 2009)
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• Payments for agrobiodiversity conservation services (Narloch et al. 2011)
However with the acronym PES emerging, the number of sources using PES as a reference
has been increasing. It is thus warranted to take a closer look at the PES term. The origin of
the PES term can be traced back to a World Bank report in 2000 (World Bank 2000). Here
the abbreviation PES emerges for a new policy framework in Costa Rica called "pagos por
servicios ambientales"(PSA). Within the glossary of the World Bank report the program
is denoted (with an English equivalence) as "Payments for environmental services"(PES).
We have not been able to identify an earlier source and thus conclude, with the usual
caution, that the term PES originates from the World Bank report.
The list of authors using the acronym PES in the sense of payments for ecosystem
services is extensive. Without laying claim to completeness, the term was used by: Corbera
et al. (2007), Pascual & Perrings (2007), Bulte et al. (2008), Jack et al. (2008), Clements
et al. (2010), Norgaard (2010), Chen et al. (2009) and Milder et al. (2010), van de Sand
(2012), Garbach et al. (2012). By contrast, the following authors regard PES as payments
for environmental services20: Wunder (2005, 2007), Wunder et al. (2008), Zbinden & Lee
(2005), Zilberman et al. (2006), Sierra & Russman (2006), Pascual & Perrings (2007),
Ferraro (2008), Pagiola (2008), Engel et al. (2008), Muradian et al. (2010), Pascual et
al. (2010), Zabel & Roe (2009), Sommerville et al. (2009), Vatn (2010), Rodríguez et al.
(2011), García-Amado et al. (2011), Tacconi (2012).
What distinguishes payments for environmental services from payments for ecosystem
services? According to Wunder (2005) and Bulte et al. (2008), PES are defined as “Pay-
ments for Environmental Services” when amenities provided by the built environment are
included. Conversely, PES are defined as “Payments for Ecosystem Services” when em-
phasis is given to enhancing nature services. The distinguishing criterion thus seems to
be whether or not amenities provided by the built environment are included in addition
to the generic services provided by nature. “Payments for environmental services” thus is
the more encompassing term. “Payments for ecosystem services” is therefore a subset of
“Payments for Environmental Services”. This is in contrast to the definition put forward by
the FAO. For environmental services the FAO states that: “Opportunities for humans to
manage environments may range from penalizing negative externalities to introducing mo-
re flexible incentive mechanisms such as Payments for Environmental Services (PES). This
tool can encourage the conservation and enhanced provision of regulating and supporting
ecosystem services, the basis for all other types of service” (FAO 2012c)21.
20Wunder, Engel, Pagiola and Zabel have joint publications and therefore share the same definition of
PES - in the sense of payments for environmental services.
21http://www.fao.org/es/esa/pesal/aboutPES4.html.
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2.3 Discussion - A framework for a consistent definition of PES
From the previous section it is apparent that no consistent definitions of the terms en-
vironmental and ecosystem services exist: Should ecosystem services be understood as a
subsystem of environmental services, or vice versa? Do environmental services have a more
holistic interpretation as Wunder (2005) states? Should one think of environmental services
as services on a larger scale as Myers (1996) suggests, or is there in the end nothing to
add to the debate as to accept that environmental and ecosystem services are synonyms
and PES is as an umbrella term irrespective of how the acronym is spelled out? In what
follows, we set out a framework for a consistent definition of terms.
In our view, there is no necessity to think of ecosystem services in terms other than the
MA (2005). We thus adopt this well-established definition as a starting point. According
to this definition, direct ecosystem goods and services are thought of as goods and services
directly provided by nature as set out above. This is in line with the FAO’s definition of
ecosystem services as products of nature or as products that are in some sense closer to
nature as environmental services.
According to the FAO, environmental services are services provided as side-products of
human production. This definition implies the assumption that the environmental goods
and services are provided unintentionally. The FAO’s definition thus ignores the subset
of environmental goods and services that are produced intentionally, for example through
conservation-minded land management or eco-certification. This is a serious shortcoming
especially in the PES context. PES schemes explicitly target this subset of man-made
environmental benefits by paying landholders to provide them. We thus argue that in-
tentionally produced environmental benefits should be included in the definition of en-
vironmental services. This holds irrespective of whether the environmental benefits are
classified as externalities of primary production (e.g. environmental enhancement through
conservation-minded management of productive agricultural land) or whether they are
themselves primary products (e.g. environmental benefits from the creation of a swamp on
non-productive land). What counts is that these services are produced intentionally.
Our definition of environmental services then encompasses both categories of environ-
mental benefits - those produced intentionally and those produced unintentionally. In a
more general sense, our proposed definition classifies countryside benefits as environmental
services when human input influences ecosystem goods and services as part of a production
process. In contrast to Muradian et al. (2010), we do not therefore regard environmental
services as a subsystem of ecosystem services but rather as a systematically diﬀerent cate-
gory.
If one accepts this definition the question arises of how the term “Payments for Ecosystem
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Services” might be defined in a context where the ecosystem goods and services under
consideration are exclusively provided by nature, i.e. without human input. We argue that
“Payments for Ecosystem Services” is a redundant term in that nature does not need to
be paid (and cannot technically be paid) for the flow of goods and services provided to
humankind22. Since only humans can be paid (and in many cases need to be paid) for the
provision of environmental benefits, there can only exist one meaning of the acronym PES:
namely “Payments for Environmental Services” in the sense of payments to the provider of
environmental services.
In Germany for example, the term “Honorierung ökologischer Leistungen” is common-
ly used to denote PES. This term translates into remunerations for ecosystem services
(Matzdorf 2004). The focal point here is that remunerations, in contrast to subsidies, are
regarded as payments in return for a service provided by the landholder. Service provision
implies eﬀort being exerted by the landholder. Landholders are thus remunerated for their
intentional actions to enhance the quality of the environment. Within our proposed defi-
nition the term “Honorierung ökologischer Leistungen” is thus referring to the category of
environmental services that are produced intentionally23.
2.4 Conclusion
The terms environmental services and ecosystem services have been used inconsistently
and in some cases interchangeably in the literature. While the MA’s (2005) definition of
ecosystem services has become widely accepted in the academic community, no agreement
has been reached on the definition and use of the term environmental services. A similar
argument holds for the definition of the terms “Payments for Ecosystem Services” and
“Payments for Environmental Services”. We argue that the definitions of environmental
services entertained in the literature are not suﬃcient to capture the man-made nature
of many environmental goods and services: That such benefits, especially those targeted
by PES schemes, are usually “produced” through intentional human intervention. Against
this backdrop, we propose a definition of environmental services which builds upon the
FAO’s definition, but broadens it to cater for the man-made nature of environmental ser-
vices, irrespective of whether these are produced intentionally (e.g. through environmental
22Prevention of actions may also be costly to the extent that conservation of the status quo often involves
opportunity costs. For example, if a landholder does not drain a piece of species-rich wetland, he will
not realize the potential gain from a more profitable use of the land. The argument here remains the
same since it is not nature that is rewarded but the ecosystem manager who receives a payment for
providing the service of not draining the wetland.
23From a political perspective, it is important to draw a clear line of distinction between “remunerations”
(or “payments”) on the one hand and “subsidies” on the other. While subsidies are simply transfers,
remunerations are payments in return for service. This distinction is particularly important in the
context of the WTO rules: most “subsidies” are subject to reduction requirements, whereas payments
for the provision of environmental services are permitted.
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contracting schemes) or unintentionally (by simply farming the land). It follows from this
definition that the acronym PES can only refer to “Payments for Environmental Services”
since payments can only be made in respect of man-made conservation activities. “Pay-
ment for ecosystem services”, i.e. those produced by nature without human intervention,
is a redundant term because nature does not have a bank account.
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3.1 Einleitung
Aufgrund der semi-ariden bis ariden Bedingungen werden die größten Teile von Namibias
Landesfläche durch extensive Weidewirtschaft genutzt. Jedoch scheint sich das Ökosystem
im Umbruch zu befinden: Das vermehrte Auftreten von Büschen auf den Weideländern
(bush encroachment oder Verbuschung) ist ein schwerwiegendes und scheinbar nicht zu
stoppendes Phänomen. Die Tiere finden nicht mehr genügend Futter und überweiden die
Flächen weiter, und auch in Jahren mit ausreichend Regen können sich die Weiden nicht
mehr vollständig regenerieren. Der Verlust für die namibische Wirtschaft durch den Rück-
gang der Bestockungsraten wird auf 86 Millionen US-Dollar pro Jahr geschätzt (de Klerk
2004).
Die Ursachen der Verbuschung werden in den zu hohen Bestockungsraten in den 1960er
Jahren vermutet. Doch hat auch eine gezielte weitere Reduktion der Bestockung das Fort-
schreiten der Verbuschung in den Weideländern (rangelands) bisher nicht aufhalten oder
umkehren können. So wird vermutet, dass durch die Überweidung die Resilienz des Systems
bereits überschritten wurde und Namibias semi-aride Weideländer ohne weitere Gegen-
maßnahmen von einem Gras-dominierten in einen Busch-dominierten Zustand “umkippen”
könnten.
Welche Rolle die Resilienz ökologisch-ökonomischer Systeme bei der nachhaltigen Nut-
zung semi-arider Weideländer in Namibia spielt oder spielen kann, soll im Folgenden vor
dem Hintergrund der Konzeption starker Nachhaltigkeit diskutiert werden. Es geht da-
bei nicht nur um die Darstellung und Anwendung des Resilienzkonzeptes, sondern auch
um seine Kritik: Ich möchte diskutieren, welche Möglichkeiten das Resilienzkonzept bietet,
aber auch abgrenzen, was Resilienz gerade nicht sinnvoll sein kann – nämlich ein Entschei-
dungskriterium für das normativ “Richtige”.
In Abschnitt 3.2 werden zunächst die generellen Ursachen und die Wahrnehmung der
Verbuschung in Namibia vorgestellt und diskutiert. Abschnitt 3.4 führt in die von mir
zugrunde gelegten Begriﬀe von Resilienz und nachhaltiger Entwicklung und deren Relation
ein. In Abschnitt 3.5 wende ich diese theoretischen Überlegungen auf Verbuschung und
Bewirtschaftung semi-arider Weideländer in Namibia an und diskutiere die Implikationen
von Resilienz für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung semiarider Weideländer, bevor ich meinen
Gedankengang in Abschnitt 3.6 zu einem Fazit zusammenfasse.
3.2 Namibia - Land und Wirtschaft
Namibia ist eines der trockensten Länder Afrikas – das trockenste südlich der Sahara.
Die mittleren Jahresniederschläge liegen in den südwestlichen Regionen bei weniger als
50 Millimetern pro Jahr und steigen nach Nordosten hin auf 700 Millimeter pro Jahr an.
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Insgesamt bezeichnet man die klimatischen Bedingungen als arid bis semi-arid. Aus einer
landwirtschaftlichen und ökologischen Perspektive ist neben der Knappheit der Nieder-
schläge vor allem ihre hohe Variabilität ausschlaggebend. Diese beträgt im Norden des
Landes ca. 30 Prozent und erreicht im Süden und Westen 70 Prozent. Das heißt, dass die
Wahrscheinlichkeit des Regeneintritts in der erwarteten Regenzeit sinkt, je weiter man sich
von Nordosten der Küste nähert.
Aufgrund dieser klimatischen Verhältnisse, hat Namibia insgesamt ein geringes Potential
für den Anbau von Feldfrüchten. Die benötigte Niederschlagsmenge für Regenfeldbau be-
trägt unter diesen klimatischen Bedingungen mindestens 500 Millimeter pro Jahr. Nur acht
Prozent der Landesfläche entsprechen diesem Kriterium. Daher prägen landesweit vor allem
Rinderzucht und Kleinviehhaltung die Landwirtschaft. Von der Resilienz und nachhalti-
ge Entwicklung von semiaridem Weideland landwirtschaftlich nutzbaren Fläche entfallen
48 Prozent auf Fleischrinderfarmen, 15 Prozent auf Mischbetriebe (Klein- und Großtier-
haltung, teilweise mit Ackerbau) und 37 Prozent auf Betriebe mit Kleintierhaltung. Zwar
stellt die Landwirtschaft, und das heißt vor allem die semiaride Weidewirtschaft, nur einen
geringen Anteil am Bruttosozialprodukt dar (2003 nur rund 4,8 Prozent), doch sind rund
70 Prozent (2006) der 2,1 Millionen Menschen Namibias ganz oder teilweise im landwirt-
schaftlichen Sektor tätig oder von diesem abhängig. Da neben Bodenschätzen hauptsächlich
Fisch- und Fleischprodukte exportiert werden, spielen landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse zu-
sätzlich bei den Exporteinnahmen eine große Rolle. Durch die Ausfuhr von landwirtschaft-
lichen Produkten (vor allem Tafeltrauben, Fisch und Rindfleisch) erwirtschaftete Namibia
im Jahr 2006 252 Millionen US-Dollar. Ein Viertel der Güter wird dabei in die Länder der
südafrikanischen Zollunion exportiert, vor allem nach Südafrika. Durch die hohen Gewinn-
spannen für Rindfleisch ist monetär aber die Europäische Union (vor allem Großbritannien)
der wichtigste Exportpartner der namibischen Weidewirtschaft, mit einem Gesamterlös von
über 124 Millionen US-Dollar pro Jahr (2006)24. Ohne die Verbuschung der Weideländer,
so wird geschätzt, könnten die Erlöse für die gesamte Weidewirtschaft allerdings um rund
86 Millionen US-Dollar pro Jahr höher ausfallen (de Klerk 2004: 5). So ist es kein Wunder,
dass die fortschreitende Verbuschung der Weideländer mit Sorge beobachtet wird.
3.2.1 Verbuschung als ein Problem der Desertifikation
Veränderungen der Savannenökosysteme, vor allem das verstärkte Auftreten von Büschen,
verringern die Grasproduktivität der semi-ariden Weideländer, das heißt das Futterangebot
für Rinder und damit auch die Bestockungsrate. Die Reduktion des Grasbestandes kann
außerdem zu einer Verstärkung von Bodendegradierung und Erosion führen, in anderen
24https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worlfactbook/print/wa.html
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Worten zu Desertifikation.
Unter Desertifikation wird allgemein die Landdegradierung in trockenen Klimaten ver-
standen. Das Übereinkommen zur Bekämpfung der Desertifikation, die United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), definiert Desertifikation als “land degra-
dation in arid, semiarid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including
climatic variations and human activities” (UNCCD Art.1a: 4) 25. Landdegradierung ist
also in diesem Falle definiert als eine spezielle Form der Desertifikation in ariden und semi-
ariden Gebieten. Die Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) versteht unter Desertifika-
tion eine durch menschlichen Einfluss hervorgerufene, irreversible Degradation natürlicher
Ressourcen in ariden und semi-ariden Klimaten, hebt also zusätzlich die Unumkehrbarkeit
der Schädigung hervor26.
Die Verbuschung in Namibia ist zwar umkehrbar, wird aber als ein Teil der Desertifikati-
on verstanden und beschrieben als “the invasion and/or thickening of aggressive undesired
woody species, resulting in an imbalance of the grass:bush ratio, a decrease in biodiversity,
a decrease in carrying capacity and concomitant economic losses” (de Klerk 2004: 2). Das
Argument für die Anwendbarkeit des Desertifikationsbegriﬀs lautet hier, dass Verbuschung
zwar prinzipiell umkehrbar, im Rahmen von ökonomisch relevanten Zeiträumen jedoch als
irreversibel zu betrachten ist. Die namibische Verfassung von 1990 sieht ausdrücklich vor,
dass der Staat auch durch den Erhalt von Ökosystemen, essentiellen ökologischen Pro-
zessen und der biologischen Diversität in Namibia zum Wohl der Bevölkerung beiträgt.
Dies umfasst auch Maßnahmen gegen die Verbuschung der Weideländer. So lautet eine
Grundzielsetzung der National Agriculture Policy des Ministry of Agriculture, Water and
Rural Development of Namibia: “[. . .] endeavour to ensure that appropriate bush control
technologies and inputs are available from the private sector at the lowest possible prices”
(Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development 1995: 29).
Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass Verbuschung in Namibia als ein Problem
der Landdegradierung und als eine Art der Desertifikation gesehen wird. Entsprechende
Gegenmaßnahmen werden durch die UNCCD abgedeckt und gefördert. Weitreichende po-
litische Maßnahmen unterstreichen die Absicht, Weideland in seinem Gras-dominierten
Zustand zu erhalten.
3.2.2 ’Cattle or Climate’ – Die Ursachen der Verbuschung
Vor der generellen Debatte um nachhaltiges Management von Savannenökosystemen steht
die Frage, welche Faktoren Verbuschung überhaupt auslösen und begünstigen. Die Zu-
25Siehe http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/conventionText/conv-eng.pdf
26http://www.fao.org/desertification/default.asp?lang=en
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sammenhänge zwischen einer erhöhten Bestockungsrate und der Verbuschung sind nicht
abschließend erforscht. Mehrere Theorien stehen einander in ihren Empfehlungen entgegen:
Die Anhänger der Equilibrium-Theorie oder Gleichgewichtstheorie beziehen die Verände-
rungen des Savannenökosystems auf die hohe Bestockung mit Vieh. Vergleicht man die
Bestockungsraten von heute aber mit denen der 1960er Jahre, wird deutlich, dass die Be-
stockungsraten von um fast 70 Prozent zurückgegangen sind (2001). Dennoch schreitet die
Verbuschung voran.
Anhänger der der Non-Equilibrium-Theorie von Savannendynamiken argumentieren da-
her, dass die hohe Variabilität der Niederschläge bei weitem der bestimmende ökologische
Faktor sei. Folglich seien Vegetation und Viehdynamik in einem solchen Ausmaß entkop-
pelt, dass auch hohe Bestockungsraten keinen Einfluss auf die Vegetationsbedeckung ha-
ben (Behnke & Scoones 1993; Elias & Swift 1988). Als Resultat empfehlen zum Beispiel
Westoby et al. (1989: 266) den Farmern ein opportunistisches Verhalten: “[F]armers should
response to climatic variability by adjusting stocking rates in order to make maximum use
of grass production”.
Als Opfer klimatischer Ereignisse hätten Landwirte in diesem Szenario keine Verant-
wortung für die Verbuschung und könnten diese auch nicht verhindern. Anhänger der
Equilibrium-Theorie dagegen empfehlen niedrige Bestockungsraten, um die Dominanz der
aufkommenden Büsche gegenüber den Gräsern zu verringern. Auch empirische Studien in
Südafrika bekräftigen die These, dass hohe Bestockungsraten die Vegetationsdynamik der
Weideländer beeinflussen können (Fynn & O’Connor 2000).
Eine dritte Theorie sieht die Hauptursache der Verbuschung in der Verhinderung na-
türlicher Feuerereignisse. Regelmäßige natürliche Feuerereignisse dezimieren die Büsche.
Dabei ist es wichtig, dass die Feuer eine bestimmte Temperatur erreichen. Für diese heißen
Buschfeuer ist ein großer Anteil an abgestorbenem Gras als Brennmaterial vonnöten. Bei
hohen Bestockungsraten sammelt sich jedoch kein abgestorbenes oder trockenes Gras an.
Auftretende Feuer sind daher nicht heiß genug und schädigen junge Büsche nicht in ausrei-
chendem Maß und in ausreichender Zahl. Dies mag die wichtigste ursächliche Verbindung
zwischen Verbuschung und Viehzucht sein (vgl. Mendelson et al. 2006).
Unabhängig von den genauen Ursachen der Verbuschung, deren Kenntnis aber grundle-
gend ist für Managemententscheidungen, muss als schlichte Tatsache festgehalten werden,
dass sich die Büsche weiter ausbreiten und geringere Bestockungsraten diese Entwicklung
bisher nicht aufhalten oder umkehren konnten. In der Sprache der Resilienz-Debatte lässt
sich die Situation so beschreiben, dass die Resilienz des Gras-dominierten Zustandes über-
schritten wurde und die Konvergenz des Systems hin zu einem Busch-dominierten Zustand
nicht mehr ohne weiteres umgekehrt werden kann: “It is probable that only complete tree
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removal, some soil surface modification and reseeding with desirable grasses will overcome
this inertia. Such a situation may constitute a diﬀerent domain of attraction as outlined by
Walker & Noy-Meir (1982) and could indicate that the bounds of resilience of the former
system have been exceeded” (de Klerk 2004: 28).
Im folgenden Abschnitt betrachte ich die Grundlagen der Resilienzdebatte und den Zu-
sammenhang zwischen nachhaltiger Entwicklung und Resilienz.
3.3 Konzeptioneller Hintergrund
3.3.1 Konzeption von Resilienz
Eine wichtige Annahme zu den Eigenschaften dynamischer Systeme in der Ökologie lau-
tet, dass in diesen Systemen mehrere lokale stabile Gleichgewichte mit mehreren stabilen
Zuständen existieren. Da Systeme außerdem von einem dieser stabilen Zustände in einen
anderen übergehen können, wenn wie einen bestimmten Schwellenwert überschreiten, ist
es möglich, dass sich die zentralen Eigenschaften des Systems grundsätzlich ändern.
Die Annahme alternativer stabiler Zustände in Ökosystemen gab in der Ökologie den
Anlass zu der Frage, wo sich ein bestimmtes Ökosystem relativ zu den Schwellenwerten
seiner stabilen Zustände befindet. Um den Zustand eines Ökosystems in dieser Hinsicht
zufriedenstellend zu beschreiben, muss nicht nur festgestellt werden, ob es Gleichgewichts-
zustände gibt und wie stabil sie sind, sondern auch, wie groß die Kapazität eines Systems
ist, Schocks zu absorbieren und in seinem gegenwärtigen Zustand zu verbleiben.27 Ich be-
rufe mich hier also auf die Definition von Holling & Gunderson (2002: 4): “[Resilience is]
the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure
by changing the variables and processes that control behavior”. Ein System zeigt sich dem-
nach resilient gegenüber einer bestimmten Störung, wenn es sich nach der Störung noch
im selben stabilen Zustand befindet.
3.3.2 Konzeption von Nachhaltigkeit
Maßgebliches Leitbild der Nachhaltigkeitspolitik für das “richtige” Handeln und den “rich-
tigen” Umgang mit Natur und Umwelt war und ist seit der UN-Konferenz für Umwelt
und Entwicklung in Rio de Janeiro 1992 die Nachhaltigkeitsdefinition der sogenannten
Brundtland-Kommission: “Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs” (WCED 1987).
In der wissenschaftlichen Nachhaltigkeitsdebatte lassen sich die Konzepte der starken
und der schwachen Nachhaltigkeit unterscheiden, die beide auf der oben genannten De-
27Eine genauere technische Definition gibt Holling (1973), zitiert in Holling & Gunderson (2002: 4).
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finition aufbauen. Die Konzepte unterscheiden sich grundsätzlich durch ihre Annahmen
darüber, in welchem Maße Naturkapital benötigt wird, um menschliche Grundbedürfnisse
zu befriedigen, bzw. inwieweit sich Naturkapital durch Sachkapital substituieren lässt (vgl.
Ott & Döring 2004). Nur wenn man davon ausgeht, dass Naturkapital vollständig durch
Sachkapital ersetzbar sei, ist der Erhalt von Naturkapital irrelevant und sind damit die
Überlegungen zur Resilienz ökologischer Systeme überflüssig28. Ich folge dem Greifswalder
Ansatz starker Nachhaltigkeit (Ott & Döring 2004) darin, dass kritische Grenzwerte von
Naturkapital, sowohl einzelner Bestände als auch ihrer Kombinationen, nicht unterschritten
werden dürfen.
Die weiteren Ergebnisse dieses Beitrags sind selbstverständlich nur vor dem Hintergrund
der gewählten Definitionen als einschlägig zu betrachten. Die Definition von Nachhaltigkeit
im Sinne der WCED (1987), die Präzisierung starker Nachhaltigkeit sensu Ott & Döring
(2004) und die Definition des Resilienzkonzeptes im Sinne Hollings (1973), auf die ich mich
hier berufe, sind aber weithin akzeptiert.
3.3.3 Zum Verhältnis von Resilienz und nachhaltiger Entwicklung
Aufbauend auf einer Vielzahl von Resilienz- und Nachhaltigkeitsdefinitionen finden sich
in der Literatur mindestens ebenso viele Versuche, diese beiden Konzepte miteinander
in Beziehung zu setzen. So formulieren zum Beispiel Common & Perrings (1992: 28) in
einem frühen Aufsatz: “A system may be said to be Holling-sustainable, if and only if it is
Holling-resilient”.
Oder es wird im Sinne des Drei-Säulen-Konzeptes von Nachhaltigkeit der Schluss gezo-
gen: “[A] resilient socio-ecological system is synonymous with a region that is ecologically,
economically, and socially sustainable” (Holling & Walker 2003: 1).
Wenn wir von diesen Definitionen ausgehen, gibt es keinen plausiblen Grund, Resilienz
als notwendig oder gar hinreichend für die nachhaltige Entwicklung ökologisch-ökonomischer
Systeme zu betrachten. So schreiben Holling & Walker (2003: 1f.) weiter: “Resilience, per
se, is not necessarily a good thing. Undesirable system configurations (e.g. Stalin’s regime,
collapsed fish stocks) can be very resilient, and they can have high adaptive capacity in the
sense of reconfiguring to retain the same controls on function”. Viel näher liegt der Schluss,
dass unerwünschte, aber resiliente Zustände gerade als nicht nachhaltig betrachtet wer-
den sollten (Beispiele in Brander 1998). In diesem Sinne formulieren auch Carpenter et al.
(2001: 766): “Unlike sustainability, resilience can be desirable or undesirable”.
Andere Autoren betrachten Resilienz zwar nicht als hinreichendes, aber als ein notwen-
28In Arbeiten, die Resilienz als Basis oder zur Operationalisierung von Nachhaltigkeit vorschlagen, wird
zwischen starker und schwacher Nachhaltigkeit meist nicht diﬀerenziert.
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diges Kriterium für Nachhaltigkeit. So vertreten Arrow et al. (1995: 93) in einem viel-
beachteten Science-Artikel die Position: “[E]conomic activities are sustainable only if the
life-support ecosystems upon which they depend are resilient”29. Auch Perrings (2006)
stellt fest: “A development strategy is not sustainable if it is not resilient: i.e. if it invol-
ves a significant risk that the economy can be flipped from desirable state (path) into an
undesirable state (path) and if that change is either irreversible or only slowly reversible”
(Perrings 2006: 418).
Die entscheidende Einschränkung ist hier, dass der Übergang in den unerwünschten Zu-
stand irreversibel oder nur langsam reversibel ist. Kann das System schnell wieder in einen
erwünschten Zustand zurückkehren, gilt es trotz seiner geringen Resilienz als nachhaltig.
Die Resilienz eines Systemzustandes kann damit generell keine notwendige Bedingung für
eine nachhaltige Entwicklung darstellen. Darüber hinaus sind Zustände denkbar, bei de-
nen gerade der Übergang in einen anderen Systemzustand eine nachhaltige Entwicklung
überhaupt erst möglich macht. Vier Fälle sind demnach bei der Beziehung von Resilienz
und nachhaltiger Entwicklung im Sinne der obigen Definition möglich:
1. Resilienz ist notwendig und hinreichend für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung ökologisch-
ökonomischer Systeme, wenn es genau einen Gleichgewichtszustand des Systems gibt,
der den Erfordernissen einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung entspricht.
2. Resilienz ist hinreichend aber nicht notwendig für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung
ökologisch-ökonomischer Systeme, wenn mehrere Gleichgewichtszustände des Sys-
tems existieren, die den Erfordernissen einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung entsprechen.
3. Resilienz ist notwendig aber nicht hinreichend für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung
ökologisch-ökonomischer Systeme, wenn es keinen Gleichgewichtzustand eines Sys-
tems gibt, der den Erfordernissen einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung entspricht.
4. Resilienz ist weder notwendig noch hinreichend für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung
ökologisch-ökonomischer Systeme, wenn der Ausgangszustand eines Systems außer-
halb der Anforderungen einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung liegt, also der kritische Wert
eines Naturkapitalbestandes bereits unterschritten wurde.
29Allerdings könnte diese Formulierung auch so interpretiert werden, dass sich die Forderung nach Resilienz
nur auf solche Ökosysteme bzw. Ökosystemfunktionen bezieht, die life-support-Funktionen aufweisen,
mit anderen Worten auf kritisches Naturkapital bezogen werden. Damit wäre Resilienz nicht per se
notwendig, sondern nur im Sinne des Erhalts von kritischem Naturkapital relevant. Dies entspricht
meiner vorliegenden Argumentation.
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3.4 Resilienz als notwendige Bedingung für die nachhaltiger Entwicklung
semi-arider Weideländer
In den vorigen Abschnitten habe ich Resilienz als deskriptives Konzept vorgestellt, während
nachhaltige Entwicklung als ein normatives definiert wurde. In der Sprache der Resilienz-
debatte lassen sich auf dieser Grundlage im Falle der namibischen Weideländer mindestens
zwei Systemzustände unterscheiden: In einem der beiden Zustände herrscht Grasvegetation
vor und ist die Haltung von Rindern ökonomisch möglich. Wird dieser Zustand gestört,
etwa durch zu hohe Bestockung und das Unterdrücken natürlicher Buschbrände, kann das
System zu einem Zustand (Entwicklungspfad) der Verbuschung übergehen. (Denkbar sind
natürlich auch Zustände, in denen zum Beispiel eine Wüste entsteht.) Ohne weitere Ein-
griﬀe würde sich das Savannensystem in Namibia von einem verbuschten Zustand nicht
mehr in einen Zustand mit vorherrschender Grasvegetation zurückentwickeln. Damit wä-
ren die ehemals hohen Bestockungsraten als eine Störung anzusehen, denen gegenüber das
Weideland nicht resilient war: “It can further be concluded that grazing pressure, even
with declining stocking rates, was still inherently too high to utilise the rangelands in a
sustainable way and resulted in a form of vicious cycle. Fear has been expressed that the
bounds of resilience of the former ecosystem have been exceeded. Only by means of exter-
nal inputs will the original status of our rangelands be able to be restored” (de Klerk 2004:
22).
Mit Blick auf die Nachhaltigkeitsdebatte stellt sich nun die Frage, ob das System in
seinem Gras-dominierten Zustand erhalten bleiben müsste, um den Anforderungen star-
ker Nachhaltigkeit gerecht zu werden. Zentral wäre hier, konkret definieren zu können,
inwieweit bei einem Übergang in einen Busch-dominierten Zustand kritisches Naturka-
pital betroﬀen ist oder wie in dieses investiert werden kann. Im Sinne des Greifswalder
Ansatzes starker Nachhaltigkeit ist also zu überprüfen, welche der genannten vier Mög-
lichkeiten (voriger Abschnitt) bei dem Übergang von einem Gras-dominierten in einen
Busch-dominierten Zustand semi-arider Weiden zutriﬀt.
Die Resilienz, das heißt in diesem Fall der Erhalt der semi-ariden Weidelandschaft, wäre
für die nachhaltige Entwicklung in Namibia nicht notwendig, wenn ein alternativer stabiler
Zustand existierte, der den Erfordernissen einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung entspricht. Dies
scheint denkbar zu sein. Nicht nur bieten die aufkommenden Büsche anderen Tier- und
Pflanzenarten ein Habitat, auch können die Büsche als Brennmaterial und zur Stromer-
zeugung verwendet werden. Da das Abholzen der Büsche sehr zeit- und arbeitsintensiv
ist, wird nicht selten mit den positiven Auswirkungen auf die namibische Beschäftigten-
quote geworben, zu denen eine stärkere kommerzielle Nutzung der Büsche führen würde.
Jedoch sind bislang interessanterweise keine Zahlen bekannt, die das Potential der Nut-
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zung und Ernte der Büsche und deren weitere Wertschöpfung umfassend darstellen, so dass
die Verbuschung ausschließlich als Verlust für die Rindfleischindustrie und als gesamtwirt-
schaftliches Problem wahrgenommen wird. Alternative Nutzungsmöglichkeiten der Büsche
sind zwar bekannt, und sie werden im kleinen Maßstab auch umgesetzt, eine grundlegende
Umorientierung der Landnutzung ist allerdings nicht zu erkennen.
Unabhängig von dieser Frage muss jedoch angesichts der oben skizzierten politischen
Zielsetzungen festgehalten werden, dass es bisher keinen gesellschaftlich akzeptierten alter-
nativen Zustand semi-arider Weideländer gibt. Dies heißt jedoch nicht, dass kein Zustand
denkbar ist, der den Vorgaben starker Nachhaltigkeit genügt, langfristig das Nutzenni-
veau der Gesellschaft mindestens konstant zu halten und kritisches Naturkapital zu be-
wahren. An dieser Stelle klaﬀen die normativen Vorgaben einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung
und das gesellschaftliche Ideal, das die Rinderhaltung als einzig akzeptable Bewirtschaf-
tungsform vorsieht, oﬀensichtlich auseinander. Die Frage, wie jenseits einer optimierenden
Ein-Zustands-Politik agiert werden müsste, ist daher notwendiger Gegenstand weiterer
Forschung.
3.5 Schlussfolgerungen
Veränderungen der Savannenökosysteme, vor allem das verstärkte Auftreten von Büschen,
werden als ein Hauptproblem für die Bewirtschaftung semi-ariden Weidelands gesehen:
Die Verbuschung des Weidelands verringert die Grasproduktivität und die mögliche Besto-
ckungsrate. Außerdem führt eine Reduktion des Grasbestandes zu einer Verstärkung von
Bodendegradierung und Erosion. Die Mechanismen der Verbuschung semi-ariden Weide-
lands sind bis heute nicht abschließend geklärt. Es scheint jedoch klar zu sein, dass zu hohe
Bestockungsraten nicht die einzige Ursache darstellen, sondern eine Ursachenkombination
vorliegt. Das Unterdrücken von Feuerereignissen und das vollständige Abgrasen der Wei-
den führen zu seltenen und schwachen Bränden, die die Büsche nicht mehr ausreichend
dezimieren. Eine Reduktion der Bestockungsraten hat die Verbuschung der Weideländer
bisher nicht aufhalten können, und es scheint, als sei die Resilienz des Gras-dominierten
Zustandes überschritten, so dass das Ökosystem nun langfristig in einen Busch-dominierten
Zustand übergeht.
Die Resilienz, das heißt in diesem Fall der Erhalt der semi-ariden Weidelandschaft in
einem Gras-dominierten Zustand, ist für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung in Namibia nicht
notwendig, falls ein alternativer stabiler Zustand existiert, der den Erfordernissen einer
nachhaltigen Entwicklung entspricht. Es scheint ein Systemzustand mit vorherrschender
Buschvegetation, mit einer eigenen Diversität von Arten und Lebensgemeinschaften und
mit einer untergeordneten Weidewirtschaft denkbar zu sein, in dem die Büsche etwa zu
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Erzeugung von Strom verwendet werden. Allerdings ist der öﬀentliche Diskurs in Namibia
bislang völlig auf die Nutzung der betreﬀenden Flächen als Weideland fixiert.
Ob ein Busch-dominierter Zustand ebenfalls Nachhaltigkeitskriterien entspräche und wie
er im Vergleich zum Gras-dominierten Zustand zu bewerten wäre, kann beim derzeitigen
Stand der Forschung nicht abschließend geklärt werden. Dazu müssen kritische Naturka-
pitalbestände identifiziert und die Kosten und Nutzen des Übergangs auch für zukünftige
Generationen geprüft werden. Fest steht jedoch, dass ein Gras-dominiertes Weideland nicht
der einzige stabile Zustand dieser Ökosysteme ist und die alternativen Zustände unvorein-
genommen in die Managemententscheidungen einbezogen werden sollten.
Diese Unterscheidungen sind bisher nicht in die Überlegungen zu nachhaltigem Manage-
ment semi-arider Gebiete eingeflossen. Eine Abwägung der Vor- und Nachteil eines solchen
regime shift könnte für die nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung semi-arider Gebiete wegweisend
sein.
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The relationship between resilience and sustainability of
ecological-economic systems
Abstract: Resilience as a descriptive concept gives insight into the dynamic properties of
an ecological-economic system. Sustainability as a normative concept captures basic ideas
of intergenerational justice when human well-being depends on natural capital and services.
Thus, resilience and sustainability are independent concepts. In this paper, we discuss
the relationship between resilience and sustainability of ecological-economic systems. We
use a simple dynamic model where two natural capital stocks provide ecosystem services
that are complements for human well-being, to illustrate diﬀerent possible cases of the
relationship between resilience and sustainability, and to identify the conditions under
which each of those will hold: a) resilience of the system is necessary, but not suﬃcient, for
sustainability; b) resilience of the system is suﬃcient, but not necessary, for sustainability;
c) resilience of the system is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for sustainability; and d)
resilience is both necessary and suﬃcient for sustainability. We conclude that more criteria
than just resilience have to be taken into account when designing policies for the sustainable
development of ecological-economic systems, and, vice versa, the property of resilience
should not be confused with the positive normative connotations of sustainability.
Keywords: ecosystem resilience, dynamics, management of ecological-economic systems,
sustainability
JEL-Classification: Q20, Q56, Q57
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4.1 Introduction
Speaking about resilience and sustainability is speaking about two highly abstract and
multi-various concepts, each of which has a great variety of interpretations and definitions.
Here we adopt what seems to be the most general and at the same time most widely
accepted definitions of resilience and sustainability30. We understand sustainable devel-
opment as the Brundtland Commission defines it as “development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs” (WCED 1987). In this definition, sustainability is a normative concept capturing
basic ideas of intra- and intergenerational justice31. Concerning obligations towards future
generations, the primary question of sustainability then is to what extent do natural capital
stocks have to be maintained to enable future generations to meet their needs32.
In contrast, resilience is a descriptive concept. In a most common definition that goes
back to Holling (1973), resilience is thought of as “[. . . ] the magnitude of disturbance that
can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing the variables and
processes that control behavior” (Holling & Gunderson 2002: 4). The underlying idea
is that a system may flip from one domain of attraction into another one as a result of
exogenous disturbance. If the system will not flip due to exogenous disturbance, the system
in its initial state is called resilient. Although Holling-resilience can be quantitatively
measured (Holling 1973), we focus on the qualitative classification, where a system in a
given state is either resilient, or it is not33.
In the literature, many connections have been drawn between resilience and sustainability
(e.g. Folke et al. 2004, Walker & Salt 2006, Mäler 2008). In some contributions, resilience
is seen as a necessary precondition for sustainability. For example, Lebel et al. (2006: 2)
point out that “[s]trengthening the capacity of societies to manage resilience is critical to
eﬀectively pursuing sustainable development”. Similarly, Arrow et al. (1995: 93) conclude
30Evidently, as definitions are not universal and are appropriate for a certain objective only (Jax 2002),
the relationship between resilience and sustainability depends on the particular definitions of these two
terms.
31We do not consider the issue of intragenerational justice in this paper, but focus on an operational notion
of sustainability that captures intergenerational justice.
32The term “natural capital” was established to distinguish services and functions of ecosystems from other
capital stocks (Pearce 1988).
33An alternative definition of resilience is due to Pimm (1984), who defines resilience as the rate at which
a system returns to equilibrium following a disturbance. Resilience, according to Pimm’s definition, is
not defined for unstable systems. Nevertheless, it is a useful concept for ecological-economic analysis.
Martin (2004), for example, suggests a quantitative measure of resilience sensu Pimm, namely the costs
of the restoration of the system after a disturbance where costs are defined as the “minimal time of
crisis”, i.e. the minimal time the system is violating pre-specified state-restrictions and, thus, is outside
the viability kernel (Béné at al. 2001).
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that “economic activities are sustainable only if the life-support ecosystems upon which
they depend are resilient”, and Perrings (2006: 418) states that “[a] development strategy
is not sustainable if it is not resilient”.
Some authors explicitly define or implicitly understand the notions of resilience and
sustainability such that they are essentially equivalent: “A system may be said to be
Holling-sustainable, if and only if it is Holling-resilient” (Common & Perrings 1992: 28),
or similarly: “A resilient socio-ecological system is synonymous with a region that is eco-
logically, economically, and socially sustainable” (Holling & Walker 2003: 1). Levin et al.
(1998) claim in general that “[r]esilience is the preferred way to think about sustainability
in social as well as natural systems”, thus also suggesting an equivalence of resilience and
sustainability.
In contrast to this view, it has been noted that “[r]esilience, per se, is not necessarily a
good thing. Undesirable system configurations (e.g. Stalin’s regime, collapsed fish stocks)
can be very resilient, and they can have high adaptive capacity in the sense of re-configuring
to retain the same controls on function” (Holling & Walker 2003: 1). In other words,
resilience is not suﬃcient for sustainability, and it can therefore not be taken as an objective
of its own.
While systems with multiple stable states are widely discussed, a systematic analysis
of the relationship between the concepts of resilience and sustainability in a system with
multiple stable states has not yet been conducted. To illustrate this research gap, the
statements quoted above do not take into account the following possibilities: if some
particular management does not conserve a system’s resilience, such that under exogenous
disturbance the system may flip from an undesirable state into a desirable one, or from
a desirable state into another desirable state, the system management might still achieve
sustainable development of the system, even though it is not resilient. As a consequence,
one may conclude that resilience is neither desirable in itself nor is it in general a necessary
or suﬃcient condition for sustainable development.
In general, four relationships between resilience and sustainability are logically possible,
and any of those may hold in a given system: a) resilience of the system is necessary, but
not suﬃcient, for sustainability; b) resilience of the system is suﬃcient, but not necessary,
for sustainability; c) resilience of the system is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for sustain-
ability; and d) resilience of the system is both necessary and suﬃcient for sustainability.
In order to clarify and illustrate the diﬀerent possibilities, and to identify the conditions
under which each of those will hold, we use a simple dynamic ecological-economic model
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where two natural capital stocks provide ecosystem services that are complementary in the
satisfaction of human needs.
This model is not meant to represent a real ecological-economic system, or to give a fully
general representation of ecological-economic systems. Rather, it is meant to illustrate the
complexity of relationships between resilience and sustainability even in a simple dynamic
model. In contrast to other models used to study resilience of ecological-economic systems,
such as the shallow lake model (e.g. Scheﬀer 1997, Mäler et al. 2003) or rangeland models
(e.g. Perrings & Stern 2000, Anderies et al. 2002, Janssen et al. 2004), it features more
than two domains of attraction and the possibility of more than one desirable state. In
traditional models of bistable systems only two relationships of resilience and sustainability
are possible: (i) the system is resilient in a desired state, such that the system’s resilience
has to be maintained for sustainability; and (ii) the system is resilient in its current state
which is, however, not a desired one, such that resilience prevents sustainability. A sit-
uation in which the system is not resilient in a desired state but nevertheless on a path
of sustainability cannot – by construction of these traditional models – possibly occur.
Our dynamic model, as simple as it is, overcomes this shortcoming and may therefore add
another valuable dimension to the model-based study of resilience and sustainability.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the following section, we present the model
(Section 4.2), analyze its basic dynamics (Section 4.3), introduce formal definitions of
resilience and sustainability (Section 4.4), and discuss the possible relationships between
resilience and sustainability (Section 4.5). In Section 4.6, we discuss our findings and draw
conclusions concerning the sustainable management of ecological-economic systems.
4.2 Resilience and sustainability in a simple dynamic model of an
ecological-economic system
The model describes the use of two natural capital stocks – say, fish and wood – and features
multiple equilibria with diﬀerent domains of attraction. The deterministic dynamics of the
two stocks of fish (x) and wood (w) are described by the following diﬀerential equations,
referring to the growth of the stocks of fish x˙ and wood w˙:
x˙ = f(x)  C = rx (x  vx)
✓
1  x
kx
◆
  C (1)
w˙ = g(w) H = rw (w   vw)
✓
1  w
kw
◆
 H (2)
where rx and rw denote the intrinsic growth rates, vx and vw the minimum viable popu-
lations, and kx and kw the carrying capacities of the stocks of fish and wood, respectively.
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Let x0 = x(0) and w0 = w(0) denote the initial state of the system. The diﬀerential
equations (1) and (2) do not contain ecological interactions, although, of course, in reality
ecological interactions may exist. As a consequence, interactions of the stock dynamics are
only due to the interrelated harvests of fish and timber. We use C and H to denote the
aggregate amounts of harvested fish and timber; f(·) and g(·) describe the intrinsic growth
of the two stocks. We assume logistic growth functions for simplicity and because using a
well-known functional form of the growth functions helps to clarify the argument.
Suppose that myopic profit-maximizing firms harvest the resources under open-access
to ecosystems and sell these ecosystem services as market products to consumers at prices
px and pw for fish and timber, respectively. Assuming Schaefer production functions, the
amounts of fish and timber harvested from the respective stocks by individual firms are
described by
C = qx x ex and (3)
H = qw w ew , (4)
where ex and ew denote the aggregate eﬀort, measured in units of labor, spent by fish-
harvesting-firms and timber-harvesting-firms, respectively, and qx and qw denote the pro-
ductivity of harvesting fish and timber, respectively. Firms can enter and exit the two
industries at no costs.
Society consists of n identical utility-maximizing individuals who derive utility from
the consumption of manufactured goods (y) as well as from the consumption of the two
ecosystem services, fish (c) and timber (h). We assume that all three goods are essential
for individual well-being. The utility function of a representative household is
u(y, c, h) = y1 ↵
h
c
  1
  + h
  1
 
i↵    1
, (5)
where ↵ 2 (0, 1) is the household’s elasticity of marginal utility for consumption of ecosys-
tem services, and   is the elasticity of substitution between the consumption of fish and
timber. Both ecosystem services are assumed to be complements in satisfying human needs,
i.e.   < 1.
Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor either to one of the resource-
harvesting firms or to the manufactured-goods sector. We assume that labor is the only
input in the manufactured-goods sector and that production exhibits constant returns to
scale. Assuming that labor supply is large enough, the wage rate is thus determined by
the marginal product of labor in the manufacturing sector, which we denote by  . Taking
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the manufactured good as numeraire, the household’s budget constraint then is
  = y + pxc+ pwh . (6)
As an exogenous disturbance to this system we consider an unforeseen, one-time random
shock   = ( x, w) that aﬀects the state of the system at time t . The random shock  
is distributed over the support ⌦ ✓ [0,1)⇥ [0,1). The random time of disturbance t  is
distributed over [0,1). The shock aﬀects the stock variables in a multiplicative way, such
that they instantaneously shift from the current state (x(t ), w(t )) to another, disturbed
state (x(t  + dt), w(t  + dt)) = ( x · x(t ), w · w(t )) an infinitesimal time increment
dt later. Thus, the shock decreases or increases the stocks x and w by a fraction of  x
and  w, respectively. The same equations of motion, (1) and (2), govern the dynamic
development of the system before and after the disturbance, but due to the one-time and
instantaneous shift in the stock variables at time t  the dynamic regime of the system may
be altered.
4.3 Basic dynamics
In this model, the deterministic dynamics of the ecological-economic system that is at all
times t in a general market equilibrium where profit-maximizing harvesting firms have open
access to ecosystems are described by the following system of coupled diﬀerential equations
(see Appendix):
x˙ = rx (x  vx)
✓
1  x
kx
◆
  n↵ (qxx)
 
(qxx)
  1 + (qww)  1
, (7)
w˙ = rw (w   vw)
✓
1  w
kw
◆
  n↵ (qww)
 
(qxx)
  1 + (qww)  1
. (8)
These dynamics are represented by the state-space diagram in Figure 1 for parameter
values rx = rw = 0.5, kx = kw = 1, vx = vw = 0.08, qx = qw = 1,   = 1, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.5
and n = 1. The green line is the isocline for w˙ = 0, the red line is the isocline for x˙ = 0.
Left (right) of the w˙ = 0-isocline the dynamics are characterized by w˙ > 0 (< 0). Likewise,
below (above) the x˙ = 0-isocline the dynamics are characterized by x˙ > 0 (< 0). In each
segment of the state space, the green and red arrows indicate this direction of dynamics.
With these dynamics, B is an unstable steady-state equilibrium; D and D0 as well as F
and F0 are locally saddlepoint-stable steady-state equilibria; and A, C, E and E0 are locally
stable steady-state equilibria34.
34For an explicit analysis of transitional dynamics and sustainability, see Martinet et al. (2007), Bretschger
& Pittel (2008).
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Figure 1: Phase diagram illustrating Basic Dynamics: w˙ > 0 left of the green line (w˙ < 0
right of the green line) and x˙ > 0 below the red line (x˙ < 0 above the red line). B
is an unstable steady-state equilibrium; D, D0, F, F0 are locally saddlepoint-stable
steady-state equilibria; A, C, E, E0 are locally stable steady-state equilibria. The
corresponding domains of attraction are the area in between the two saddlepaths
southwest of B for equilibrium A, the area in between the two saddlepaths north-
east of B for equilibrium C, the area northwest of the upper saddlepath for equi-
librium E (southeast of the lower saddlepath for E0), the upper (lower) saddlepath
northeast of B for equilibrium D (D0), and the upper (lower) saddlepath south-
west of B for equilibrium F (F0). Parameter values: rx = rw = 0.5, kx = kw = 1,
vx = vw = 0.08, qx = qw = 1,   = 1, ↵ = 0.4,   = 0.5, n = 1.
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Let (x?i , w?i ) denote the stock levels in steady-state equilibrium i 2{A, B, C, D, D0, E,
E0, F, F0}. The domain of attraction Ai of equilibrium i is the set of all initial states for
which the system converges towards equilibrium i:
Ai =
n
(x0, w0) 2 R+ ⇥ R+
    lim
t!1(x(t), w(t)) = (x
?
i , w
?
i )
o
, (9)
where (x(t), w(t)) denotes the solution of Eqs. (7) and (8) for initial state (x0, w0).
The model features eight domains of attraction: the area in between the two saddlepaths
southwest of B for equilibrium A, the area in between the two saddlepaths northeast of B for
equilibrium C, the area northwest of the upper saddlepath for equilibrium E (southeast of
the lower saddlepath for E0), the upper (lower) saddlepath northeast of B for equilibrium D
(D0), and the upper (lower) saddlepath southwest of B for equilibrium F (F0). Each domain
of attraction comprises only a limited part of the state space, so that the system may flip
from one domain of attraction to another one as a result of exogenous disturbance. Thus, if
the system was initially, for example, on the saddlepath converging towards equilibrium D
it may be disturbed such that it no longer converges towards equilibrium D, but flips into
the domain of attraction of another equilibrium, e.g. C or E.
4.4 Formal definitions of resilience and sustainability
As we are considering a setting under uncertainty where the system may be subject to an
exogenous random shock, we shall briefly discuss diﬀerent meanings of sustainability and
resilience with respect to uncertainty, before giving the exact definitions of resilience and
sustainability that we will use in the analysis.
To guide today’s decision-making in a world of uncertainty, sustainability has to be a
meaningful and operational concept ex ante, i.e. given today’s (incomplete) information.
Such an ex-ante concept of sustainability makes an ex-ante assessment of the future con-
sequences of today’s actions with respect to some normative sustainability criterion which
refers to the actual future state of the world and given today’s information about the
uncertain future consequences of today’s action.
If, for example, a notion of strong sustainability is adopted, the normative sustainability
criterion is that, in the actual future development, critical stocks and services of (natural)
capital are maintained above some minimum levels. A corresponding ex-ante concept is
then ecological-economic viability (Baumgärtner & Quaas 2009), which demands that,
roughly speaking, the critical stocks and services of (natural) capital are maintained above
some minimum levels with some minimum probability. If, as another example, a notion
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of weak sustainability is adopted, the normative sustainability criterion is that, in the
actual future development, a given level of aggregate wealth or welfare is maintained. A
corresponding ex-ante concept is then that the certainty equivalent of the next generation’s
aggregate wealth is not smaller than the current generation’s aggregate wealth (Asheim &
Brekke 2002).
Ex ante and under uncertainty, the normative sustainability criterion – whatever it may
be – cannot be met for sure, but only with a certain probability. Even if some action is
found to be sustainable ex-ante, i.e. the action meets the ex-ante concept of sustainability,
it may ex post turn out to actually not be sustainable with respect to the normative
sustainability criterion. While meeting the ex-ante concept of sustainability is, of course,
the best that today’s actors can do under uncertainty, our interest here is to study the
question of what is the role of resilience to exogenous disturbances for actually meeting
the normative sustainability criterion in some ecological-economic system. To study this
question, we have to consider the normative sustainability criterion rather than an ex-
ante concept of sustainability. In this paper, we therefore use the term “sustainability”
synonymous to the statement that the normative sustainability criterion has been actually
met.
We define the resilience of the ecological-economic system based on Holling (1973) and
Carpenter et al. (2001): The ecological-economic system in a given state is resilient to an
exogenous disturbance if it does not flip to another domain of attraction.
Definition 1 (Resilience)
The ecological-economic system in state (x(t ), w(t )) is called resilient to disturbance by
an actual shock   at time t  if and only if the disturbed system is in the same domain of
attraction in which the system has been at the time of disturbance35:
(x(t ), w(t )) 2 Ai ) (x(t  + dt), w(t  + dt)) 2 Ai . (10)
Thus, resilience is defined relative to the system state at the time of disturbance,
(x(t ), w(t )), and the actual extent of disturbance,  36. Whether the system is ac-
tually resilient (or not) in this sense can therefore only be assessed for sure ex post, after
the disturbance has actually occurred. This means, the notion of resilience employed here
is one of ex-post. In particular, it does not express any ex-ante expectation or assessment
of resilience to all possibly occurring disturbances.
35In slight notational sloppiness, we denote the realization of the random variable by the same symbol as
the random variable.
36In the following, we will still simply speak of the system as being “resilient” for short, but this implicitly
means “resilient in state (x(t ), w(t )) to the actual disturbance  ”.
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The normative criterion for sustainability applied here is that utility shall at no time fall
below a specified level, the so-called sustainability threshold u¯.
Definition 2 (Sustainability)
A consumption path (y(t), c(t), h(t)) is called sustainable with respect to sustainability
threshold u¯ if and only if utility at no time falls below the specified threshold level u¯:
u(y(t), c(t), h(t))   u¯ for all t . (11)
Thus, sustainability is defined relative to a sustainability threshold u¯37. This captures
intergenerational equity in the sense that an equal minimum level of well-being, u¯, is sus-
tained for all generations, with ecosystem services and manufactured goods being substi-
tutes in generating well-being. Obviously, the choice of a particular sustainability threshold
u¯ requires a normative judgment.
As with the property of resilience (Definition 1), whether a consumption path is actually
sustainable or not (sensu Definition 2) can only be assessed for sure ex post, after the
disturbance has actually occurred. Therefore, the notion of sustainability (as the notion of
resilience) employed here is one of ex-post. In particular, it does not express any ex-ante
expectation or assessment of sustainability under all possibly occurring disturbances38.
Although utility u(y, c, h) directly depends only on the manufactured good and the two
ecosystem services, and not on the two stocks of natural capital per se, the two natural
capital stocks are nevertheless important to meet the sustainability criterion (11) because
the ecosystem services are to be obtained from these stocks. In other words, sustainability
criterion (11) can only be met if the levels of both natural capital stocks, fish and wood,
meet a related criterion. A necessary and suﬃcient condition, in terms of stock levels
x(t) and w(t), for sustainability criterion (11) to be met in a system that is at all times
t in a general market equilibrium where households maximize their individual utility and
profit-maximizing harvesting firms have open access to ecosystems, is that39
⇥
(qxx(t))
  1 + (qww(t))  1
⇤ 1
  1   u¯
1/↵
↵ [(1  ↵) ] 1 ↵↵
for all t . (12)
Note that with this condition, the open-access market equilibrium studied here, which
is well known to be ineﬃcient, may nevertheless be sustainable.
37In the following, we will still simply speak of “sustainability” for short, but this implicitly means “sus-
tainability of consumption path (y(t), c(t), h(t)) with respect to sustainability threshold u¯”.
38As we are not interested here in the issue of management or (optimal) control of the ecological-economic
system, we do not need to employ ex-ante notions. Ex-ante notions would be needed, though, for
studying forward-looking decision-making under uncertainty. We have elaborated elsewhere on an
ex-ante criterion of ecological-economic sustainability under uncertainty (Baumgärtner & Quaas 2009).
39Proof: Insert Eqs. (21), (22) and (23) in Eqs. (11) and rearrange.
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We call the set of all x(t) and w(t) that fulfill condition (12) for a given sustainability
threshold u¯ the sustainability set Su¯. Figure 2 illustrates the sustainability set in state space
for diﬀerent values of the sustainability threshold u¯ with parameter values qx = qw = 1,
  = 1, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.5. For each threshold level u¯, the sustainability set Su¯ comprises all
dynamic paths x(t) and w(t) that are contained for all times in the area northeast of the
magenta-colored curve.
4.5 Possible relationships between resilience and sustainability
In the following, we show that in the model described above diﬀerent relationships be-
tween resilience and sustainability may hold, depending on the initial state (x0, w0) of
the ecological-economic system, the sustainability threshold level u¯, and the disturbance
  at t  to which the system is (or is not) resilient. Each case is illustrated by an ex-
ample. For that sake, we consider the parameterization of the model that also underlies
Figure 1 (rx = rw = 0.5, kx = kw = 1, vx = vw = 0.08, qx = qw = 1,   = 1, ↵ = 0.4,
  = 0.5, n = 1). This figure thus depicts the diﬀerent domains of attraction to which our
argument refers. To start with, assume that the support of the random disturbance   is
⌦ = [0,1) ⇥ [0,1), that is, the actual disturbance may either increase or decrease the
two state variables x and w, and the states can potentially assume any non-negative values
after the disturbance.
Proposition 1
There exists an initial state (x0, w0) of the system and a sustainability threshold level u¯, so
that under any actual disturbance  at any time t  resilience is necessary for sustainability.
In particular, this is the case for all (x0, w0) 2 Su¯ if there exists an equilibrium i with
Su¯ ✓ Ai.
The proposition is proven by giving an example for (x0, w0) and u¯, so that under any ac-
tual disturbance   at any time t  resilience is necessary for sustainability. The example is
illustrated by Figure 3. Consider the initial state (x0 = 0.7, w0 = 0.5) (marked by a cyan-
colored dot) and sustainability threshold level u¯ = 0.22 (marked by a magenta-colored
curve). Suppose that sustainability holds, that is, the entire dynamic path (x(t), w(t))
remains within the sustainability set Su¯ before and after the disturbance. Then, as the
sustainability set is a subset of the domain of attraction AC of equilibrium C, the en-
tire dynamic path (x(t), w(t)) necessarily remains within this domain before and after the
disturbance. This means, the system is necessarily resilient to the disturbance. Thus,
resilience is necessary for sustainability. Evidently, this is true independently of the par-
ticular disturbance   or time of disturbance t . The crucial property here is that the
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Figure 2: Sustainability set in state space: For u¯ = 0.12, 0.17 and 0.22. For each threshold
level u¯, the sustainability set Su¯ comprises all dynamic paths x(t) and w(t) that
are contained for all times in the area northeast of the magenta-colored curve.
Parameter values: qx = qw = 1,   = 1, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.5.
73
4 The relationship between resilience and sustainability of ecological-economic systems
(x0, w0)
path after disturbance
sustainability threshold
saddlepaths
F0
E0
D0
D
E
F
C
B
A
 
stock x of fish
st
oc
k
w
of
w
oo
d
10.80.60.40.20
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Figure 3: Phase diagram illustrating Propositions 1 and 4: Resilience of the system in state
(x0 = 0.7, w0 = 0.5) to any disturbance at any time is necessary for sustainability
at threshold level u¯ = 0.22. Resilience of the system in state (x0 = 0.7, w0 = 0.5)
to disturbance   = (0.643, 0.9) at time t  = 0 is not suﬃcient for sustainability
at threshold level u¯ = 0.22. Other parameter values as in Figure 1.
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sustainability set Su¯ is fully contained within the domain of attraction AC of equilibrium
C40.
Proposition 2
There exists an initial state (x0, w0) of the system, an actual disturbance   at time t ,
and a sustainability threshold level u¯, so that resilience is not necessary for sustainability.
The proposition is proven by giving an example for (x0, w0),  , t  and u¯, so that
resilience is not necessary for sustainability. The example is illustrated by Figure 4. In
this example, the domains of attraction AC and AD of equilibria C and D are all fully
contained in the sustainability set Su¯ for threshold level u¯ = 0.12 (marked by a magenta-
colored curve). The initial state of the system, (x0 = 0.212, w0 = 0.401) (marked by a
cyan-colored dot), is assumed to be in equilibrium D’s domain of attraction AD. Without
disturbance, the system would therefore remain within the sustainability set Su¯ for all
times. Yet, sustainability is not compromised if the system flips into equilibrium C’s
domain of attraction AC as a consequence of disturbance   = (1.552, 1) at time t  = 0,
because this domain of attraction is also fully contained in the sustainability set Su¯. That
is, resilience is not necessary for sustainability.
Proposition 3
There exists an initial state (x0, w0) of the system and a sustainability threshold level u¯, so
that under any actual disturbance  at any time t  resilience is suﬃcient for sustainability.
In particular, this is the case for all (x0, w0) 2 Ai if there exists an equilibrium i with
Ai ✓ Su¯.
The proposition is proven by giving an example for (x0, w0) and u¯, so that under any
actual disturbance   at any time t  resilience is suﬃcient for sustainability. The example
is illustrated, again, by Figure 4. The initial state of the system, (x0 = 0.212, w0 = 0.401)
(marked by a cyan-colored dot), is assumed to be in equilibrium D’s domain of attraction
AD, which is fully contained in the sustainability set Su¯ for sustainability threshold level
u¯ = 0.12 (marked by a magenta-colored curve). Suppose that resilience holds, that is,
the entire dynamic path (x(t), w(t)) remains within equilibrium D’s domain of attraction
AD also after the disturbance. Then, as this domain is a subset of the sustainability set
Su¯, the entire dynamic path (x(t), w(t)) necessarily remains within the sustainability set.
Thus, resilience is suﬃcient for sustainability. Evidently, this is true independently of the
particular disturbance   or time of disturbance t . The crucial property here is that
40The proof generalizes as follows. Suppose that (x(t), w(t)) 2 Su¯ for all t   0 (sustainability). If Su¯ ✓ Ai,
as long as (x(t), w(t)) 2 Su¯ it also holds that (x(t), w(t)) 2 Ai. Thus, (x(t), w(t)) 2 Ai for all t   0
(resilience).
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Figure 4: Phase diagram illustrating Propositions 2 and 3: Resilience of the system in state
(x0 = 0.212, w0 = 0.401) to disturbance   = (1.552, 1) at time t  = 0 is not
necessary for sustainability at threshold level u¯ = 0.12. Resilience of the system
in state (x0 = 0.212, w0 = 0.401) to any disturbance at any time is suﬃcient for
sustainability at threshold level u¯ = 0.12. Other parameter values as in Figure 1.
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equilibrium D’s domain of attraction AD is fully contained within the sustainability set
Su¯41.
Proposition 4
There exists an initial state (x0, w0) of the system, an actual disturbance   at time t ,
and a sustainability threshold level u¯, so that resilience is not suﬃcient for sustainability.
The proposition is proven by giving an example for (x0, w0),  , t  and u¯, so that
resilience is not suﬃcient for sustainability. The example is illustrated, again, by Figure 3.
Consider the initial state of the system, (x0 = 0.7, w0 = 0.5) (marked by a cyan-colored
dot), which is in equilibrium C’s domain of attraction AC and also in the sustainability set
Su¯ for sustainability threshold level u¯ = 0.22 (marked by a magenta-colored curve). The
system is resilient to disturbance   = (0.643, 0.9) at time t  = 0, as the system is still
in equilibrium C’s domain of attraction after this disturbance. Yet, the disturbed system
is no longer in the sustainability set, and will, at least for some period of time, remain
outside the sustainability set. Thus, resilience is not suﬃcient for sustainability.
With these four elementary propositions, combined statements about the relationship
between resilience and sustainability are possible. Figure 3 provides an example where
resilience is necessary, but not suﬃcient, for sustainability. Figure 4 provides an example
where resilience is suﬃcient, but not necessary, for sustainability.
Propositions 2 and 4 may hold for the same initial state and sustainability threshold, but
not the same actual disturbance. Loosely speaking, this means that resilience is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient for sustainability. Strictly speaking, this means that there exists an
initial state (x0, w0) of the system and a sustainability threshold u¯ such that the following
holds: there is an actual disturbance   at any time t  such that resilience is not necessary
for sustainability, and there is another actual disturbance  0 at the same or another time
t0  such that resilience is not suﬃcient for sustainability. Figure 5 provides an example. In
this example, the sustainability set Su¯ for sustainability threshold level u¯ = 0.17 (marked
by a magenta-colored curve) partially contains, inter alia, the domains of attraction AC
and AE0 of equilibria C and E0. The initial state of the system, (x0 = 0.85, w0 = 0.18)
(marked by a cyan-colored dot), is in that part of equilibrium E0’s domain of attraction
AE0 that is also part of the sustainability set Su¯. Disturbance   = (0.882, 1.833) at time
t  = 0 would flip the system into the domain of attraction of equilibrium C, i.e. the system
is not resilient against such disturbance. Yet, the system remains in the sustainability set
41The proof generalizes as follows. Suppose the system in domain Ai is resilient to disturbance   (re-
silience). Then, if (x0, w0) 2 Ai it also holds that (x(t), w(t)) 2 Ai for all t   0. If Ai ✓ Su¯, it follows
that (x(t), w(t)) 2 Su¯ for all t   0 (sustainability).
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Figure 5: Phase diagram illustrating resilience is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for sustain-
ability: Resilience of the system in state (x0 = 0.85, w0 = 0.18) to disturbance
  = (0.882, 1.833) at time t  = 0 is not necessary for sustainability at threshold
level u¯ = 0.17; resilience to disturbance  0 = (0.882, 0.167) at time t0  = 0 is
not suﬃcient for sustainability. Other parameter values as in Figure 1.
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Su¯ for all times. That is, resilience of the system in state (x0, w0) to disturbance   at time
t  is not necessary for sustainability at threshold level u¯. Now, consider a disturbance
 0 = (0.882, 0.167) at time t0  = 0 which would leave the system in the same domain of
attraction AE0 but move it out of the sustainability domain Su¯. That is, resilience of the
system in state (x0, w0) to disturbance  0 at time t0  is not suﬃcient for sustainability at
threshold level u¯.
As long as the support of the random disturbance  is unbounded, resilience is necessary
and suﬃcient for sustainability if and only if the domain of attraction, in which the system
initially is, and the sustainability set coincide. In the model studied here, this possibility
does not exist, and it is very unlikely to exist in any model. However, resilience may
be necessary and suﬃcient for sustainability if the support of the random disturbance
  is small enough, that is, if only small disturbances may occur. Formally, there exists
an initial state (x0, w0) of the system, a sustainability threshold level u¯, and a support
⌦ ⇢ [0,1) ⇥ [0,1) of the random disturbance, so that under any actual disturbance
  2 ⌦ at any time t  resilience is necessary and suﬃcient for sustainability.
This is proven by giving an example, which is illustrated by Figure 6. The initial state of
the system, (x0 = 0.528, w0 = 0.528) (marked by a cyan-colored dot), is assumed to be in
equilibrium C, so that the system remains in this equilibrium until the time of disturbance
t . With a support ⌦ = [0.621, 1.379]⇥ [0.621, 1.379] of the random disturbance, whatever
disturbance   2 ⌦ actually occurs at time t  will not move the system outside of the
cyan-colored rectangle. Given the system dynamics (depicted in Figure 1), the system will
return to equilibrium C along a dynamic path that is entirely within both the sustainability
set Su¯ for sustainability threshold level u¯ = 0.17 and equilibrium C’s domain of attraction
AC, because the cyan-colored rectangle is fully contained within both the sustainability set
Su¯ and equilibrium C’s domain of attraction AC. Thus, both sustainability and resilience
hold, so that resilience is necessary and suﬃcient for sustainability.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how, in general, resilience is related to sustainability in
the development of an ecological-economic system. Resilience is in the first place a purely
descriptive concept of system dynamics. In contrast, sustainability is a normative con-
cept capturing basic ideas of intergenerational justice when human well-being depends on
natural capital and services. Thus, resilience and sustainability are independent concepts
characterizing the dynamics of ecological-economics systems.
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Figure 6: Phase diagram illustrating resilience is necessary and suﬃcient for sustainability:
Resilience of the system in state (x0 = 0.528, w0 = 0.528) to any disturbance  
from the support ⌦ = [0.621, 1.379] ⇥ [0.621, 1.379] at any time t  is necessary
and suﬃcient for sustainability at threshold level u¯ = 0.17. Other parameter
values as in Figure 1.
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We have distinguished and specified four possible relationships between resilience and
sustainability: a) resilience of the system is necessary, but not suﬃcient, for sustainability;
b) resilience of the system is suﬃcient, but not necessary, for sustainability; c) resilience
of the system is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for sustainability; and d) resilience of the
system is both necessary and suﬃcient for sustainability. All of those are logically possible,
and any may hold in the simple dynamic ecological-economic model that we have presented
here, depending on the initial state of the system, the normative sustainability threshold,
and the uncertain disturbance to the system.
The result that there are four potential relationships between resilience and sustainabil-
ity has a much broader validity and generally holds for all systems with more than two
domains of attraction. Generalizing from our particular model, we conjecture that the
following holds. If the sustainability set is a subset of the domain of attraction and the
system initially is in the sustainability set, resilience of the system is necessary for sustain-
ability. Resilience is suﬃcient for sustainability, on the other hand, if the entire domain of
attraction in which the system initially is, is contained in the sustainability set. Finally,
resilience and sustainability are equivalent if the domain of attraction in which the system
initially is coincides with the sustainability set.
All taken together, in general the deduction from sustainability to resilience, or vice
versa, is not possible. This has implications for the sustainable management of ecological-
economic systems. In particular, the property of resilience should not be confused with
the positive normative connotations of sustainability, and, vice versa, more criteria than
just resilience have to be taken into account when designing policies for the sustainable
development of ecological-economic systems. Rather, for the sustainable management of
an ecological-economic system it is decisive to know (1) the current state of the system,
(2) the domains of attraction of the system, (3) the sustainability norm and the associated
sustainability set in state space, and (4) the potential extent of disturbance.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for critical discussion and to the German
Federal Ministry of Education and Research for financial support under grant 01UN0607.
81
4 The relationship between resilience and sustainability of ecological-economic systems
Appendix
With the harvesting functions (3) and (4), assuming that the unit costs of harvesting eﬀort
are simply given by the wage rate, and given that the wage rate equals the marginal product
  of labor in the manufactured-goods sector, the aggregate profits of firms harvesting fish
and timber are given by:
⇡x = pxC    ex = (pxqxx   )ex , (13)
⇡w = pw H    ew = (pwqww    )ew . (14)
If firms can freely enter and exit the industry, an open-access equilibrium is characterized
by complete dissipation of resource rents, i.e. zero profits for all firms:
⇡x = 0 and ⇡w = 0 . (15)
With Eqs. (13) and (14), this condition implies that equilibrium market prices px for
fish and pw for timber are related to resource stocks x and w as follows:
px =
 
qx
x 1 , (16)
pw =
 
qw
w 1 . (17)
The Marshallian demand functions of a representative household can be obtained from
solving the utility maximization problem
max
y,c,h
u(y, c, h) subject to (6) , (18)
where u(y, c, h) is the utility function (5), and (6) is the budget constraint. The first-order
conditions lead to the Marshallian demand functions for fish and timber,
c(px, pw, ) = ↵ 
p  x
p1  x + p1  w
, (19)
h(px, pw, ) = ↵ 
p  w
p1  x + p1  w
, (20)
as well as to the demand for the manufactured good,
y(px, pw, ) = (1  ↵)  . (21)
With labor income   and the open-access equilibrium prices of the two resources, Eqs.
(16) and (17), this gives consumption of an individual household as a function of the two
resource stocks:
c(x,w) = ↵
(qxx) 
(qxx)
  1 + (qww)  1
, (22)
h(x,w) = ↵
(qww) 
(qxx)
  1 + (qww)  1
. (23)
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Using the market-clearing conditions C = nc and H = nh in the equations of motion (1
and 2) for the two resource stocks, these become
x˙ = f(x)  n c(x,w) , (24)
w˙ = g(w)  nh(x,w) . (25)
Inserting c(x,w) and h(x,w) from Equations (22) and (23), and f(x) and g(w) from
Equations (1) and (2), yields Equations (7) and (8).
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Consumer preferences determine resilience of
ecological-economic systems
Abstract: We perform a model analysis to study the origins of limited resilience in cou-
pled ecological-economic systems. We demonstrate that under open access to ecosystems
for profit-maximizing harvesting firms, the resilience properties of the system are essen-
tially determined by consumer preferences for ecosystem services. In particular, we show
that complementarity and relative importance of ecosystem services in consumption may
significantly decrease the resilience of (almost) any given state of the system. We conclude
that the role of consumer preferences and management institutions is not just to facilitate
adaptation to, or transformation of, some natural dynamics of ecosystems. Rather, con-
sumer preferences and management institutions are themselves important determinants of
the fundamental dynamic characteristics of coupled ecological-economic systems, such as
limited resilience.
Keywords: consumption, ecological-economic systems, ecosystem services, natural re-
source management, preferences, resilience
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5.1 Introduction
Natural systems that are used and managed by humans for the ecosystem services they
provide may exhibit nontrivial dynamics. This makes the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of such systems a huge challenge.
In particular, a coupled ecological-economic system may be characterized by limited
resilience (Holling 1973). That is, it exhibits multiple stability domains (“basins of attrac-
tion”) that diﬀer in fundamental system structure and controls as well as in the level and
quality of ecosystem services provided to humans. These stability domains are separated
by thresholds in the system’s state variables. Theoretically, the resilience of the system
in some state can be measured by the stability basin’s width, also known as its “latitude”
(Walker et al. 2004). As a result of exogenous natural disturbances or ill-adapted human
interference with the system, the system may flip from one stability domain into another
one with diﬀerent basic functions and controls (Holling 1973, Levin et al. 1998, Carpenter
et al. 2001, Scheﬀer et al. 2001). Examples encompass a diverse set of ecosystem types that
are highly relevant for economic use, such as boreal forests, semiarid rangelands, wetlands,
shallow lakes, coral reefs, or high-seas fisheries (Gunderson & Pritchard 2002).
As the system undergoes a regime shift and flips from one basin of attraction with
more desirable ecosystem service provision, from the anthropocentric point of view based
on valuation of ecosystem services, to a basin of attraction with less desirable ecosystem
service provision, humans will assess this change as a deterioration in ecosystem service
provision, or even as a “catastrophic” shift (Scheﬀer et al. 2001). Such system flips may
threaten the intertemporal eﬃciency of resource management and the intergenerational
equity of ecosystem services use from this system, and may thus impair a sustainable
development (Arrow et al. 1995, Perrings 2001, Perrings 2006, Mäler 2008, Derissen et al.
2011).
Many studies analyzing the role of resilience for the long-term development of coupled
ecological-economic systems explain limits to resilience, i.e. the existence of multiple and
limited basins of attraction in a dynamic system, by natural characteristics of the system
that exist prior to any human interference with the system, such as ecological properties
of shallow lakes or the interaction between grass and shrub species in semiarid rangelands.
Human management of the system then has to be adapted to this natural characteristic, or
transform the dynamic characteristics of the natural system, so as to achieve sustainability
(e.g. Berkes & Folke 1998, Gunderson et al. 2001, Berkes et al. 2002). How the stability
landscape of a coupled ecological-economic system is determined by, and may be changed
through, institutional arrangements has been analyzed by, e.g., Horan et al. (2011).
In this paper, we point out that under open access to ecosystems for profit-maximizing
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harvesting firms, which describes many exploited ecosystems, consumer preferences may
induce similar characteristics into a dynamic system. Here, the term “consumer prefer-
ences” denotes the preferences that consumers hold over the diﬀerent commodities that
are directly consumed, including ecosystem services, based on the individual utility con-
ferred by such consumption, in contrast to preferences for particular ecosystem states or
properties that may indirectly result from consumers’ behaviour, i.e., “green consumerism”.
A decrease in the resilience of some desired state in a coupled ecological-economic sys-
tem, i.e., a decrease in the corresponding stability basin’s width or an increase in the
number of alternative basins of attraction, may arise because of particular consumer pref-
erences for ecosystem services, even if the underlying ecological processes are rather simple
and management institutions are stable. To demonstrate this, we present a model of a
simple multispecies ecosystem that may be harvested for economic purposes by profit-
maximizing resource-extracting firms. We model biological interactions as competition
between the species. We show that multiple basins of attraction may be introduced into
the system’s dynamics, and, thus, the width of some desired state’s basin of attraction
may decrease, solely as a consequence of changes in consumer preferences. We also ana-
lyze how the resilience properties of the coupled ecological-economic system depend on the
consumers’ preferences for ecosystem services and on the degree of biological interaction
between species. Thus, we clearly distinguish the eﬀects of economic use and consumer
preferences from the eﬀect of ecological interactions on the system’s resilience properties.
5.2 Model
Consider the following model, which gives a highly stylized description of dynamic ecological-
economic systems. Society consists of n identical individuals whose well-being derives from
the consumption of manufactured goods (y) and two diﬀerent ecosystem services, say fish
(c) and timber (h). Assume that all three goods are essential for individual well-being
and that the two ecosystem services are complementary in human well-being. Then, a
representative household’s well-being can be described by the utility function
u(y, c, h) = y1 ↵
h
c
  1
  + h
  1
 
i↵    1
. (1)
Parameter ↵ (with 0 < ↵ < 1) expresses the representative household’s dependence on
ecosystem services, where a higher value of ↵ describes a higher relative importance of
ecosystem services for the household’s utility. Parameter   (with   > 0) represents the
elasticity of substitution between the consumption of fish and timber: a smaller value of  
implies a higher degree of complementarity of fish and timber. In the limit   ! 0, fish and
timber would be perfect complements and utility would be determined by the relatively
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scarcer ecosystem service only. In the opposite limit   ! 1, fish and timber would be
perfect substitutes and utility would be determined only by the sum of both ecosystem
services.
The dynamics of the stocks of fish (x) and wood (w) is described by the following system
of diﬀerential equations
dx
dt
= f(x,w)  C, (2)
dw
dt
= g(w, x) H, (3)
where the functions f(x,w) and g(w,x) describe the intrinsic growth of the stocks of fish
and wood, and C and H denote the aggregate amounts of fish and timber harvested.
For expositional simplicity, we specify f(x,w) and g(w,x) in a standard manner as logis-
tic growth functions with competitive interaction between species (e.g., Appendix A4 in
Scheﬀer 2009):
f(x,w) = ⇢x
✓
1  x+  xw
x
◆
x, (4)
g(w, x) = ⇢w
✓
1  w +  wx
w
◆
w, (5)
where ⇢i denotes the intrinsic growth rate and i the carrying capacity of the stocks of fish
(i = x) and wood (i = w), respectively, and  i denotes the impact of competition on species
i (i = x,w) from the other species. The specification of logistic growth functions and this
particular form of biological interaction is by no means essential for the results derived
below. But using a well-known functional form of the biological growth functions f(x,w)
and g(w,x) helps to clarify the argument and to highlight the role of consumer preferences
for the dynamics of the ecological-economic system.
The consumption of ecosystem services relies on the harvest of fish and timber. There
are mx identical fish-harvesting firms and mw identical timber-harvesting firms, where
the exact numbers are endogenously determined according to market conditions in these
two sectors. Let ex and ew denote the eﬀort, measured in units of labor, spent by some
representative fish-harvesting firm and some representative timber-harvesting firm. The
maximum amounts of fish and timber that can be harvested from the respective stocks by
individual firms are described by Gordon-Schaefer production functions
cprod = vx x ex, (6)
hprod = vw w ew, (7)
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where vx and vw denote the productivity of harvesting fish and timber, respectively. Then,
the aggregate amounts of fish and timber harvested are simply
C = mx c
prod, (8)
H = mw h
prod. (9)
Assume that each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor, so that total labor
supply of the economy is equal to human population size n. Households work either in one of
the resource harvesting sectors or in the manufactured-goods sector. Assuming that labor
is the only factor input for the production of manufactured goods, and that production
is through a constant-returns-to-scale technology, i.e., each unit of labor produces ! > 0
units of output, aggregate output of manufactured goods is
Y = ! (n mx ex  mw ew) . (10)
5.3 Analysis
To show that under open access to ecosystems for profit-maximizing harvesting firms con-
sumer preferences about ecosystem services essentially matter, we analyze the resilience
properties of the coupled ecological-economic system for diﬀerent scenarios in terms of
resource-management and consumer preferences. To this end we employ local and global
stability analysis based on graphical representation of the system’s dynamics in state space.
The analytics behind the graphical representation are derived in the Appendix.
5.3.1 Natural dynamics
In the absence of any resource harvesting by society, the system’s dynamics are completely
determined by the natural dynamics of the two resources stocks of fish and wood, described
by Equations (2) to (5) with C = H = 0. This scenario goes back to Lotka (1932) and
Volterra (1926) and sets the benchmark against which we then study the influence of
harvesting and consumer preferences on resilience.
If the dynamics of the two resource stocks are independent of each other, i.e., if there
is no interspecies competition ( x =  w = 0), both stocks converge to their respective
carrying capacities. The isoclines dx/dt = 0 and !˙ = 0 thus are the straight lines with
w = w and x = x, respectively. This dynamics is represented by the upper phase
diagram in Figure 1 for parameter values ⇢x = ⇢w = 0.5 and x = w = 1. The green
line is the isocline for dx/dt = 0, the red line is the isocline for dw/dt = 0. Below (above)
the dx/dt = 0-isocline the dynamics are characterized by dx/dt > 0(< 0). Likewise, left
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Figure 1: Phase diagrams in state space for the ecosystem’s natural dynamics without any
harvesting (C = H = 0). Dynamics is characterized by dx/dt > 0(< 0) below
(above) the green line, and dw/dt > 0(< 0) left (right) of the red line. Blue
lines indicate saddlepaths. The upper diagram displays the case of independent
species ( x =  w = 0). In the middle diagram interspecies competition is weaker
than intra-species competition ( x =  w = 0.25), and in the lower diagram,
interspecies competition is stronger than intra-species competition ( x =  w =
1.25). Parameter values for all diagrams: ⇢x = ⇢w = 0.5, x = w = 1.
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(right) of the dw/dt = 0-isocline the dynamics are characterized by dw/dt > 0(< 0). In
each segment of state space, the green and red arrows indicate this direction of dynamics.
At the intersection of the isoclines (point D: x = 1, w = 1), one has dx/dt = dw/dt = 0
and the arrows indicate that this is a stable equilibrium.
Other than D, the system has three more equilibria: A (x = w = 0), B (x = 1, w =
0) and C (x = 0, w = 1). In the absence of interspecies competition ( x =  w = 0),
it is obvious from the state-space representation (Fig. 1, upper diagram) that A is an
unstable equilibrium, whereas B and C are locally saddlepoint-stable equilibria. The basin
of attraction corresponding to the only stable equilibrium, D, comprises the entire state
space with the exception of the axes (x = 0, w   0) and (x   0, w = 0). From any
system state in this domain the system will automatically converge towards equilibrium
D. Therefore, equilibrium D is (almost) globally stable, where the “almost” refers to the
exception of the axes. In terms of resilience, (almost) every state of the natural system is
therefore characterized by (almost) unlimited resilience.
If the system exhibits interspecies competition, neither stock reaches its full carrying
capacity because of competition from the other species (Fig. 1, middle and lower diagrams).
As long as interspecies competition is weaker than intra-species competition ( i < 1),
however, the ecosystem still exhibits one (almost) globally stable equilibrium at point D
(Fig. 1, middle diagram). In terms of resilience, (almost) every state of the natural system
with moderate ecological interaction (0   i < 1) is therefore characterized by (almost)
unlimited resilience.
If interspecies competition is stronger than intra-species competition ( i > 1, Fig. 1,
lower diagram), this changes fundamentally as point D no longer represents an (almost)
globally stable equilibrium. D is now only saddlepoint-stable, but B and C are locally sta-
ble. Hence, the system exhibits two corresponding basins of attraction: the area northwest
of the saddlepath is the basin of attraction for equilibrium B, the area southwest of the
saddlepath is the basin of attraction of equilibrium C. Because of an exogenous distur-
bance, the system may flip from one basin of attraction to another. This means, ecological
interaction in the form of strong interspecies competition has a destabilizing eﬀect on the
ecosystem.
5.3.2 Profit-maximizing harvesting under open access to ecosystems significantly
weakens resilience
We now include the impact of economic resource use. That is, we no longer study an
isolated natural system, but a coupled ecological-economic system with profoundly diﬀerent
resilience properties. In this section, we study this impact for one given level of mild
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complementarity between ecosystem services in consumption, and without interspecies
competition. In the next section, we then systematically study variations in these two
parameters: complementarity and interspecies competition.
We suppose for the economic part that profit-maximizing firms can harvest the re-
source species from their natural stocks under open access and competitively sell these
ecosystem services as market products to consumers. This is the currently dominant
economic institution for the use of ecosystem services. Compared to the scenario with-
out resource harvesting and with not-too-strong interspecies competition (cf. Fig. 1,
upper and middle phase diagrams), the stability properties of the ecosystem are now
fundamentally altered (for the mathematical derivation, see Appendix). This dynam-
ics is represented by the state-space diagram shown in Figure 2 for parameter values
⇢x = ⇢ = 0.5,x = w = 1,  x =  w = 0, vx = vw = 1,↵ = 0.6,  = 0.4 and n = 1.
Figure 2: Phase diagram for the ecosystem’s dynamics under open access and profit-
maximizing harvesting. Dynamics are characterized by dx/dt > 0(< 0) left
(right) of the green line, and dw/dt > 0(< 0) below (above) the red line. A
is an unstable equilibrium; E and F are locally saddlepoint-stable equilibria; B,
C, and D are locally stable equilibria; the corresponding basins of attraction are
the area northeast of the upper saddlepath (for B), the upper saddlepath (for
F), the area in between the two saddlepaths (for D), the lower saddlepath (for
E), and the area southwest of the lower saddlepath (for C). Parameter values:
⇢x = ⇢w = 0.5,x = w = 1,  x =  w = 0, vx = vw = 1,↵ = 0.6,  = 0.4, n = 1.
Again, the green line is the isocline for dx/dt = 0, the red line is the isocline for dw/dt =
0. Left (right) of the dx/dt = 0-isocline the dynamics are characterized by dx/dt > 0(< 0).
Likewise, below (above) the dw/dt = 0-isocline the dynamics are characterized by dw/dt >
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0(< 0). In each segment of state space, the green and red arrows indicate this direction
of dynamics. While A (x = w = 0) is still an unstable equilibrium, B (x = 1, w = 0) and
C (x = 0, w = 1) are now locally stable equilibria. D is still a stable equilibrium, but it
is now only locally stable. In addition, there are two new equilibria, E and F, that are
locally saddlepoint-stable. The basins of attraction associated with the stable equilibria
are as follows: the area northwest of the upper saddlepath (for B), the upper saddlepath
(for F), the area in between the two saddlepaths (for D), the lower saddlepath (for E), and
the area southeast of the lower saddlepath (for C).
It is obvious that the particular resource management institution considered here, i.e.,
open access to ecosystems of profit-maximizing harvesting firms, has fundamentally altered
the resilience properties of the ecosystem. Although in the absence of resource harvesting
and not too-strong interspecies competition there exists only one (almost) globally stable
equilibrium, so that (almost) every state of the system is characterized by (almost) un-
limited resilience, under open access to ecosystems of profit-maximizing harvesting firms
the system has three locally stable equilibria. Each of those has an associated basin of
attraction that comprises only a limited part of the state space, so that the system may
flip from one basin of attraction to another one as a result of exogenous disturbance. In
particular, equilibrium D (with both resource species in existence) and any state in its
basin of attraction have only limited resilience, and any of those states may be disturbed
in a way that the system flips into another basin of attraction with another locally stable
equilibrium characterized by extinction of one or the other species.
5.3.3 Complementarity and relative importance of ecosystem services in
consumption decrease resilience
Consumer preferences about ecosystem services and manufactured goods are a significant
determinant of an ecosystem’s resilience properties. This is demonstrated here by illus-
trating for the institutional setting considered previously, i.e., open access to ecosystems
of profit-maximizing harvesting firms, how a change in the elasticity of substitution   be-
tween the consumption of fish and timber, and how a change in the relative importance of
ecosystem services ↵, aﬀect the resilience properties of the ecosystem.
In the previous section, the analysis of that setting was carried out for an elasticity of
substitution between the consumption of fish and timber of   = 0.4, which reflects a mild
complementarity (cf. Fig. 2). Figure 3 illustrates the resilience properties of the ecosystem
when, everything else being equal, the elasticity of substitution changes to   = 0.95 (low
complementarity) and   = 0.05 (high complementarity).
From Figure 3 (left diagram) it is apparent that even for open access and profit-maximizing
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Figure 3: Phase diagrams for the ecosystem’s dynamics under open access and profit-
maximizing harvesting for low complementarity (  = 0.95, left diagram) and
high complementarity (  = 0.05, right diagram) between ecosystem services in
consumption. Dynamics are characterized by dx/dt > 0(< 0) below (above) the
green line, and dw/dt > 0(< 0) left (right) of the red line. In the left phase
diagram, A is an unstable equilibrium, B and C are locally saddlepoint-stable
equilibria, D is the only and (almost) globally stable equilibrium; the corre-
sponding basin of attraction comprises the entire state space with the exception
of the axes (x = 0, w   0) and (x   0, w = 0). In the right phase diagram,
A is an unstable equilibrium, B and C are locally stable equilibria; the corre-
sponding basins of attraction consisting of the areas northeast (B) and south-
west (C) of the saddlepath; D is a saddlepoint-stable equilibrium whose basin of
attraction is just a one-dimensional line. Parameter values for both diagrams:
⇢x = ⇢w = 0.5,x = w = 1,  x =  w = 0, vx = vw = 1,↵ = 0.6, n = 1.
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resource harvesting, with low complementarity between ecosystem services in consumption
the resilience properties of the system are very similar as in the natural dynamics without
human resource management and with moderate interspecies competition. That is, with
low complementarity between ecosystem services in consumption, and a low relative im-
portance of ecosystem services, resource harvesting only lowers the species’ abundances at
the stable equilibrium D (cf. Fig. 1), but this equilibrium and every state of the system
in its basin of attraction are characterized by (almost) unlimited resilience.
With increasing complementarity between the two ecosystem services in consumption,
i.e., a decreasing value of  , the resilience of this equilibrium reduces. The reason for this
decrease in resilience is a vicious circle brought about by the complementarity between
ecosystem services. Because the benefits from ecosystem services use are limited by the
scarcer service, more eﬀort is spent on harvesting this resource. The increased harvesting
eﬀort, in turn, reduces the abundance of that resource even further, thus leading to self-
reenforcing dynamics. At a certain threshold value of   (  = 13 for the parameter values
used to compute the figures) the locally stable equilibrium D in Figure 3 (left diagram) loses
its stability and turns into an only saddlepoint-stable equilibrium (Fig. 3, right diagram).
The basin of attraction for this equilibrium is just a one-dimensional line. This means, its
resilience is extremely reduced and the state of the system is very brittle and sensitive to
exogenous disturbance.
Consumer preferences influence the ecological-economic system’s resilience properties
also via the relative importance of ecosystem services in the consumer’s utility function,
↵. If ecosystem services are relatively unimportant in the utility function, as compared
to the manufactured good, the system shows almost unlimited resilience. In contrast,
increasing the relative importance of ecosystem services destabilizes the system. If the
relative importance of ecosystem services is very large, the ecosystem’s resilience sharply
declines and small exogenous perturbations may lead to extinction of one of the species.
Figure 4 illustrates this result. Taking Figure 2 again as a reference point, the phase
diagrams of Figure 4 show how changes in the relative importance of ecosystem services
in the consumer’s utility-function alter the resilience properties of the system. Everything
else being equal, decreasing the value of ↵ from 0.4 to 0.25 stabilizes the system in that
interior equilibrium D is now almost globally stable (Fig. 4, left diagram). Conversely,
increasing the relative importance of ecosystem services in the consumer’s utility function
by raising ↵ from 0.4 to 0.75 entails destabilization of the system: the interior equilibrium’s
basin of attraction now consists only of the saddlepath, so its resilience is sharply reduced
and the system is very sensitive to exogenous disturbance (Fig. 4, right diagram).
In passing we note that increasing the productivity of the harvest technology, vx and vw,
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Figure 4: Phase diagrams for the ecosystem’s dynamics under open access and profit-
maximizing harvesting for diﬀerent levels of relative importance of ecosystem
services, a. Dynamics are characterized by dx/dt > 0(< 0) left (right) of the
green line, and dw/dt > 0(< 0) below (above) the red line. Blue lines indi-
cate saddlepaths. In both diagrams, A is an unstable equilibrium. In the left
diagram, relative importance of ecosystem services is low (↵ = 0.25) and D is
an (almost) globally stable equilibrium, whereas B and C are only saddlepoint-
stable. In the right diagram, relative importance of ecosystem services is high
(↵ = 0.75) and D is only saddlepoint-stable while B and C are locally sta-
ble, the corresponding basins of attraction consisting of the areas northeast
(B) and southwest (C) of the saddlepath. Parameter values for both diagrams:
⇢x = ⇢w = 0.5,x = w = 1,  x =  w = 0, vx = vw = 1,  = 0.4, n = 1.
has qualitatively exactly the same eﬀect as increasing the relative importance of ecosystem
services in the consumer’s utility function, ↵: in a market economy and under open access
to ecosystems, both changes lead to an increase in harvesting pressure, which reduces the
potential for sustainable resource use. Similarly, decreasing the resources’ intrinsic growth
rates, ⇢x and ⇢w, lowers their ability to recover from harvesting and destabilizes the system
in qualitatively the same way.
The general insight from the analysis so far is that resilience of the interior equilibrium
with both resource species in existence (point D) tends to decrease (i) with increasing com-
plementarity, i.e., decreasing elasticity of substitution, between the two ecosystem services
in consumption and (ii) with increasing relative importance of ecosystem services for the
consumer’s well-being. In other words, although complementarity and relative importance
of ecosystem services in consumption reduce the resilience of the interior equilibrium with
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both resource species in existence, substitutability and relative unimportance of ecosys-
tem services in consumption tend to make this equilibrium and all system states in its
basin of attraction more resilient. This general insight continues to hold with interspecies
competition. This is shown in the remainder of the section.
Whereas in Figures 2 to 4 there was no interspecies competition, in the analogously
constructed phase diagrams of Figure 5 there is weak interspecies competition ( i = 0.25).
Figure 5 shows that the destabilizing eﬀect of complementarity in consumption also occurs
under interspecies competition. The same holds for the destabilizing eﬀect of relative
importance of ecosystem services (not shown).
In all three phase diagrams of Figure 5, equilibrium A, where both species are extinct,
is unstable. In the case of low complementarity (  = 0.95; Fig. 5, upper diagram), D
is an (almost) globally stable equilibrium, whereas B and C are only saddle-point stable.
Thus, there is only one basin of attraction and coexistence of both species is likely. At a
certain threshold value of   (about   = 0.62 for the parameter values used to compute the
figures) the locally stable equilibrium D loses its stability and turns into a saddlepoint-
stable equilibrium: D lies on a saddle-path and B and C are locally stable equilibria. In
other words, if complementarity is high enough, there are two basins of attraction and
the interior equilibrium D exhibits very limited resilience (  = 0.4, middle and   = 0.05;
Fig. 5, lower diagram). Note that compared to Figures 2 to 4, the threshold value of  
in Figure 5 is higher (i.e., threshold-complementarity is lower) because of the additional
destabilizing eﬀect of species competition.
The destabilizing eﬀect of increasing interspecies competition also occurs under resource
harvesting. This is shown in Figure 6 for a given level of resource complementarity. With-
out interspecies competition ( x =  w = 0; Fig. 6, upper diagram), the interior equilibrium
D with both resource species in existence is locally stable, but exhibits limited resilience be-
cause of open-access resource harvesting. The resilience of this interior equilibrium sharply
decreases with the introduction of species competition ( x =  w = 0.25; Fig. 6, middle
diagram): equilibrium D’s basin of attraction shrinks to a one-dimensional-line. Thus the
system is very brittle and sensitive to exogenous disturbances. Once dislodged from point
D, the system will converge to either point B or C, where only one of the species exists.
Both B and C remain locally stable equilibria. Further increasing the strength of inter-
species competition ( x =  w = 1.25; Fig. 6, lower diagram) entails lower abundances of
both species at the saddlepoint-equilibrium D.
Comparing Figure 6 to Figure 1 shows that the eﬀects on resilience of increasing inter-
species competition are also present under economic resource use. In Figure 6 however,
as equilibrium D’s resilience is already decreased by resource harvesting and consumer
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Figure 5: Phase diagrams for the ecosystem’s dynamics with interspecies competition for
diﬀerent levels of complementarity between ecosystem services in consumption,
s. Dynamics in each diagram are characterized by dx/dt > 0(< 0) left (right)
of the green line, and dw/dt > 0(< 0) below (above) the red line. Blue lines
indicate saddlepaths. The upper diagram shows the case of low complementarity
(  = 0.95), the middle diagram displays mild complementarity (  = 0.4) and
the lower diagram high complementarity (  = 0.05). Parameter values for all
diagrams: ⇢x = ⇢w = 0.5,x = w = 1,  x =  w = 0.25, vx = vw = 1,↵ =
0.6, n = 1.
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preferences, low levels of species competition are suﬃcient to significantly further decrease
the resilience of the system. Put another way, open access economic resource use, relative
importance of ecosystem services and complementarity in consumption entail a decrease
of resilience that may be even larger with stronger species competition.
5.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Our analysis has demonstrated that consumer preferences are an important determinant
of the dynamic characteristics of coupled ecological-economic systems, such as limited
resilience. In particular, we have clearly distinguished the eﬀects of economic use and
consumer preferences from the eﬀect of ecological interactions on the system’s resilience
properties.
We have identified three destabilizing eﬀects that genuinely stem from consumer pref-
erences in an ecological system used for economic purposes. First, we have shown that
profit-maximizing harvesting by competitive firms under open access to the ecosystem
considerably weakens the resilience of the interior equilibrium of the coupled ecological-
economic system as compared to the natural dynamics. Second, we have shown that
complementarity of ecosystem services in consumption significantly reduces the resilience
of the system’s interior equilibrium where both species are in existence. The economic
logic behind this result is the following: out of two complementary ecosystem services,
the scarcer one is limiting the benefits from ecosystem service use. Hence, under an in-
stitutional setting of open access, this ecosystem service is the one to which harvesting is
directed primarily. The increased harvesting eﬀort, in turn, reduces the abundance of that
resource even further, thus leading to self-reenforcing dynamics.
Third, we have shown that an increased relative importance of ecosystem services for the
consumer’s well-being destabilizes the system. The economic logic behind this result is the
following: if consumers’ well-being derives to a larger degree from ecosystem services, the
share of their budget spent on ecosystem services increases. In a market economy and under
open access to resource, this leads to an increase in harvesting pressure, which reduces the
potential for sustainable resource use. Conversely, if the consumer’s well-being does not, or
only to a small degree, derive from consuming ecosystem services, harvesting pressure on
the ecosystem is very low and it displays an almost globally resilient interior equilibrium.
These three preference-eﬀects act in addition to the ecological mechanisms that are well-
known to destabilize an ecological-economic system and to give rise to multiple basins of
attraction and limited resilience: increased competition between species and low intrinsic
growth rates (e.g. Scheﬀer 2009).
Although our model analysis was based on specific functional forms and certain proper-
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Figure 6: Phase diagrams for the ecosystem’s dynamics at a given level of resource com-
plementarity and increasing interspecies competition,  i. Dynamics in each di-
agram are characterized by dx/dt > 0(< 0) left (right) of the green line, and
dw/dt > 0(< 0) below (above) the red line. Blue lines indicate saddlepaths.
The upper diagram displays the case of independent species ( x =  w = 0).
Competition occurs in the middle ( x =  w = 0.25) and increases in the lower
( x =  w = 1.25) diagram. Parameter values for all diagrams: ⇢x = ⇢w =
0.5,x = w = 1, vx = vw = 1,↵ = 0.6,  = 0.4, n = 1.
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ties of the particular functions used, of course, determine the results obtained, our results
would qualitatively survive a fair amount of generalization. As for the utility function (1),
the crucial property, upon which our results critically depend, is the complementarity be-
tween the two ecosystem services and the substitutability of aggregate ecosystem services
by manufactured goods. As for the logistic growth functions (4) and (5) for both biological
resources, the crucial property, upon which our results critically depend, is that the intrinsic
growth rate is bounded as the stock declines to zero. Other models with this property, such
as the Beverton & Holt (1957) or the Ricker (1954) models used to describe the dynamics
of fish stocks, would yield qualitatively the same results. In contrast, if the intrinsic growth
rate increased to infinity as the stock level declines to zero one would obtain qualitatively
very diﬀerent results. Assuming the existence of a minimum viable population level for one
or both biological resources would make the whole system even more instable, as we have
demonstrated elsewhere (Derissen et al. 2011), and would therefore reinforce our results.
As for the Gordon-Schaefer-harvest functions (6) and (7), the crucial property, upon which
our results critically depend, is that harvest positively depends on the stock level. Any
other harvest function with this property would yield qualitatively the same results. As for
the institutional setting, strong complementarity between ecosystem services reduces the
resilience of the ecological-economic system also when resources are optimally managed,
provided the discount rate applied is relatively large (Quaas et al. 2011).
In the joint endeavor of natural and social scientists as well as practitioners of resource
management to understand and manage coupled ecological-economic systems for sustain-
ability, our results call for truly interdisciplinary and integrated analysis of such systems
and their management.
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Appendix
Taking manufactured goods as the numeraire, the representative household’s utility max-
imization problem is
max
y,c,h
u(y, c, h) subject to ! = y + pxc+ pwh , (11)
where px and pw are the market prices of fish and timber, respectively. With utility function
(1), this leads to Marshallian demand functions for fish and timber:
c(px, pw,!) = ↵!
p  x
p1  x + p1  w
and (12)
h(px, pw,!) = ↵!
p  w
p1  x + p1  w
. (13)
Profits of representative firms harvesting fish and timber are given by
⇡x = px c
prod   !ex = (pxvxx  !) ex and (14)
⇡w = pw h
prod   !ew = (pwvww   !) ew , (15)
where production functions (6) and (7) have been employed in the second equality. In
open access equilibrium, which is characterized by zero profits, i.e. ⇡x = 0 and ⇡w = 0 for
all firms, we thus have the following relationships between equilibrium market prices and
resource stocks of fish and wood:
px =
!
vx
x 1 and (16)
pw =
!
vw
w 1 . (17)
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Inserting these expressions into demand functions (12) and (13), we obtain open- access
per-capita resource demands of fish and timber as functions of the respective resource
stocks:
c(x,w) = ↵
(vxx) 
(vxx)
  1 + (vww)  1
and (18)
h(x,w) = ↵
(vww) 
(vxx)
  1 + (vww)  1
. (19)
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Combining performance-based and action-based payments to
provide environmental goods under uncertainty
Abstract: Payments for environmental services (PES) are widely adopted to support
the conservation of biodiversity and other environmental goods. Challenges that PES
schemes have to tackle are (i) environmental uncertainty and (ii) information asymmetry
between the provider of the service (typically a farmer) and the regulator. Environmental
uncertainty calls for action-based payment schemes, because of the more favorable risk
allocation if the farmer is risk-averse. Information asymmetry, on the other hand, calls for
a performance-based payment, because of the more direct incentives for the farmer. Based
on a principal-agent model, we study the optimal combination of both, performance-based
and action-based payments under conditions of environmental uncertainty and asymmetric
information. We find that for a risk-neutral regulator a combination is optimal in the
majority of cases and that the welfare gain of the combined scheme over a pure action-
based (performance-based) payment increases with information asymmetry (environmental
uncertainty). We further show that for a regulator who is risk-averse against fluctuations
in environmental goods provision the optimal performance-based payment is lower than
for a risk-neutral regulator. We quantitatively illustrate our findings in a case study on the
enhancement of the butterfly Scarce Large Blue (Maculinea teleius) in Landau/Germany.
Keywords: Conservation Contracts, Payments for Ecosystem Services, Payments for En-
vironmental Services, Biodiversity, Uncertainty
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6.1 Introduction
The protection and enhancement of environmental assets are objectives shared by many
governments around the globe. Often these assets depend on how farmers manage their
private land, but as they typically have characteristics of public goods, farmers have little
incentives to make socially optimal decisions (Bardsley and Burfund 2008). For this reason
policy instruments such as payments for environmental or ecosystem services (PES) have
been advocated to create incentives similar to those that would be provided by market
prices, if markets for environmental services would exist (e.g. Bulte et al. 2008, Corbera
et al. 2007, Vatn 2009).
Two types of payment schemes are used in practice: Action-based payments are bound to
a predefined action or measure, whereas performance-based payments are directly bound to
the outcome of a desired ecosystem good or service42. Performance-based payments have
the advantage that they set the direct incentive to provide ecosystem services eﬃciently
(Matzdorf 2004, Zabel & Roe 2009). A drawback of performance-based payment schemes is
that the risk of producing an ecosystem good comes at the expense of the farmer, since the
quantity of environmental service also depends on external influences beyond the farmer’s
control. If the farmer is risk-averse, and the regulator is risk-neutral, a pure performance-
based payment scheme thus leads to an ineﬃcient risk allocation43. As a result, most
existing schemes are action-based, although performance-based payments are sometimes
applied for the conservation of an already given state or of existing biodiversity (Osterburg
2006, Hampicke 2001). Action-based payments may be a cost-eﬀective alternative if there is
a clear action that is required to provide the environmental good, known and observable by
the regulator (Gibbons et al. 2011). If there is informational asymmetry between farmer
and regulator, however, a pure action-based payment is likely to lead to an ineﬃcient
outcome.
In this paper, we consider payment schemes that combine performance-based and action-
based payments. We set up a principal-agent model to study what combination of both
is optimal when there is both environmental uncertainty aﬀecting the provision of the
environmental good and asymmetric information about how productive a management
42Many labels for these payment schemes can be found within the literature. Other common names for
action-based payments are e.g. input- or measure-based payments, for performance-based payments the
terms output-oriented, outcome- or result-based payments are also common.
43An eﬃciency improvement in the risk-allocation could be obtained by shifting risk from the risk-averse
farmer to the risk-neutral regulator. One way of doing this (the one considered in this paper) is to
combine a pure performance-based payment to some extent with an action-based payment.
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asymmetric information
between farmer and regulator
both perfectly informed
environmental risk combination action-based
no environmental risk performance-based any
Table 1: Table showing the optimal PES scheme for a risk-neutral regulator.
action is for providing the environmental good.
We find that the optimal payment typically will be a combination of performance-based
and action-based payments (see Table 1). A pure performance-based payment is optimal
for a risk-neutral regulator (the principal) only if either there is no environmental risk or
if the farmer (the agent) is risk-neutral. A pure action-based payment is optimal only
if the regulator has full information about the marginal productivity of the actions for
providing the environmental good. The performance-based fraction of the optimal pay-
ment increases with environmental uncertainty, while the action-based fraction increases
with information asymmetry. These findings are also reflected in the welfare gains of the
combined scheme over the pure performance-based or action-based schemes: the welfare
gain, measured as the payoﬀ of a risk-neutral regulator, of the optimally combined scheme
over an optimally chosen, pure action-based (performance-based) payment increases with
information asymmetry (environmental uncertainty).
The assumption of a risk-neutral regulator may be inappropriate, because society’s
marginal willingness to pay for the environmental asset may increase if an environmen-
tal asset becomes increasingly scarce. For this reason we also consider a regulator who
is risk-averse against fluctuations in environmental goods provision. As the argument for
an action-based payment scheme is the more favorable allocation of risk if the farmer is
risk-averse but the regulator is risk-neutral, one might expect that the performance-based
fraction of the optimal payment might be relatively higher when the regulator is risk-averse.
We find, however, that the optimal performance-based payment actually decreases with
the regulator’s degree of risk aversion.
We apply our analysis to the case study on the enhancement of the butterfly Scarce
Large Blue (Maculinea teleius) in Landau/Germany, based on data from the literature
(Drechsler et al. 2007, Wätzold et al. 2008). Results indicate that the optimal combination
of the performance-based and action-based payments may lead to a welfare gain of several
thousand euros per hectare.
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6.2 Principal-agent model of environmental good provision under
uncertainty
We consider a principal-agent setting where a regulator (the principal) oﬀers a PES to a
single, representative farmer (the agent), who chooses an action that contributes to the
production of an environmental good. This means, we assume that all farmers share the
same characteristics with respect to preferences and production technology44. We thereby
extend the approach of Zabel & Roe (2009), allowing for a combination of a performance-
based payment with an action-based payment, and risk aversion on the regulator’s side.
The temporal structure of the problem is that, first, the principal announces the payment
scheme. Second, the agent decides on whether or not he would like to participate in the
program. If he participates, he receives (or pays) a base-payment. Third, the agent chooses
his action, and fourth, nature adds stochastic disturbance. Finally, the agent receives
performance-based and action-based payments from the principal, and society enjoys the
environmental good.
The quantity y of the environmental good is produced according to
y =  x+ ". (1)
The provision of the environmental good can be increased by the farmer’s action x with a
constant marginal productivity  . For example, x can be thought of as the area of farmland
set aside for biodiversity protection. We consider y to be the additional environmental
goods provided, i.e. y is the (net) growth of the environmental good. This growth is also
aﬀected by a stochastic disturbance ", capturing environmental noise, which is independent
and identically normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation  "45.
Marginal productivity   of the action x is known to the farmer, but not to the regu-
lator. This information asymmetry arises, because the farmer knows the peculiarities of
his farmland while the regulator does not. The regulator only knows a prior probability
distribution over  . We assume that this is any probability distribution with a mean  ¯
and variance  2 . The quantity x of the action exerted by the farmer is common knowledge
of both farmer and regulator.
Some important and restrictive assumptions about the production of the environmental
good are embodied in Eq. (1), which we shall discuss in the following.
44The question how to deal with heterogenous farmers (for example by designing adequate auction schemes
such as, e.g. Latacz-Lohmann & van der Hamsvoort (1997)) is beyond the scope of this paper.
45Note that the net growth of the environmental good may be negative even with a positive eﬀort x, due
to environmental uncertainty.
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(i) Taking asymmetry with regard to the observability of the farmer’s action into account
has similar eﬀects as the information asymmetry with regard to marginal productivity and
could be included in the model in a straightforward way. In either case the essential
assumption is that the farmer may have more information about his contribution to the
provision of the environmental good than the regulator.
(ii) Assuming perfect information on   on the farmer’s side is rather strong. However,
the crucial aspect of this assumption is that the farmer has better information about what
he is doing than the regulator. Assuming perfect information only simplifies the analysis.
Environmental uncertainty, captured by " in equation Eq. (1), is an aspect of incomplete
information about the production of y faced by the farmer and the regulator to an equal
extent.
(iii) As we are considering a representative farmer, assuming production of the environ-
mental good according to Eq. (1) means that either there are no external eﬀects between
farmers, or that all external eﬀects are internalized, for example by a farmer’s association
that negotiates about the PES contract with the regulator.
We consider a payment ! for the provision of the environmental good that is composed
of a base payment b, a payment for the action, a x, and of a payment for the performance,
i.e. the provision of the environmental good, p y,46
! = b+ a x+ p y. (2)
Because of environmental uncertainty, y may be negative. In such a case the performance-
based payment p y will be negative as well, although typically the expected performance-
based payment will be positive. The base payment b is chosen such that the farmer
nevertheless has an incentive to participate in the PES scheme. Using the base payment
to meet the participation constraint is in line with the recent literature on PES that has
adopted this approach from labor economics (Zabel & Roe 2009)47.
The participation constraint could also be met in other ways, for example by increasing
the action-based component of the overall payment to compensate for expected losses in
the performance-based component, or by restricting the performance-based payment to be
46We restrict our analysis to linear combinations of the three payment parts here. An analysis of more
general payment structures is left for future research.
47One example for combined payment schemes can be found in Switzerland: Here the schemes contain
site-specific direct payments, similar to the base payment considered here. Additional payments are
bound to the condition that 7% of the farm area are managed in line with specific ecological stan-
dards, corresponding to the action-based payment considered here. Finally, the Swiss authority adds a
performance-based payment when biodiversity is suﬃciently high.
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nonnegative. These approaches will lead to lower welfare, however, either because they
induce distortions in the payment structure (as for the case of the adapted action-based
payment), or because the expected public expenditures associated with the PES scheme are
unnecessarily high (when performance-based payments are restricted to be nonnegative).
For these reasons, a negative base payment may well be part of the optimal payment
scheme.
If the farmer participates in the program, his payoﬀ Y is given by
Y = !   c
2
x2. (3)
Here we use c to denote the cost parameter of the action, with linearly increasing
marginal costs. If the farmer does not participate, both payment and costs are zero,
and thus the net payoﬀ is zero.
The farmer maximizes expected utility. We assume a risk-averse farmer with preferences
that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA):48
U = E" [  exp ( ⌘ Y )] , (4)
where ⌘ is the coeﬃcient of constant absolute risk aversion and E" denotes the expectation
with respect to environmental uncertainty ".
As participation is voluntary, expected utility of participation in the program must at
least equal utility from not participating in the program and receiving a zero net payoﬀ
for sure. With U(0) =   exp(0) =  1 denoting the reservation utility level of the farmer,
the participation constraint is
E" [  exp ( ⌘ Y )]    1. (5)
The regulator receives a benefit
v(y) = y   ⇢
2
y2 (6)
from the provision of the environmental good. The quadratic benefit function (6) captures
in a simple form that the regulator may be averse against uncertainty in the provision
of the environmental good, with ⇢ being the regulator’s coeﬃcient of risk aversion. The
benefit v(y) is measured in monetary terms, such that the regulator’s net benefit is given
by v(y)   !. This assumption may actually be quite restrictive. It presupposes that the
48We make this assumption to be able to solve the model analytically. It is in line with most models
of this type. More realistic is the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion (Gollier 2001). A deeper
exploration of this case is, again, left for future research.
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environmental good desired by the regulator is well-defined and that further its benefit
can be measured in monetary terms. For the case study, we use published results from
a contingent valuation study for this purpose. We make this assumption here, as we
are not interested in studying the eﬀects of ill-defined objectives49. The quadratic benefit
function (6) implies that the marginal environmental benefit is linear in y. As the marginal
environmental benefit can be identified with the willingness to pay (WTP) for the provision
of the environmental good, the specification Eq. (6) is in line with a common empirical
specification of the WTP for environmental goods.
The optimal payment scheme (a, b, p) is derived by solving the regulator’s optimization
problem to maximize expected net benefit
max
a,p,b
E  [E"[v(y)  !]] (7)
subject to the constraints that the action x is chosen by the farmer such as to maximize
the farmer’s expected utility and the participation constraint Eq. (5).
6.3 Analytical results: Optimal combination of performance-based and
action-based payments
The problem is solved backwards by first considering the farmer’s optimization for given
payment levels (b, a, p). Inserting Eq. (1) and (2) into Eq. (4), the farmer’s expected utility
is
E"
h
  exp
⇣
 ⌘
⇣
b+ (a+ p )x+ p "  c
2
x2
⌘⌘i
. (8)
Taking the expectation over environmental uncertainty we obtain
U˜ =  1
⌘
ln( U) = b+ (a+ p )x  c
2
x2   ⌘
2
p2  2" , (9)
which is the certainty equivalent of the income lottery generated by participating in the
PES with uncertain provision of the environmental good.
Using the first-order conditions of utility maximization with respect to x, we find that
the farmer’s optimal choice of action is (see appendix 6.5)
x? =
8<:
a+p 
c if U˜   0
0 if U˜ < 0.
(10)
Assuming that the farmer participates in the PES program (which is the case if U˜   0),
the optimal action is increasing in both action-based and performance-based payments, and
49Ill-defined objectives may favor action-based payments compared to performance-payments (Zabel &
Roe 2009).
116
6 Combining performance-based and action-based payments to provide environmental
goods under uncertainty
decreasing in the cost parameter c, which is in line with intuition. For a given performance-
based payment p, it is also increasing in the marginal productivity   of the action (cf.
appendix 6.5).
Using the result of Eq. (10) in Eq.(1), we find that the (uncertain) provision of the
environmental good under payment scheme (b, a, p) is given by
y⇤ =  
a+ p 
c
+ ". (11)
For a given marginal productivity   of the farmer’s action, and a given payment scheme
(b, a, p), the expected benefit of environmental good provision (conditional on  ) thus is
E" [v(y
⇤)] = E"
"
 
a+ p 
c
+ "  ⇢
2
✓
 
a+ p 
c
+ "
◆2#
=  
a+ p 
c
  ⇢
2
✓
 
a+ p 
c
◆2
  ⇢
2
 2" . (12)
To obtain this result, we have used that the expected value of " is zero. Environmental
uncertainty thus decreases the benefit of a risk-averse regulator, but this eﬀect is indepen-
dent of the payment scheme. This means that, in the absence of asymmetric information,
risk aversion on the regulator’s side has no influence on the optimal payment scheme. Put
diﬀerently, we have the following lemma (which we need to derive result 3):
Lemma 1. Environmental uncertainty does not directly aﬀect the optimal payment scheme
for a risk-averse regulator.
Environmental uncertainty aﬀects the optimal payment scheme indirectly, however, be-
cause the farmer is risk-averse, as we will show below. To meet the participation constraint,
the regulator has to set the base payment b such that reservation utility is reached. The
certainty equivalent of participating in the PES is obtained by using Eq. (10) in Eq. (9).
Equating this to the certainty equivalent of not participating, which is equivalent to an
income of zero, we obtain the minimal base payment b of
b? =
⌘
2
p2  2"  
(a+ p )2
2 c
. (13)
With a risk-averse farmer, environmental uncertainty increases the base payment. As
the performance-based payment p y may either be positive (in case of favorable environ-
mental conditions) or negative (in case of very unfavorable environmental conditions), the
eﬀect of p on the based payment is ambiguous. The action-based payment a, by contrast,
unambiguously decreases the base payment.
Overall, the base payment may well be negative, because the expected value of action-
based and performance-based payments is positive. In such a case the regulator can use
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the base payment to reduce expected public expenditures associated with the PES scheme.
Such a negative base payment then means that a farmer will have to make a payment to
the regulator in order to benefit from the participation in the PES scheme. Depending
on the parameter constellation, in particular if environmental uncertainty is large and the
farmer is very risk-averse, the base payment may of course also be positive. In this case
the participating farmer receives a payment just for agreeing to participate in the PES
program.
Using Eq. (10), (11), and (13) in Eq. (2), the expected payment can be expressed as
E"[!] =
(a+ p )2
2 c
+
⌘
2
p2  2" . (14)
As the farmer is risk-averse, and the performance-based payment is aﬀected by envi-
ronmental uncertainty, the optimal payment rate p depends on environmental uncertainty.
Using Eq. (12), (13), and (14) in Eq.(7), and employing Lemma 1, the regulator’s opti-
mization problem can be written as
max
a,p
E 
⇢
 
a+ p 
c
  ⇢
2
✓
 
a+ p 
c
◆2
  (a+ p )
2
2 c
  ⌘
2
p2  2"
 
. (15)
In appendix 6.5 we show that the optimal action-based and performance-based payments
are
a? =
 ¯
⌦
⇣
c ⌘  2" + 2
⇢
c
 ¯2  2 
⌘
(16a)
p? =
 2 
⌦
⇣
1  ⇢
c
 
 ¯2    2 
 ⌘
(16b)
with
⌦ ⌘  2  + c ⌘  2" +
⇢
c
 
2 2 
 
 ¯2 + 2 2 
 
+ c ⌘
 
 ¯2 +  2 
 
 2"
 
+
⇢2
c2
 2 
 
 ¯4 + 3 4 
 
> 0. (17)
To analyze the optimal payment scheme, we first focus on the case of a risk-neutral
regulator, assuming ⇢ = 0. In this case, the optimal payments are given by the following,
much simpler expressions.
a?|⇢=0 =  ¯
c ⌘  2"
 2  + c ⌘  
2
"
(18a)
p?|⇢=0 =
 2 
 2  + c ⌘  
2
"
(18b)
The following result is obtained immediately.
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Result 1. For a risk-neutral regulator (⇢ = 0), the optimal PES scheme includes both an
action-based and a performance-based component, except for the following cases
• If the farmer is risk-neutral (⌘ = 0), or if there is no environmental uncertainty
( 2" = 0), the action-based component of the optimal payment scheme is zero.
• If there is no asymmetric information,  2  = 0, the performance-based component of
the optimal payment scheme is zero.
This result shows that an optimal PES scheme should combine both an action-based
and a performance-based payment. The only exceptions are extreme cases where either
environmental uncertainty plays no role or the regulator has perfect information about the
productivity of the farmer’s actions. Furthermore, the relative shares of the action-based
and the performance-based component of the optimal PES scheme depends on environ-
mental uncertainty and information asymmetry in a very intuitive way, as stated in the
following result.
Result 2. a) For a risk-neutral regulator (⇢ = 0), the optimal action-based payment in-
creases and the optimal performance-based payment decreases with the farmer’s degree of
risk aversion, ⌘, and with environmental uncertainty,  ".
b) For a risk-neutral regulator (⇢ = 0), the optimal action-based payment decreases and
the optimal performance-based payment increases with the degree of asymmetric informa-
tion,   .
We now turn to the case of a risk-averse regulator, assuming ⇢ > 0, and focus on the
question how the optimal payment scheme compares to the case of a risk-neutral regulator.
The optimal payment scheme is much more complicated than in the case of a risk-neutral
regulator. We show in appendix 6.5 that the optimal action-based payment depends in an
ambiguous way on the degree of risk aversion. For low levels of risk aversion for both the
regulator and the farmer, the optimal action-based payment increases with the regulator’s
degree of risk aversion. We find that even for a risk-neutral farmer the optimal action-based
payment for a risk-averse regulator is positive, which is diﬀerent from the case of a risk-
neutral regulator. For very high levels of risk aversion of regulator and farmer, however,
the optimal action-based payment will decrease again with the regulator’s risk aversion.
The performance-based payment, by contrast, decreases with the regulator’s degree of risk
aversion whenever it is positive at all.
Result 3. a) For a risk-averse regulator, the optimal action-based payment is positive even
when the farmer is risk-neutral.
b) The optimal performance-based payment decreases with the regulator’s degree of risk
aversion,
@p?
@⇢
< 0 for all p? > 0. (19)
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The intuition behind this result is as follows. The farmer will choose his action x? in
response to the payment according to Eq. (10). An increase in the action-based payment
will increase the farmer’s action independently of the marginal productivity, while an
increase in the performance-based payment will lead to a lower (higher) increase in the level
of his action if marginal productivity is low (high). Relative to the action-based payment,
the performance-based payment thus amplifies the eﬀect of the regulator’s uncertainty on
marginal productivity on the provision of the environmental good. The more risk-averse the
regulator, the relatively less attractive becomes the performance-based payment compared
to the action-based payment50.
In the extreme, the performance-based payment may even become negative. This is the
case if
⇢ >
c
 ¯2    2 
. (20)
A second eﬀect is that the presence of informational asymmetry and the associated
risk premium make the payment for environmental services overall less attractive for the
risk-averse regulator. If this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong – which is the case for high envi-
ronmental uncertainty – also the optimal action-based payment is lower for a risk-averse
compared to a risk-neutral regulator.
As a final step of the analysis we study how high is the welfare gain, measured by the
regulator’s objective function, for the combined payment scheme compared to either a
pure action-based or a pure performance-based payment scheme. The pure action-based,
or performance-based, schemes are obtained by setting p ⌘ 0, or a ⌘ 0, in the regulator’s
optimization problem Eq. (15).
In appendix 6.5 we derive the welfare levels for all three payment schemes, assuming a
risk-averse regulator. We find that the combined payment scheme outperforms the pure
action-based scheme except for the case when the regulator has full information, i.e.  2  = 0.
The combined scheme outperforms the pure performance-based scheme except for the case
when there is no environmental uncertainty,  2" = 0, and when the regulator is risk-neutral,
⇢ = 0. For a risk-averse regulator, the pure performance-based scheme is worse than the
combined scheme even in the absence of environmental uncertainty (see also result 3a).
For a risk-neutral regulator, the comparisons for the welfare levels is as follows. The
welfare gain of the combined payment scheme over the pure action-based scheme is given
50This result depends on the assumption that the informational asymmetry between the farmer and the
regulator is with regard to the marginal productivity of the action, but that there is no hidden action.
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by
E [v(y)  !]  E [v(y)  !]|p⌘0
   
⇢=0
=
1
2 c
 4 
 2  + c ⌘  
2
"
, (21a)
and the welfare gain of the combined payment scheme over the pure performance-based
scheme is given by
E [v(y)  !]  E [v(y)  !]|a⌘0|⇢=0 =
1
2 c
 
 ¯ c ⌘  2"
 2⇣
 2  + c ⌘  
2
"
⌘ ⇣
 ¯2 +  2  + c ⌘  
2
"
⌘ . (21b)
Finally, the welfare diﬀerence between the pure performance-based PES scheme and the
pure action-based one is given by
E [v(y)  !]|a⌘0   E [v(y)  !]|p⌘0
   
⇢=0
=
1
2 c
 4  +  ¯
2
⇣
 2    c ⌘  2"
⌘
 ¯2 +  2  + c ⌘  
2
"
. (21c)
Using these relationships, we obtain the following result:
Result 4. For a risk-neutral regulator (⇢ = 0),
a) The welfare gain of the combined PES scheme over the pure action-based scheme
increases with information asymmetry  2  and decreases with both the farmer’s degree
of risk aversion ⌘ and environmental uncertainty,  2" .
b) The welfare gain of the combined PES scheme over the pure performance-based scheme
decreases with information asymmetry  2  and increases with both the farmer’s degree
of risk aversion ⌘ and environmental uncertainty,  2" .
c) The pure performance-based PES scheme is better than the pure action-based one if
and only if
c ⌘  2" <  
2
 
 
1 +
 2 
 ¯2
!
. (22)
Inequality (22) gives an explicit condition which instrument to use if only pure performance-
based or action-based payments are available. As found in Result 2, the performance-based
component of the optimal payment tends to be low when the farmer’s coeﬃcient of risk-
aversion, ⌘, and environmental uncertainty,  " are high, while the action-based component
of the optimal payment tends to be low when the degree of informational asymmetry is
high. These eﬀects are also captured in condition (22). A “high” coeﬃcient of risk-aversion
thereby means that 1/⌘ is low relative to the cost parameter c, and a “high” informational
asymmetry means that    is high relative to  ¯.
In order to quantify these eﬀects, we apply our analysis to the case of butterfly protection.
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6.4 Quantitative application: Optimal payment scheme for butterfly
protection
We base our quantitative application on published ecological-economic studies on the con-
servation of the Scarce Large Blue (Maculinea teleius) in the region of Landau, Germany
(Drechsler et al. 2007, Wätzold et al. 2008). Within European nature conservation, but-
terflies of the Maculinea genus are considered as important flagship species (Dierks &
Fischer 2009, Thomas & Settele 2004) and have suﬀered substantial population declines
with local extinctions in recent years (Wynhoﬀ 1998). M. teleius is therefore considered
as a threatened species in Europe (Swaay & Warren 1999). The butterfly is characterized
by a complex life cycle whereby the early instars of this species first feed on the blossoms
of Sanguisorba oﬃcinalis (Great Burnet). Late instars are carried by ants (e.g. Myr-
mica rubra) into their nests where the larvae actively prey on ant brood. Especially the
blooming of S. oﬃcinalis and therefore the egg deposition and stage of development of the
early instars of M. teleius are determined by the mowing regime (Dierks & Fischer 2009).
Conservation measures for diﬀerent mowing regimes have been applied for the enlargement
and enhancement of M. teleius.
Before turning to the application of our model, we would like to emphasize the limita-
tions with regard to the direct applicability of our analysis for the conservation of Scarce
Large Blue in the Landau region. To obtain eﬀective conservation, many farmers have
to be included in the protection scheme, and external eﬀects of management arise due to
metapopulation dynamics (Drechsler et al. 2007). Thus, the assumption of a single, repre-
sentative farmer is a strong abstraction from reality. It should therefore be kept in mind
that further sophistication of payment schemes may be needed to actually implement the
optimal conservation scheme for butterfly conservation in Landau. Given these caveats, the
quantitative results derived in the following still give some feeling how large the potential
welfare gains of combining performance-based and action-based payments could be.
Environmental benefit y is measured in monetary terms. Wätzold et al. (2008, Table 1)
provide modeling results of how many butterflies can be conserved by applying conserva-
tion measures (alternative mowing regimes) to a certain area of farmland. Specifically, the
authors consider three projects that correspond to 4, 16, and 64 ha on which conservation
measures are applied. The results of a Contingent Valuation study published in Wätzold
et al. (2008, Table 3), indicate societal conservation benefits of approximately 260, 297,
and 426 thousand euros for the three projects. Taking the number of hectares with conser-
vation measures as the farmer’s action x, a simple OLS regression shows that the expected
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marginal productivity of applying conservation measures is  ¯ = 2.74 thousand euros per
hectare51.
According to Drechsler et al. (2007, page 183), the coeﬃcient of variation of marginal
productivity is about   / ¯ = 0.25. Hence,  2  = 0.47. Wätzold et al. (2008) use a linear
cost function with constant marginal costs of 0.123 thousand euros per hectare. However,
Figure 7b in Drechsler et al. (2007) suggests that it is equally plausible to assume an
overall convex cost function. A quadratic cost function with cost parameter c = 0.015
[1000 euros/ha] gives the best fit for the range of hectares (4, 16 and 64) considered by
Wätzold et al. (2008), assuming log-normal errors.
We assume a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for farmers of ⌘ = 0.74, which is consis-
tent with experimental evidence for Western Europeans (Andersen et al. 2008). The mean
income for German farmers in 2011 was 24.6 thousand euros per year. This leads to an
estimate for the degree of absolute risk aversion of about ⌘ = 0.74/24.6 = 0.03/thousand
euros.
Since we have no information on the degree of environmental uncertainty, we vary the
standard deviation of environmental noise,  ". Furthermore, we also vary the regulator’s
coeﬃcient of risk aversion to obtain an insight of how this parameter influences the quan-
titative results. These are shown in Figure 1. The left-hand panel in this figure shows
the optimal performance-based payment, and the right-hand side the optimal action-based
payment as functions of environmental stochasticity  ". In line with Result 2, the optimal
performance-based payment decreases, and the action-based payment increases, with en-
vironmental uncertainty. With a risk-averse regulator (⇢ > 0), the eﬀect corresponds to
Result 4 : With increasing risk aversion, the performance-based fraction of the combined
scheme becomes less attractive for the regulator. The optimal action-based fraction is even
higher than the performance-based fraction under circumstances with low environmental
stochasticity and increases slightly with increasing  " while the performance-based fraction
decreases respectively.
Turning to a risk-neutral regulator again we quantify the overall welfare gains of the dif-
ferent payment schemes for the case of the protection of the Scarce Large Blue (M. teleius)
in Landau. The results shown in Figure 2 correspond to the theoretical findings of Result 1 :
51The estimated equation is y1 = y0 +  x + ✏, which results in the estimates y0 = 250.8 (standard error
2.9) and   = 2.74 (standard error 0.075), with an R2 = 0.999. Allowing for y0 > 0 we assume that
there might be some willingness to pay also when x = 0, and use y = y1   y0 as a measure for the
additional environmental good provided. Thus we interpret the results of the contingent valuation
study diﬀerently than Wätzold et al. (2008), who assume that the estimated willingness to pay must
be zero for x = 0.
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Figure 1: Optimal performance and action-based payments for protection of the Scarce
Large Blue (M. teleius) in Landau, Germany. The model is calibrated using
data from Drechsler et al. (2007) and Wätzold et al. (2008).
For low environmental uncertainty the pure performance-based PES may do substantially
better than the pure action-based PES, while for high environmental uncertainty, the pure
action-based PES would be preferred. However, the combined payment scheme leads al-
ways to a higher welfare than either the pure action-based or the pure performance-based
scheme. The welfare gain of the combined payment over the pure action-based PES de-
creases with environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, the welfare gain of the combined
scheme over the pure performance-based PES is zero in the absence of environmental
uncertainty, in which case the pure performance-based payment is optimal, as shown in
Result 1, but is positive when environmental uncertainty matters. Overall the welfare gain
of the combined scheme over the pure schemes may sum up to several thousand euros per
hectare.
6.5 Conclusion
In the ongoing discussion on new policy instruments for the provision of environmental
goods such as PES, performance-based payments gain significant support. In contrast
to action-based payment schemes, which are bound to a predefined action or measure,
performance-based payments are directly bound to the outcome of the desired environ-
mental good. Even though in the literature performance-based payments occur as the
preferred concept in many ways, examples of action-based payments still predominate in
practical application. Although it is acknowledged that an action-based payment scheme is
not optimal under information asymmetry, a performance-based payment scheme may not
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Figure 2: Welfare gains of combined payment scheme over pure performance-based or pure
action-based payment schemes, and of pure performance-based payment scheme
over pure action-based payment scheme for a risk-neutral regulator (⇢ = 0) aim-
ing to protect the Scarce Large Blue (M. teleius) in Landau, Germany. Data as
in figure 1.
be the preferred option either if the performance is risky. Therefore, in this paper we have
studied how both types of payment schemes could be optimally combined, because typi-
cally both information asymmetry and environmental uncertainty matter in a real-world
context.
Based on a principal-agent model we have shown that an exclusively performance-based
payment is optimal only if there is no environmental uncertainty or if both the farmer
and the regulator are risk-neutral. An exclusively action-based payment is optimal only,
if the regulator has full information about the productivity of the action i.e. if there is
no information asymmetry. In every other case a combination of performance-based and
action-based payments (with diﬀerent weighting) may increase welfare. Accordingly, the
welfare gain of the combined scheme over the pure action-based scheme increases with
information asymmetry, while the welfare gain of the combined scheme over the pure
performance-based scheme increases with environmental uncertainty.
With a risk-averse regulator the situation changes as follows. The regulator is not
directly aﬀected through environmental uncertainty, but indirectly through the farmer’s
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choice of action, since the farmer chooses his actions considering environmental uncertainty.
Under information asymmetry a performance-based payment would amplify the eﬀect of
the regulator’s uncertainty about the action’s productivity compared to the action-based
payment. Thus, for a risk-averse regulator, the performance-based payment tends to pay
out less favorable compared to the action-based payment.
Our quantitative application to the case study of butterfly conservation indicates that
the welfare gain of the combined scheme over the pure action-based or performance-based
schemes may be substantial, reaching several thousand euros per hectare.
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Appendix
Farmer’s optimal choice of action
The first-order condition of maximizing Eq. (9) with respect to x is
(a+ p )  c x = 0. (E.23)
Rearranging leads to Eq. (10).
Assuming that the farmer participates in the PES program, the comparative statics of
the farmer’s optimal action with respect to a, p, c, and   are obtained as follows
@x?
@a
=
1
c
> 0 (E.24)
@x?
@p
=
 
c
> 0 (E.25)
@x?
@c
=  a+ p 
c2
< 0 (E.26)
@x?
@ 
=
p
c
> 0 (E.27)
Optimal payment scheme
Taking expectation over   according to the regulator’s assumed distribution with mean  ¯
and variance  2 , the optimization problem can be written as
max
a,p
⇢
a  ¯+ p ( ¯2 +  2 )
c
  ⇢
2
a2 ( ¯2 +  2 ) + 2 a p ( ¯
3 + 3  ¯  2 ) + p
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4
 )
c2
  a
2 + 2 a p  ¯+ p2  ¯2 + p2  2 
2 c
  ⌘
2
p2  2"
 
. (E.28)
After few steps of simplification, the first-order conditions with respect to a and p can
be written as
c
 
a? +  ¯ p?    ¯ + ⇢  a? ( ¯2 +  2 ) +  ¯ p? ( ¯2 + 3 2 )  = 0 (E.29)
 ¯2 +  2 
c
(1  p?)  a
?  ¯
c
  ⌘ p?  2"
  ⇢ a
? ( ¯3 + 3  ¯  2 ) + p
? ( ¯4 + 6  ¯2  2  + 3 
4
 )
c2
= 0. (E.30)
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Solving for a? and p?, we obtain
a? =
2c ¯3⇢ 2  + c
3⌘ ¯ 2" 
c+  ¯2⇢
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4
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(E.31a)
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The denominator of these expressions is
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Simplifying and dividing by c2 leads to Eq. (17). Plugging into Eqs. (B.31a) and (B.31b)
, we obtain Eqs. (16a) and (16b). (16).
Proof of result 3
Diﬀerentiating Eq. (16b) with respect to ⇢ yields
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Diﬀerentiating Eq. (16b) with respect to ⇢ yields
@a?
@⇢
=
 ¯
c⌦2

2  ¯2  2 
✓
 2  + c ⌘  
2
"
+
⇢
c
 
2 2 
 
 ¯2 + 2 2 
 
+ c ⌘
 
 ¯2 +  2 
 
 2"
 
+
⇢2
c2
 2 
 
 ¯4 + 3 4 
 ◆
 
⇣
c ⌘  2" + 2
⇢
c
 ¯2  2 
⌘ ✓
2 2 
 
 ¯2 + 2 2 
 
+ c ⌘
 
 ¯2 +  2 
 
 2"
+
2 ⇢
c
 2 
 
 ¯4 + 3 4 
 ◆ 
=
 ¯
c⌦2

2  ¯2  2 
✓
 2  + c ⌘  
2
"  
⇢2
c2
 2 
 
 ¯4 + 3 4 
 ◆
  c ⌘  2"
✓
2 2 
 
 ¯2 + 2 2 
 
+ c ⌘
 
 ¯2 +  2 
 
 2" +
2 ⇢
c
 2 
 
 ¯4 + 3 4 
 ◆ 
=
 ¯
c⌦2

2  ¯2  4 
✓
1  ⇢
2
c2
 
 ¯4 + 3 4 
 ◆
  c ⌘  2"
✓
4 4  + c ⌘
 
 ¯2 +  2 
 
 2" +
2 ⇢
c
 2 
 
 ¯4 + 3 4 
 ◆ 
(E.34)
Proof of result 4
Using Eq. (16a) and (16b) in the regulator’s objective function that is given in Eq. (E.28),
we obtain after few steps of rearrangement
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for the combined PES.
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal pure action-based payment would be
a?|p⌘0 =
 ¯
1 + ⇢c ( ¯
2 +  2 )
. (E.36)
Using this, together with p ⌘ 0, in the regulator’s objective function yields a welfare
level of
E [v(y)  !]|p⌘0 =
1
2 c
 ¯2
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2 +  2 )
(E.37)
for the pure action-based PES. Finally, the optimal pure performance-based payment would
be
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With this, the welfare level is
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1
2 c
( ¯2 +  2 )
2
 ¯2 +  2  +
⇢
c ( ¯
4 + 6  ¯2  2  + 3 
4
 ) + c ⌘  
2
"
(E.39)
for the pure performance-based PES.
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Chapter 7
Discussion and Conclusion
Within the research field of environmental and resource economics, resilience is increa-
singly believed to be a key concept for the management of ecological-economic systems.
However in many cases it is not taken into account that the paradigm of resilience as a
descriptive concept is not suﬃcient to provide management directives for these systems.
Policy Instruments such as conservation contracts are a possible management strategy to
incentivize behavior that attempts to maintain or to reach a specific system state which
corresponds to a desired level of ecosystem services. Up to this point characteristics of
systems, such as the level of resilience or the possibility of non-linear reactions, receive no
consideration within the design of conservation policy. As a consequence, the characteri-
stics of ecological-economic systems also receive no consideration for the management of
these systems. This dissertation concluded that these characteristics should be regarded
for contract design to define proper management guidelines.
In the following section the insights of the dissertation thesis are reviewed, contribu-
ting to the overall objective of the dissertation: The design of policy instruments for the
management of ecological-economic systems with respect to system dynamics. In addition
the integration and contribution to the current state of the literature is emphasized. A
second section addresses a critical appraisal of the applied methodology and the choice of
model assumptions. A section proposing and recommending further research completes the
chapter.
7.1 Discussion of results
During the research for the dissertation the paradigm of resilience has been revealed as
applicable and beneficial for the design of conservation contracts and for the definition of
management directives to obtain desired ecosystem services in a number of ways:
Payments, which feature to prevent or achieve a special environmental service, are for
their success heavily dependent on the functioning and interdependencies within ecological-
economic systems, e.g. species interactions, growth rates, the access to resources and consu-
mer preferences for the environmental service. Additional economical influences also change
the stability landscape of the system as shown within the dissertation. Since the perfor-
mance of conservation contracts is heavily dependent on the reaction and feedback of the
underlying ecological-economic system, deep knowledge about system dynamics is import-
ant for the design of policy instruments. However, up to this point system dynamics have
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seldom been connected to the design of conservation contracts and to questions concer-
ning the management of ecological-economic systems, which shall be guided by such policy
instruments.
As argued within the introduction part of the dissertation thesis “Payments for environ-
mental“ or “ecosystem services“ (PES) are a common instrument for the provision of public
goods such as biodiversity. Considering this the dissertation discussed the current state of
the literature regarding the PES approach. A common definition of “Ecosystem services”
is, as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) outlined it, the “[. . .] provisioning ser-
vices such as food and water; regulating services such as regulation of floods, drought, land
degradation, and disease; supporting services such as soil formation and nutrient cycling;
and cultural services such as recreational, spiritual, religious and other nonmaterial be-
nefits” (MA 2005: 27). This is also a definition many authors draw upon to as their key
reference e.g. Corbera et al. (2007), Pascual & Perrings (2007), Engel et al. (2008), Chen
et al. (2009), Carpenter et al. (2009), Norgaard (2010) and Swallow et al. (2009). On the
other hand it was revealed that the term “environmental services” is less clearly defined
and there are barely two authors sharing the same definition. Furthermore some authors
also use environmental services as synonymous to ecosystem services e.g. Myers (1996),
Engel et al. (2008) and the FAO (2012).
As a consequence, the dissertation proposed a consistent meaning for both terms, connec-
ting the definition to management strategies as proposed trough a debate in Germany where
landowners receive money for conducting or omitting a specific land management. Usually
such eﬀorts of landowners are not regarded in definitions of environmental and ecosys-
tem goods or services. In contrast “services” are usually defined as services which humans
receive from nature but not as services by humans.
Therefore in contrast to the current definitions of PES, the dissertation gave center stage
to the actor’s role terminologically, taking the term environmental service as a service by
the landowner who provides an ecosystem service. Since humans can be rewarded for their
actions and services, whereas “nature” cannot, the connotation of “Payments for ecosystem
services” was found to be redundant.
The case study of Namibia’s semi-arid rangelands motivated the further research ap-
proach of the dissertation thesis. This ecological-economic system reveals multiple-stable
states and faces an eventual regime shift and as a consequence the question arose about the
optimal management strategies. The prevailing view in the literature is that a regime shift
from a grass-dominated to a bush dominated system state - or basin of attraction - should
be prevented in semi-arid grasslands (de Klerk 2004, Moleele et al. 2002, Smit 2004 and
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Gil-Romera et al. 2010). Authors have proposed that a given state should be conserved to
meet the needs of the present and future generations (Arrow 1995, Lebel et al. 2006). In
a second step however, and with great implications on upcoming management strategies,
the question arose if an alternative state might be suﬃcient as well.
It became apparent that the crucial assumption in the discussion regarding the resilience
of ecological-economic system so far was that the system has exactly two diﬀerent states:
One which is desirable and one which is not. A system therefore is either in the desired
state of the system and a society has to maintain it or it is not, and, given a high resilience
of the system, society is locked in (e.g. Hanna et al. 1996). It is this scenario which often
leads to the conclusion, that resilience is a precondition for sustainability (which is true,
assuming, that the society is in a desired system state and there is no other state which
fulfils the requirement of sustainability). This is also in line with other sources such as the
shallow lake model (e.g. Scheﬀer 1997, Mäler et al. 2003, Martin 2004) or rangeland models
(e.g. Perrings & Stern 2000, Anderies et al. 2002 and Janssen et al. 2004). In general here
one simple management strategy is that a society might seek to maintain its actual desired
state and prevent a regime shift. Or, in cases of an undesired initial state, tries to reach the
desired state. Here the dissertation reason not much diﬀerent. However, the most authors
do not take into account the following possibilities: i) not only one basin of attraction
might yield the desired level of utility and ii) due to the assumed system properties a
certain, desired amount of natural capital can fall below a given sustainability threshold
even within a basin of attraction.
To study the resilience of ecological-economic systems and the services they provide
an ecological-economic model was designed, which features more than two domains of
attraction. The occurrence of systems with multiple stable states has been widely discussed;
e.g. Petraitis & Dudgeon (2004), Feng et al. (2012) and Nao & Akihiko (2014) and especially
for marine and coral reef ecosystems e.g. Knowlton (2004), Takashina & Mougi (2014) and
Cruz et al. (2014). A connection regarding the relationship to sustainability has not yet
been conducted up to this point. Contributing to this research gap the dissertation analyzed
the relationship of resilience as a property of ecological-economic systems and sustainability
as a normative claim on the basis of an ecological-economic model. As a result in Chapter 4
the insight was revealed that the deduction from sustainability to resilience, or vice versa,
is not possible in general.
This has implications for the management of ecological-economic systems with more than
two domains of attraction, since the claim for resilience of a single state is not decisive for
the management of ecological-economic systems but the properties of the whole system. In
particular: (1) the current state of the system, (2) the domains of attraction of the system,
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(3) the sustainability norm and the associated sustainability set in state space, and (4) the
potential extent of disturbance.
Taking these insights as a basis, the dissertation derived that two following questions
for management advice are possible to decide whether an actual system state should be
prevented or if a system shift can be allowed or should be facilitated:
1. Do any other basins of attraction exist which can provide the desired ecosystem
service in the same quantity?
2. Can the ecosystem service be substituted by another service within another basin of
attraction?
If one question can be answered positively, a system change is possible and in line with
a claim of sustainability of a society. However, the question remains in case of maintaining
the actual state: Does the cost of maintaining outperform the necessary adaptation costs
within a new basin of attraction? If both questions 1) and 2) are answered negatively the
actual system state should be maintained. Clearly these questions are not to be answered
easily but might be leading questions for an application of these theoretical insights within
further research (see Section 7.3, Further Research).
Since the maintenance of a whole ecosystem requires super-ordinated actions in ma-
ny cases, policy instruments might be implemented. As for their success they are heavi-
ly dependent on the reaction and feedback of the ecological-economic system. Therefore
the dissertation studied impacts of external factors which change the stability landscape
of ecological-economic systems. Based on an analytical model it has been derived that
the stability landscape of ecological-economic systems is by no means immutable: People
are aﬀected by changes in ecosystem services, but also do humans modify these services,
the corresponding ecosystem and its dynamic through the decisions they make and the
management actions they take. Thus, the stability landscape of the systems depends on
socio-economical circumstances together, but with distinction to ecological feedbacks. Up
to this point the literature has primarily focused on changes in systems’ stability, which
are initiated by changes of ecosystem interdependencies and biotic factors. There is sub-
stantial debate on the relationship between biodiversity and stability, with a focus on how
biodiversity aﬀects the stability of systems, see e.g. May (1973), Naeem & Li (1997), Til-
man et al. (1998), Tilman & Downing (1994), McCann (2000), Ives & Carpenter (2007),
Scheﬀer (2009) and Naeem et al. (2012), to name a few. Although the discussion is broad
it is generally agreed upon not only that species’ diversity is crucial for system stability
(Naeem et al. 1994), but primarily for their composition and connectivity.
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The relationship between the resilience of a system and its biodiversity is discussed as
another aspect. A higher level of biodiversity is usually thought of as equivalent with higher
resilience (Mageau et al. 1995). Connected to this debate is the theory of the co-evolution of
systems. Norgaard (1994) describes how the change of ecological and social systems can be
understood in their connectivity, and how the change in one system aﬀects other systems
and subsystems. Also Levin et al. (1998) point out that the resilience of a system is aﬀected
by institutional circumstances since: “[. . .] the resilience of social systems in turn depends
on a range of institutional and other properties” (Levin et al. 1998: 221). Another pioneer
of this perspective has been Holling (1978) who emphasizes the impact of feedbacks and
changing dynamics of ecosystems in his approach of “adaptive management”. Here, control
mechanisms and instruments have to be seen as merely part of an experiment and have
to be adjusted necessarily and continuously to meet the properties of the changing system
(Gunderson et al. 1995). The answer to the question of how one might exactly influence
systems stability and make such behavior beneficial for an eﬃcient conservation contracting
requires further research (see Section 7.3, Further Research).
As already discussed instruments such as regulatory or market-oriented measures can be
used to provide ecosystem services by promoting special management strategies - especially
if this is required in terms of the revealed preconditions of Chapter 4. Many advantages and
disadvantages regarding diﬀerent payment schemes and incentives have been suﬃciently
discussed within the literature (Ferraro & Kiss 2002, Matzdorf 2004, Gibbons et al. 2011
and Hampicke 2013). Within the literature those payment schemes are examined primarily
within case studies considering the conservation of single species, such as birds, butter-
flies or considering habitats such as certain types of forests, fens or heath (Wunder 2005,
Pagiola 2008, Asquith et al. 2008, Corbera et al. 2007 and Manzo-Delgado et al. 2014).
Also considerations about policy implications and this new way to incentivize and reward
environmental services are discussed (Engel et al. 2008, Bulte et al. 2008, Clements et al.
2010, Fauzi & Anna 2013, and Greiner & Stanley 2013). General studies at the model and
conceptual level on the other hand are scarce.
As an exception Zabel & Roe (2009) analyzed the concept of performance-based con-
tracts under uncertainty with the help of a principal-agent model. They concluded that
a base-payment is necessary to conduct a performance-based payment under uncertainty.
Although this has been suﬃciently discussed on a theoretical basis (e.g. Hampicke 2006
and Gibbons et al. 2011) this is one of the first examples which considered conservation
contracts on a conceptual level.
The dissertation built on this current state of the literature with an extension of the
model of Zabel & Roe (2009) i.e. with the assumption of information asymmetries between
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principal and agent, environmental uncertainty and a risk-averse regulator. The applied mo-
del originates from the general contract theory of Bolton & Dewatripont (2005) who discuss
several forms of contracting, e.g. with or without uncertainty or information asymmetries
(see Methodological Annex). While Zabel & Roe (2009) examined only a single payment
scheme, i.e., a performance-based payment, the dissertation combined a performance-based
and action based-payment for one payment scheme.
As a result it has been concluded within the dissertation that an exclusively performance-
based payment is optimal only if there is no environmental uncertainty or if both the farmer
and the regulator are risk-neutral. An exclusively action-based payment is optimal only
if the regulator has full information about the productivity of the action i.e. if there is
no information asymmetry. A main contribution of the dissertation was the insight that
in every other case a combination of performance-based and action-based payments (with
diﬀerent weightings) may increase welfare. This also gives way for further management
recommendations, especially with respect to the dynamics of ecological-economic systems
and the desired services derived from these systems.
Taken together, the results of the dissertation lead to the following management impli-
cations: If the conservation objective is dependent on its basin of attraction, as discussed,
it is also dependent on the resilience of that state. High resilience corresponds to low envi-
ronmental uncertainty and it is therefore, taken the other way around, nearly certain that
a system does not flip into another basin of attraction i.e. an undesired stable state.
Since uncertainty matters for the design of conservation contracts the corresponding
resilience of the ecological-economic system also does. With respect to a management
perspective, given an initial state and desirability of a system state, four possibilities arise
for a system with two basins of attraction, each in need of its own management strategy
and contracting:
• Given a first situation a system is in a state of “high” resilience, i.e. it has a low
probability to change into another domain of attraction after a disturbance, and the
given state of the system is supporting the conservation objective. As a consequence,
the uncertainty considering the probability of maintaining an already existent con-
servation objective is low. With low uncertainty of maintaining or achieving the
conservation objective, expected utility respecting the payoﬀ rises, the base payment
decreases. As the relative shares of the conservation contract depend on environmen-
tal uncertainty, with decreasing uncertainty the share of an action-based payment
decreases and the share of the performance-based payment increases.
• Secondly, the situation might occur that a system is within a state of low resilience,
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and the given state of the system is supporting the conservation objective. As a con-
sequence it is unlikely that the existing conservation objective will be maintained.
With high uncertainty of maintaining or achieving the conservation objective, expec-
ted utility respecting the payoﬀ rises, the base payment decreases. As the relative
shares of the conservation contract depend on environmental uncertainty, with incre-
asing uncertainty the share of an action-based payment increases and the share of
the performance-based payment decreases.
• Thirdly, a system might be within a state of high resilience and the given state
of the system does not support the conservation objective. As a consequence it is
almost certain that the desired state cannot be reached. As the relative shares of the
conservation contract depends on environmental uncertainty, the share of an action-
based payment increases and the share of the performance-based payment decreases
in this case.
• In the fourth and final case, a system might be within a state of low resilience, i.e. it
has a high probability to change into another domain of attraction after a disturbance.
The given state of the system does not support the conservation objective. As a
consequence the probability to change the given state of the system and to reach the
desired state of the system is high, uncertainty is low. With increasing certainty the
share of an action-based payment decreases and the share of the performance-based
payment increases for an optimal conservation contract.
Since those connections are not regarded suﬃciently for the design of policy instruments
current conservation contracts might lead to welfare losses.
To sum up the discussion it can be stated: Resilience was identified as a leading criterion
for the design of instruments and the derivation of management strategies featuring eco-
system goods and services, but not as a goal in itself. Ecology relations such as ecological
interdependencies and economic relations such as preferences and management regimes,
change the systems’ stability and therefore the resilience and the corresponding probabili-
ty of a regime shift. Since uncertainty matters for the design of conservation contracts so
does the resilience of the corresponding system state whereby each situation of combined
risk and desirability of the initial state asks for its own management strategy. As this holds
true within a framework for a system with two basins of attraction further research is
needed for cases of systems with multiple stable states (see Further research).
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7.2 A critical appraisal of methods
Some essential insights of the dissertation are derived through analytical models. Within
the general field of analytical modeling the concern is often raised that there is a tendency
to use models as a means of legitimizing rather than informing policy decisions. The sa-
me holds true regarding the subject of ecological-economic models. For example Robinson
states that “[b]y cloaking a policy decision in the ostensibly neutral aura of scientific forecas-
ting, policy makers can deflect attention from the normative nature of that decision [. . .]”
(Robinson 1992: 148). It is needless to say that those tendencies would be diﬃcult to pro-
ve; however this cannot be a general statement on the methodology of ecological-economic
modeling. Instead it should be the responsibility of science and a claim of best practice
to make assumptions explicit and indicate the applicability of the results. In this sense it
should be indicated once more that also within this dissertation the model assumptions
constitute the obtained results.
Complementing the previous chapters of the dissertation the applied methods and model
assumptions are reflected and commented here. The central focus of the dissertation was
neither a methodological discussion nor a qualitative or quantitative inquiry and although
some of the case studies of the thesis comprise empirical considerations and results, the
main research was on a theoretical and conceptual level. Therefore diﬀerent methods and
model types have been used, depending on the research question of each Chapter as intro-
duced in the following. Given the broad range of methods the interdisciplinary character
of the dissertation becomes apparent. For a further detailed explanation of limitations and
assumptions there will be a focus on the applied analytical ecological-economic model and
the principal-agent model.
By means of creating analytical models science aims at simplicity and reduction of the
real world while looking for boundaries that minimize interaction. However as Costanza et
al. (1993) indicate: “The interactions between ecological and economic systems are many
and strong. So, splitting the world into separate systems is a poor choice of boundary”
(Costanza et al. 1993: 545). Thus, the focus within the field of environmental and resource
economics is on investigating the interdependencies of economy and ecology. Therefore
“ecological-economic” models are used here which are characterized through assumptions on
both economic relations e.g. the management regime such as profit-maximizing harvesting
firms, and determinants of the ecosystem such as the intrinsic growth rates of the resources
in question.
Evidently, no model is “right” within an entire range of uses but only in the context of
a specific purpose. Model usefulness might be judged best by its ability to help to solve a
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certain problem, in this case to clarify the relationship between resilience and sustainability
in ecological-economic systems. To address the research question and clarify the argument
of Chapter 4 it was the explicit aim of the model to create a system with the characteristic
of multiple stable states. Therefore model assumptions which feature especially those model
characteristics have been chosen despite other characteristics.
The aim of the analytical ecological-economic model here was to achieve not high rea-
lism or precision but to address basic questions about the functioning of systems with
multiple stable states. Therefore the ecological-economic models of Chapters 4 and 5 can
be characterized as conceptual models, aiming at high generality but less realism or pre-
cision. The relationships of the management regime are simplified and highly stylized by
the assumptions of e.g. open access and without extraction cost, perfect substitutability
of the ecosystem services and where households’ utility only depends on the given goods
and services. Also with Chapter 4 the center of attention was not how the resilience of a
basin of attraction exactly has been or to what extent a system has to be disturbed to
change its basin of attraction. Therefore those parameters have not been quantified within
the model.
As intended, the system featured multiple basins of attraction which enabled a broader
discussion and generated a comprehensive picture of the relationship between resilience of
ecological-economic systems and sustainability. The crucial assumptions for the dynamic of
the system have been that there was no interaction between the natural capital stocks and
that the resources have been compliments. These assumptions have then been widened and
partly relaxed within Chapter 5, to reveal the dependencies of those assumptions and their
impact on systems’ stability. As for the logistic growth function for both biological resources
the crucial property was that the intrinsic growth rate was bounded as the stock declines
to zero. The crucial property for the utility function was the complementarity between
the two ecosystem services and the substitutability of aggregate ecosystem services by
manufactured goods. With a variation of the complementarity assumption the systems’
stability changes, i.e. with complementarity between the ecosystems services the resilience
of the basin of attraction, where both species are in existence, decreases.
Taken together the dynamics of this special model setting have been discussed thorough-
ly. With Chapter 4 general insights about the probabilities of systems with multiple basins
of attraction and its relationship to sustainability have been achieved. With the variation of
the diﬀerent assumptions as debated in Chapter 5 the systems dynamic has been debated
in detail, giving the results a much broader validity.
Despite the assumptions and discussion of well established functions other assumptions
direct the results of the model: The definitions of resilience and sustainability. As for
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resilience, the definition of Holling & Gunderson (2002) on the basis of Holling (1973)
was essential throughout the whole dissertation. For the definition of resilience in Chapter
4, the resilience of a specific basin of attraction could only be declared as resilient ex
post, i.e. after a disturbance took place. If a system remains in its basin of attraction a
system’s state can be declared as resilient, if not, the system has been not resilient due to
this disturbance. However generalized statements for other disturbances are not possible.
With respect to this approach no management advice is possible ex ante, but also not
intended within Chapter 4. Therefore the given definition of resilience served its purpose.
Consequently, for a management perspective within Chapter 5, additional assumptions are
necessary to imply management recommendations and estimate the resilience of a basin of
attraction before a disturbance took place and independent of a specific disturbance. For
this purpose it is necessary to quantify resilience to assess the probability of a given system
state to change into another basin of attraction, a task which is not easily conducted. As
described within the Introduction resilience is not measured directly and quantitatively
here. Instead the resilience of the ecological-economic system is said to decrease as the
distance between corresponding stability basins decreases, which increases the systems’
number of alternative basins of attraction.
The paradigm of resilience was an interesting but intricate research field. Many ideas and
principals are based on mathematical findings which have been adopted to real ecosystems
in retrospect. Diﬀerent definitions of resilience have applications within diﬀerent research
areas. At this point it might be indicated that resilience has been understood as a property
of ecological-economic systems and not, as it might be within other approaches, as a nor-
mative aspect. Therefore for that reason alone it would be not possible to conclude from a
specific characteristic whether it is desirable or not, this would be a natural fallacy. As this
is a classical examination within philosophical theory one can reflect upon the additional
value of an ecological-economic model, but it might be bridging disciplines.
The terms sustainability and sustainable development as used within the dissertation
are closely related to the approach of sustainability based on and in analysis of the concept
of Ott & Döring (2004) and modified for the purpose of the research question. Regarding
the discussion about weak and strong sustainability which the dissertation calls upon, the
model of Chapter 4 “only” assumed weak sustainability. Fulfilling the claim of sustainability
a given level of aggregate wealth or welfare has to be maintained within the model setting, a
claim which is usually associated with weak sustainability. Here, a minimum level of well-
being is sustained for all generations, with ecosystem services and manufactured goods
as substitutes (Asheim & Brekke 2002). “Strong” sustainability however would require
the maintenance of a minimum level of critical natural capital for a future development.
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However, the minimum-level of well being as demanded within the dissertation will be
only achieved if both resources are maintained, since complementarity of the resources has
been assumed. Therefore in this case “weak‘” sustainability comprises the claim for “strong”
sustainability i.e. that critical natural capital has to be maintained.
As to study the design of conservation contracts the dissertation drawed upon the me-
thodology of the so called principal-agent models (see Methodological Annex for further
details). As usual two contract parties have been distinguished for the principal-agent mo-
del in Chapter 6: One principal who oﬀers a contract and one agent, to whom the contract
is oﬀered. As usual the two contract parties have been assumed to be rational individuals
i.e. they estimate the given possible alternatives regarding the highest expected utility and
each aim to achieve the highest possible payoﬀ. Since principal-agent models are quite
common within labor economics or contract design of insurance, contracts for providing
a special ecosystem service have not been studied in such a formal context in the majo-
rity of cases. With the help of contract theory and principal-agent models it was possible
to formalize the relationships and requirements of conservation contracts which have be-
en scarcely addressed on a conceptual level. Since it was first necessary to transfer these
established model types to a context of conservation contracts the model started rather
simply. Therefore many variations and enhancements are possible (see Section 7.3, Further
research).
For a typical conservation contract the agent was assumed to be better informed about
the best action to choose to reach a given conservation objective. Therefore as one core
concept, asymmetric information was assumed within the contract model. Two types of
asymmetric information are usually distinguished, while only the second has been regarded
within the dissertation: First the principal has no perfect knowledge about the characte-
ristics of the agent and secondly the principal is not perfectly informed about the actions
of the agent. Asymmetric information with regard to the type of the agent might lead to
adverse section. This problem is often addressed within a context of insurance contracts
and labor economics (Siemens & Kosfeld 2014, Chiappori & Salanié 2000 and Cohen &
Siegelman 2010) but has not been regarded here; since the agent was assumed to be a re-
presentative farmer i.e. all farmers share the same characteristics. Asymmetric information
regarding the information of the agent might lead to problems of moral hazard if the agent
has diﬀerent objectives than the principal. Thus, to improve eﬃciency the literature has
considered how to deal with cheating by the agent and ensure compliance, so contracts to
fight moral hazard are designed. Some authors discuss windfall eﬀects, arguing that e.g.
actions which already have been performed before the payment took place should not be
rewarded. On the other hand, those payments might ensure that actions which provide a
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certain ecosystem service will also be conducted in the future. Other voices also appreciate
those eﬀects as producer surpluses (Hampicke 2006). However in the dissertations setting it
was not necessary that the agent conducted a certain action but chose the actions himself
and is rewarded afterwards due to expenditures. Therefore compliance has not been con-
sidered. There is another aspect which diﬀerentiates the contract model to other current
approaches: Since the focus was on utility maximization on the part of the principal in
contrast to cost eﬃciency, no budget restrictions have been assumed. For the discussion of
eﬃcient contracting the comprehensive studies of e.g. Drechsler et al. (2007) and Wätzold
et al. (2008) might be recommended.
It was further assumed that the principal has no preferences about a specific action
alternative but is exclusively interested in the outcome i.e. the performance of the conser-
vation objective, which might not reflect reality. Notice also that in case of a risk-averse
regulator this aversion is against fluctuations in environmental goods provision. Thus, his
utility is solely dependent on the performance of the ecosystem state minus the payment
for the agent. Within a first instance only one principal and one landowner have been
assumed for model simplicity acting in a bilateral contracting situation and without other
parties as externalities. An extension of the model setting which considers more than one
farmer or groups of actors will be interesting and is recommended for further research. Also
bargaining was not assumed within the thesis. Another shortcoming of the model is that
the model assumed perfect knowledge of marginal productivity of the conducted action for
the part of the agent. This assumption might be rather strong but simplifies the analysis.
Besides, the crucial aspect of this assumption is that the farmer has better information
about his contribution to the provision of the environmental good, i.e. marginal producti-
vity, than the regulator. Due to environmental uncertainty, incomplete information about
the production is faced by the farmer and the regulator to an equal extent.
As within the literature concerning payments for ecosystem services the best way to
cope with information asymmetries has been found within performance-based payments.
However, as considered within the dissertation, the risk burden of the agent often is opposed
to a pure performance-based payment scheme. As a main achievement and innovation of the
dissertation, a combination of diﬀerent payment schemes was applied. Therefore a model
with both environmental uncertainty for the agent and the principal and, regarding the
principal, hidden information concerning the best possible action of the agent was chosen.
Here a payment scheme was defined which on the one hand pays the agent for the actions
he attended on a basis of his expenses. Additionally to that, a payment on the basis of
the performance was oﬀered. As a third component a base-payment was provided which
compensates the agent’s opportunity cost.
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The implementation of a base-payment has been a much discussed point. In comparison
with the current state of the literature a base-payment is not uncommon. Within their
model Zabel & Roe (2009) assumed that a performance-payment is safeguarded by means
of a base-payment. Otherwise with high uncertainty a contract on a voluntary basis would
obviously be unlikely to be negotiated. Additionally, the combination of performance-based
payments with a base-payment is also well established within practical applications, e.g.
with the well known example of the “Ökoqualitätsverordnung” (ÖQV) in Switzerland.
Within a first attempt for a combination of performance-based and action-based payments
the first idea was to exclude a base-payment, since base-payments bear the suspicion of
ineﬃcient payout and improper welfare gains for the actor (Drechsler et al. 2007 and
Hampicke 2006). There are also other ways to meet the participation constraint of the actor.
One way might be to increase the action-based component of the contract to compensate
for expected losses in the performance-based component. Another possibility might be
to restrict the performance-based payment to be non-negative. However it is plausible to
assume that these assumptions will lead to lower welfare: If the action-based payment
would counterbalance expected losses they induce distortions in the payment structure
since actions might be performed which gain a high payoﬀ but are unrewarding. In addition,
net growth of the environmental good may be negative even with a positive eﬀort, which is
an important impact regarding the assumption of a base payment as discussed below. On
the other hand if performance-based payments are expected to be nonnegative the expected
public expenditures associated with the PES scheme might be unnecessarily high.
Taken together the logic behind the assumption of a base-payment is the following here:
A base-payment was assumed since it increases the flexibility and eﬃciency of the contract
design. However, a base payment might be not necessary. In this case it will be zero. In
every other case it will on the one hand counterbalance welfare gains or on the other
hand compensate for performance losses. Therefore the base payment will be negative or
positive, respectively.
7.3 Further Research
The dissertation is concerned with the management of ecological-economic systems and
the desired ecosystem services they provide. The problem which arises, is as Berkes (2007)
states, that “[. . .] systems are suﬃciently complex that our knowledge of them and, our
ability to predict their future dynamics, will never be complete” (Berkes 2007: 284). The
resilience of a system’s state can be a guideline for the probability of how the system behaves
while facing disturbances and oﬀers significant insights of how environmental uncertainty
can be overcome (Mäler 2008). Ecosystem services depend on such system dynamics thus
145
7 Discussion and Conclusion
their maintenance cannot be treated independently of these. Therefore for the eﬃcient
design of policy instruments such as conservation contracts, it is highly advisable to regard
those dynamics. Although this position has been underlined and made plausible during the
research of the dissertation, some questions remain for further research.
To begin with, the question of how the resilience of a system state should be linked
exactly to the design of conservation contracts is not finally answered. The question is how
the level of resilience aﬀects the choice for an optimal combination of payment schemes.
Some results have been given to this subject within Section 7.2 for a system with two basins
of attraction and with the assumption, that one state of the system is considered to be
desired because of its ecosystem services provision, and one is not. Obviously, for systems
with two basins of attraction with either of the states being desirable or undesirable, there
would be diﬀerent management implications. For the first case with two desirable basins
of attraction, resilience of one state would obviously not be decisive for sustainability
since both cases would be beneficial. However society might decide that one state is more
preferable. Potentially for the latter case in economical terms, the given resources could be
used and exploited, since no desired state can be reached with a management intervention.
However, the interesting point for further research will be to broaden the previous as-
sumptions and consider systems with multiple stable states. Drawing on the insights of
Chapters 4 and 5 of the dissertation, the question arises which consequences occur if more
than one desired state of a system is possible i.e. a system with more than one basin of
attraction which supports the conservation objective. Obviously management advice here
would also be based upon the knowledge of the probability that a system would flip into
another desired basin of attraction, or, with a higher probability, would flip into an unde-
sired state. Also here it would be necessary to take more than just the knowledge about
the actual given system state into account and management advice has to be based on the
knowledge about the system as a whole.
Regarding the design of conservation contracts, many extensions would be interesting.
Within the model of Chapter 6 perfect knowledge of the actions’ impact was assumed. As a
modification it would be interesting to design a model with imperfect knowledge about the
marginal productivity of actions. Furthermore a contract could be designed with more than
one time period. In this case the actor would have the chance to learn how his management
actions influence and direct the conservation objective. Thus, the increase (and decrease)
of a conservation objective within a first period gives a hint for further necessary actions
and reduces uncertainty, in the case of imperfect knowledge.
Another extension concerns the possible negotiation of contracts. Up to this point a
contract on a take-it or leave basis which is oﬀered by the principal was assumed. Bargaining
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might be a possible and interesting option if a specific area has to be involved to reach a
conservation objective and a principal might not be sure about the oﬀer he has to make.
Also, up to this point only one actor and one principal have been assumed as a necessary
simplification to gain basic insights of the main driving forces of the model. Naturally it
would be interesting and necessary to conceptualize a framework of contract designs with
more than one agent, as it is widely done in the field of network analysis. Here first of
all the interdependencies between single actors or groups are analyzed. Also the spatial
dimension in compensation schemes, particularly of mobile ecosystem goods such as birds
or butterflies, have been widely discussed e.g. based on the idea of an agglomeration bonus
where land-owners only receive payments if managed patches are arranged in a specific
spatial configuration (Drechsler et al. 2007 and Wätzold et al. 2008). However a study
which discusses group behavior regarding the specific dynamics of the relevant ecological-
economic system has not yet been conducted. Also, assuming a contract with bargaining, an
agent could negotiate new and adjusted contract contents based on the gained insights for
a second period. With these insights adjustments concerning environmental uncertainty
and feedbacks of the ecosystem would be possible and might be regarded within a new
contract design.
If more than one actor is assumed, the field of auctions for conservation contracts gains
high importance. While auction and auction theory is a renowned and well explored field
of research, some aspects regarding conservation contracts remain for further investigation.
First of all within auction theory it is usually assumed that the bidder has perfect informa-
tion about their costs and can therefore align his bid in an appropriate way. However the
costs of maintaining or enhancing a conservation objective are usually uncertain given the
assumption of imperfect knowledge about marginal productivity. An interesting research
question for auction theory will be to analyze how this uncertainty influences the bidding
behavior of the landowners: On the one hand they might choose to submit a lower bid to
be awarded the contract; on the other hand uncertainty about the production costs will
promote higher bid submission.
In addition to this, a last research recommendation regards the insight that a manage-
ment regime significantly changes the system’s resilience. Here the question remains: How
to influence a system in a way such that a state which is desired, and at the same time
resilient, could be reached or maintained in the long run? For this purpose the model of
Chapter 6 might be adjusted and extended by considering that the agent’s expected utility
changes with respect to the resilience of the system and the desired conservation objective.
As for the production function an interesting adjustment might be that the conservation
objective would be directly dependent on the system’s resilience, which then aﬀects the
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actor’s expected utility and therefore her behavior and choices.
Furthermore, it might be interesting to transfer and apply the obtained model results
of Chapter 6 and its extensions to a real landscape and research area. However this will
probably require long term studies and monitoring of both ecological development and
management of the ecological-economic system, followed by a comparison between systems
with diﬀerent stability landscapes. This last research question is likely to be the most
extensive and eventually the most important, and will be suﬃcient to provide interesting
research work and decisive implications for the design of conservation contracts and the
management of ecological-economic systems for a long time to come.
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Chapter 8
Methodological Annex - Contract Theory
8.1 Introduction
For more than three decades the theory of contracts and incentives has received
vast attention within labor economics, organization theory, and corporate finance.
In 1973 Ross introduced the study of agency in terms of problems of compensation
contracting. Here, in essence, agency was seen as an incentive problem originating in
society and not, as the existing stream of research considered, as a merely theory of
the firm (e.g. Williamson 1964, Alchian & Demsetz 1972). Simultaneously Mitnick
(1975) introduced the insight that institutions form around agency, originating the
institutional theory of agency. Today, the most applied principal-agent models and
the contract theory provide “[. . . ] a rich research basis for selecting an appropriate
contractual form, with an emphasis on the eﬀects of uncertainty and asymmetric in-
formation” as Hooper (2008) points out. The assumption of information asymmetries
as an extension and improvement of general equilibrium models has been crucial for
the emergence of the principle-agent theory and the economics of contracts, as Salanié
(1997: 2) indicates: “It is fairly straightforward to extend the general equilibrium
model to cover uncertainty as long as information stays symmetric. Unfortunately,
asymmetries of information are pervasive in economic relationships [. . . ]. The theory
of contracts originates in these failures of general equilibrium theory”.
As explained within Chapter 7, a principal-agent model was chosen to investigate
general mechanisms of contract relations between principal and agent. This course
of action was chosen based on the insight, that contracts plays a major not only
within firms and employment relationships but also considering policy instruments
regarding the provision of ecosystem services. Due to spatial limitations it has not
been possible within each Chapter to go into detail for all applied model types and
methodology. Therefore additional information is provided here for the broad field
of contract theory with a special emphasis on principal-agent models.
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8.2 Theoretical background and some basic models
The fundamental activity of every production or allocation process in economics is
the exchange of goods and services. As Ross (1973: 134) noted “agency relationship
has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts
for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a
particular domain of decision problems [. . . ]”.
The starting point of incentive theory therefore corresponds to the problem of
delegating a task to an agent with private information. This raises the problem
of managing information flows. As Arrow (1964) points out, the agent has been
selected for his better knowledge concerning a task and the principal can never hope
to completely check the agent’s performance. Incentive theory considers when this
private information is a problem for the principal.
The theory of incentives and contracts emerges with the exchange of labor for
money, and questions about their optimal allocation. A classic example of Microe-
conomic Theory for a simple exchange situation is the well known “Edgeworth box”:
Two actors trade two commodities in a given place and point in time. The idea of
“state-contingent” commodities, where the output is dependent on a specific, future
state (Arrow 1964 and Debreu 1959), together with the formulation of a theory of
“choice under uncertainty” by Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), has enabled more
complex exchange situations to be considered, such as trading in diﬀerent points in
time and risk sharing of default and non-delivery.
In general, contract theory and incentive theory can also be addresses as a branch
of game theory (Salanié 1997). However, the distribution of information is diﬀerent in
contrast to most games: In the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma for example, each actor
know as much or as little as the other. On the other hand, a main assumption within
principal-agent models is the lack of information on one side about the character or
action while this information is crucial for the contracts’ outcome.
Principal-agent games can therefore be understood as a special kind of game,
assuming one informed and one uninformed party. This disequilibrium of informa-
tion endowment is mostly described as information asymmetry (see e.g. Salanié
1997). Considering this, in general two forms of information asymmetry can be
distinguished:
1. lack of knowledge concerning the type of agent and
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2. lack of knowledge concerning the performed actions of the agent.
For the first problem, models of “adverse selection” have emerged, discussing sev-
eral forms of best practice, eﬃcient contracting and strategies of how to reveal the
agents’ type. Here, within so called “signaling games”, the revealed preferences of an
agent are interpreted as “signals” to detect her actual type. Within the second group
of contract games, where the actions of the agent are not fully known, contracts
of “hidden action” are concerned with the problem of “moral hazard” as described
below.
To further this basic diﬀerentiation, models of contract theory can be expanded
in several dimensions: Regarding the related research question, they can be static or
dynamic, complete or incomplete, with hidden information or hidden actions, with
and without uncertainty, containing two or more agents or parties, and with bilateral
or multilateral contracting52. To outline the basic ideas of contract theory and
principal-agent models, the description has been limited here to a basic model, first
without moral hazard followed by an example of adverse selection and an extension
of the hidden action problem as applied within the dissertation.
A basic example of optimal contracting
A basic bilateral contract model without uncertainty and moral hazard usually as-
sumes the following situation: An informed party meets an uninformed party whose
information is relevant to them. A contract is negotiated either with bargaining or
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The so called principal-agent models usually assume
the latter, given the bargaining power to one party. The principal, usually the un-
informed party, oﬀers the contract to an agent. Interaction would stop if the agent
rejects the oﬀered contract.
As an example, a standard situation might be a contracting problem between an
employer as principal and an employee as an agent. The employee has an initial
amount of time which she can either keep for herself or oﬀer to sell to perform a
specific task53. The employer on the other hand needs some labor to be conducted
52Further information about this branch of research gives Salanié (1997), Laﬀont & Martimort
(2002) and Bolton & Dewatripont (2005).
53Within principal-agent models and contract theory the agent is usually denoted as “she” whereas
a principal is denoted as “he”.
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and might do this by himself or oﬀer others money and thereby delegate his task.
So in the initial case and without trade or contracting, the agent has all the time t,
whereas the principal has all the money q. This initial endowment can be denoted
as (t1, q1) = (0, 1) for the principal and (t2, q2) = (1, 0) for the agent. Therefore the
corresponding utility functions of principal and agent can be denoted as U(t, q) and
u(t, q), with utility level U¯ = U(0, 1) and u¯ = u(1, 0) without trade.
If the employer can make productive use of the agent’s time he might oﬀer a
contract. This is the case if both the utility function of the agent and the principal are
strictly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave. In this case principal and
agent might increase their joint payoﬀ by exchanging time for money. The question
which arises therefore concerns the optimal rate of exchange between money and
time. This leads to the following maximization problem:
max
ti,qi
U(t1, q1) + µu(t2, q2) subject to (1)
t1 + t2 = 1 and
q1 + q2 = 1 ,
since time and money are limited. Here, µ corresponds to the bargaining power
of each individual as well as their reservation utility, ti as the actual time consumed
and qi as the amount of output after trade, respectively. It follows that, without fur-
ther assumptions joint surpluses are maximized if the marginal rates of substitution
between money and time are equalized:
Ut
Uq
=
ut
uq
.
Obviously, there are gains from trade as long as
Ut
Uq
>
ut
uq
.
Therefore principal and agent will trade until their utility level without trade
becomes more equal. However, assuming, that the principal oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-
it contract, as common within principal-agent models, bargaining is not a part of the
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game. Since the principal has a strong interest in the agent signing the contract, he
has to match at least the agent’s utility constraint with his contract oﬀer such as:
Maximization problem of the principal:
max
t1,q1
U(t1, q1) subject to (2)
u(1  t1, 1  q1)   u¯.
Assuming, that the agent will sign the contract and the principal has full knowl-
edge about his utility constraint and the agent’s actions, i.e. he can observe all
actions or all outcomes, and the outcome directly represents the agent’s action, the
contract is optimal. Since the principal might now know the agent’s utility constraint
exactly, the contracts which are oﬀered might not be eﬃcient. For the possibility to
reveal the agent’s utility constraint, a framework of auctions for conservation con-
tracts might be applicable (see e.g. Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi (2005, 2007) for a
detailed discussion of conservation contract auctions). This revelation principle is
also decisive for contracting under asymmetric information of all kinds: However, it
is not necessary to know the exact type of the agent but to make sure that an agent
of a specific type "has an incentive to select only the contract that is destined to
him/her" (Bolton & Dewatripont 2005: 16). In this sense first contracts of adverse
selection are considered in the following sections.
A simple model with adverse selection
Bolton & Dewatripont (2005) consider contracts where the hidden information is the
working skills of a prospective future employee, hereafter called agent for simplicity.
The skills of the agent might not be known at the time of contracting to the principal.
Therefore there might be two types of agents: One who is highly skilled, with a valued
time of  H and one who is lowly skilled, with a value time hereafter denoted  L, with
a value of time  L <  H . The employee knows whether she is skilled or unskilled
whereas the principal only knows a probability facing a skilled employee of pH . The
principal now has to make sure that his oﬀered contract is incentive compatible,
i.e. each agent picks the contract which is suitable for her. Therefore in general,
principal-agent models with imperfect knowledge can be described as a “Stackelberg”
game where the principal moves first, but chooses his oﬀer with anticipation to the
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agent’s expected response54.
Let’s assume on the basis of the basic contracting model that the agent’s utility
function is u( t+ q) and the principal’s utility function is U [  (1  t)],
• with (1   t) as the time sold to the principal, and t as the time she keeps for
herself.
• q as the output received
•   as a positive constant; and
•   as the skill level of the agent.
For incentive compatibility of an oﬀered contract, the contracts have to be designed,
such that type  H must prefer a contract (qH , tH) over (qL, tL) and type L a contract
(qL, tL) over (qH , tH). An optimal menu of contracts under hidden information then
can be found by:
max
tj ,qj
pLU [  L(1  tL)  qL] + pHU [  H(1  tH)  qH ] (3)
subject tou(tL L + qL)   u( L) and
u(tH H + qH)   u( H).
Also, two incentive constraints have to be added:
u(tH H + qH)   u(tL H + qL) and (4)
u(tL L + qL)   u(tH L + qH). (5)
In general, contracts under incentive constraints will be second-best contracts,
which do not achieve optimal allocative and distributive eﬃciency. The trade of
between the extraction of information and an eﬃcient allocation is therefore much
discussed (Bolton & Dewatripont 2005).
54 Stackelberg games denote models of imperfect competition based on a non-cooperative game
strategy (Stackelberg 1934).
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A model with moral hazard
Turning now to the case that information asymmetry is present, i.e. that the principal
is not fully informed about the agent’s actions. In the former section information
asymmetry arises before the contract was signed, i.e. the type of the agent was
not revealed. In this instance information asymmetry arises after the contract was
signed, by the action the agent chooses.
In this setting moral hazard of the agent might occur, since the principal might not
be able to observe all the actions of the agent, or observation is too costly. If he can
observe the outcome then the case might be interpreted that the outcome represents
with some probability the agent’s action. A contract therefore can be described as a
contract under “hidden action” or “hidden information”. Note, however, that in such
settings it is implicitly assumed, that the principal knows about the best possible
action the agent should perform. However, the diﬃculty arises in monitoring the
act that the agent chooses, especially if agents are numerous. This problem was
examined by Spence & Zeckhauser (1971) in the case of insurance. While it might
be principally possible to observe all the agent’s actions it would not be economically
viable to do so (Ross 1973). Therefore within a first line of research regarding this
contract setting, the question is how moral hazard can be eliminated or at least
reduced by choosing the “right” incentives and contract settings.
To introduce hidden information assume that the amount of time (1   t), which
the agent works is her private information. Then the output for the employer is  ,
with a probability function p(1 t) increasing in 1 t, given that the amount of work
is positively correlated with the amount of output given the probability  . However,
“nature” can be good or bad, such that the outcome of the work is state-contingent,
i.e. if “nature” is positive, say work creates the output  H , whereas if a “bad nature”
occurs, output only increases to  L.55 Thus a probability function denoting the
outcome might be:
pH [1  t] for a “good nature” or as within the former example for a highly skilled
agent, and pL[1  t] = 1  pH [1  t] in case of a “bad nature” or lowly skilled agent.
Since eﬀort is not observable the contract payoﬀmight be dependent on the realized
outcome  j . Since the principal must expect that (1  t) will be chosen by the agent
55Note that if output might rise deterministically with eﬀort, the unobservability of eﬀort would
not matter.
161
8 Methodological Annex - Contract Theory
as to maximize her expected payoﬀ under the outcome-contingent payment scheme,
the principal has to make sure that it is the agent’s best interest to supply the right
level of working time (1  t). Therefore the principal must not only take into account
the agent’s rationality constraint but also her incentive constraint.
The agent’s optimizations problem:
(1  t) 2 max
l˜
pL[1  t]u[q( L) + t] + pH [1  t]u[q( H) + t]. (6)
The principal optimization problem:
max
q( i)
{pL[1  t]U [ L   t[ L] + pH [1  t]U [ H   q( H)]]} subject to (7)
pL[1  t]u[q( L) + t)] + pH [1  t]u[q( H) + t]   u¯ = u(1) and
(1  t) 2 max
l˜
{pL[1  t]u[q( L] + t] + pH [1  t] + u[q( H) + t]}.
The compensation scheme typically will comprise a loss since the outcome is only
a noisy signal of the agent’s eﬀort. Since eﬀort is costly and the outcome is unpre-
dictable, the principal has to insure the agent for her eﬀort and the tradeoﬀ between
incentivizing a certain action and insuring against uncertainty remains. In general,
the characterization of optimal contracts in the context of moral hazard is still limited
(Bolton & Dewatripont 2005).
An assumption which makes the solution much simpler would be to assume a risk-
neutral agent, where the agent bears all the risk of the expected outcome. However
in most cases a common assumption is a risk-neutral principal. Here, the common
explanation is that he is not dependent on the relationship to the agent and that
he can diversify his risks. As for the agent on the other hand, it is more diﬃcult
to diversify her risks; therefore the usual assumption is risk-aversion on behalf of
the agent. As within the chosen principal-agent model of the dissertation, in a first
instance the agent was assumed as risk-averse, the principal as risk-neutral. In a
second instance both principal and agent have been assumed to be risk-averse. For a
risk-averse agent the situation becomes more complicated: Very few general results
can be derived about the form of optimal contracting with moral hazard and each
asks for more special assumptions. A common, applicable assumption is for one,
that it might be assumed that only two outcome states would be possible, or that
the performance is normally distributed together with constant absolute risk-averse
preferences for the agent and a linear incentive contract.
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8.3 Multi-agent games and the problem of contract enforcement
The consideration of multi-agent games and interactions between larger groups of
actors is another main focus of game theory and the economics of contracts (Demski
& Sappington 1984). As already indicated, this topic, in its simplest form, is related
to the model family of adverse selection with multiple but heterogeneous actors. Of
course, multi-agent contracts can be also studied as repeated (Abreu et al. 1991)
and/or dynamic games (Laﬀont & Tirole 1988), or e.g. with intertemporal incentives
(Holmström & Milgrom 1987), leading to an even more complex contract setting.
Also, in relation to the field of multi-agent games, one might referred to the broad
field of auction theory, as already mentioned56. In a nutshell, auction theory aims
to search for the best suitable agent for a specific task, as the agent reveals her
characteristics through her bidding.
Further on, if contracts are not negotiated between an institution and a single
actor but between many actors, other research branches come into focus, namely the
huge research field of Agent-Based Modeling (ABM)57 and Social Network Analysis,
starting e.g. with Kent (1978) and proceeding till today to e.g. Jackson & van den
Nouweland (2002) and Jackson (2008)58. Contract relationships here are not only in-
vestigated regarding the strategies and actions between actors but also between actor
groups and institutions. In general, ABMs and Social Network analysis often focus
on the dynamics of a specific behavior (Epstein & Axtell 1996). Here, equilibria may
be diﬃcult to find or may not exist at all, and outcomes may be complex. However,
there might still be patterns of behavior which agents may follow for optimization.
Those rules can be searched for and tested empirically (Laver & Sergenti 2011).
As a final remark, it might be noted that contracts, as regarded within the thesis,
are assumed to be complete and automatically enforced by a legal system, which
is obviously not always given in reality. The enforcement and control of contracts
relates to the field of Economic Governance, which recently was mostly coined by
56see e.g. Vickrey (1961), Milgrom & Weber (1982), Bulow & Roberts (1989), Milgrom (2004) for
technical introductions, Maskin & Riley (2000) for asymmetric auctions, and Klemperer (2002)
for the eﬃciency of auctions design.
57For a comprehensive introduction to Computational Sociology and Agent-Based Modeling see
e.g. Macy & Willer (2002) and de Marchi & Page (2014).
58For a comprehensive introduction to Social Network Analysis see Wassermann & Faust (1994).
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Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Wiliamson who shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Eco-
nomic Sciences in 2009. Wiliamson is mostly concerned with the theory of the firm
and internal enforcements and relationships within a firms’ environment (Wiliamson
1985, 1988, 2000), whereas Ostroms’ main field of interest is the study of the man-
agement of common pool resources and collective action (Ostrom 1990, 1999, 2000,
2005). Both are interested in the contracts’ “environment”, i.e. under which cir-
cumstances and institutional settings contract enforcements and negotiations fail or
work out (see also e.g. Milgrom et al. (1990), Aghion & Tirole (1997) or Dixit (1996,
2009)).
Taken as a whole, all this can be only a brief glimpse into the broad field of
contract theory and the related fields of research, to which the thesis added a small
epistemological gain regarding selected assumptions.
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